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ARTICLES
The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas
Review Reconsidered
Clarke D. Forsythe'

[A] proper determination of the Great Writ's future
requires an accurate understanding of its past.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

History continues to be a defining factor in the Supreme
Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. Although the modem doctrine of federal habeas as a post-conviction remedy bears little
likeness to its common law function, Supreme Court Justices repeatedly extol the history of the writ in applying it.2 However, a
growing criticism of expansive habeas jurisdiction among some
Justices has fostered a continuing examination of the history of
habeas corpus and of the 190 years of Supreme Court habeas
jurisprudence. Justices Brennan and Harlan debated the common
law background and legislative purpose of the 1867 Act in Fay v.
Noia' Justice Powell reviewed the historical function of habeas in
* B.A., Allegheny College, 1980; J.D., Valparaiso University, 1983. 1 am grateful to
Richard and Imogene Forsythe for a gift that allowed me to complete this article; to
Gerry Bradley, Mary Ann Glendon, Michael Paulsen, and Kent Scheidegger for comments
on an earlier draft; to Miranda Perry (J.D., University of Chicago, 1996) for her helpful
research assistance; to Virginia Reuter for word processing assistance; to Michael Brown
and the D'Angelo Law Library at the University of Chicago for providing quiet space to
research and write; and to my wife, Karen, for her patience throughout the research and
writing of this article.
1 James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas
Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1997, 1999 (1992).
2 See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 541 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
126 (1982); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 544 (1976); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
401-02 (1963); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 188 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("the
writ's historic purpose"); see also Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280, 1294 & n.6
(9th Cir.) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (invoking the history of the writ), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
3 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,4 Rose v. Mitchell,5 and Kuhlmann v. Wilson.6 Justice Scalia surveyed the history of Supreme Court habeas
doctrine in Withrow v. Williams.7 Justice Kennedy summarized the

evolution of federal habeas for state prisoners in McCleskey v.
Zant' Justices Thomas and O'Connor sparred over the history of
the federal court's standard of review for mixed questions of fact
and law in Wright v. West.9 Last Term, in Heck v. Humphrey,"0 the
intersection between section 1983 and the federal habeas statutes
was revisited. In the 1994-95 Term, the Court will hear at least
three habeas cases, and historical analyses are sure to influence
the Court's consideration." Clearly, history continues to shape
the Court's habeas jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, the writ's arcane Latin phraseology obscures its
historic purpose. A writ of habeas corpus is a civil procedure,
directed to a law enforcement authority, to contest "the legality of
the detention of one in the custody of another.""3 The writ is
deeply based in the English comnion law, dating back at least to
the thirteenth century. It was first referred to as the "great writ"
by Chief Justice Marshall in Ex parte Bollman, 4 because of its
function in preserving freedom against illegal custody of the innocent. Its essential purpose was to liberate those "imprisoned without sufficient cause." Although the United States Constitution

4 412 U.S. 218, 254 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
5 443 U.S. 545, 580-82 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
6 477 U.s. 436, 445-48 (1986).
7 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
8 499 U.s. 467 (1991).
9 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992). For one perspective on this debate, see Liebman, supra
note 1.
10 114 S. CL 2364, 2374 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
11 Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995) (holding that actual innocence exception
for a successive or abusive petition is governed by colorable showing of innocence standard and not by more stringent clear and convincing evidence standard); O'Neal v.
McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995) (holding that federal habeas court which finds constitutional error in state court criminal judgment, and is in "grave doubt" about whether
the error was "harmless," should treat error as if it affected the verdict); Kyles v. Whitley,
5 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
granted, 114 S. Ct. 1610 (1994) (No. 93-7927).
12 Habeas corpus is a latin phrase meaning "[y]ou have the body." BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990).
13 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934), overruled on other grounds, Peyton v.
Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) ("It is
clear . . . from the common-law history of the writ, that the essence of habeas corpus is
an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.").
14 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 96 (1807).
15 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830); see also BARBARA J. SHAPIRO,
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restricts the ability of Congress to suspend the availability of the
writ,'" habeas corpus has never been held to be a constitutional
right. 7 It is essentially a matter of federal statutory law in its
practical implementation. In the original Judiciary Act of 1789,
Congress made habeas corpus in federal court available to federal
prisoners only.' Not until 1867 did Congress allow state prisoners
to seek habeas corpus in federal court. The Act of 1867 has been
amended only occasionally, most notably in 1948"s and in
1966.20

"BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": HISTORICAL PERSPECriVES ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 131, 133 (1991)
(citing WILLIAM LAMBARDE,
EIRENARCHA, OR OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 93 (1614 ed.) and WILLIAM SHEPPARD, AN EPITOME OF ALL THE COMMON AND STATUTE LAw (1659) on the
function of habeas corpus).
16 "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, §
9, cl. 2.
17 See Habeas Corpus Reform, Hearings on S. 88, S. 1757 and S. 1760 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciay, 101st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 11 n.2 (1989 & 1990) [hereinafter
1989-90 Senate Habeas Hearings) (Testimony of Lewis F. Powell).
This is also implied by the Court's holding in Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853
(1993), that there is no constitutional right to a judicial determination of "actual innocence" via habeas corpus.
18
And be it further enacted, That all the before-mentioned courts of the United
States, shall have power to issue writs of scire fadas, habeas corpus, [] and all
other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the
exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law. And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as wel as
judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for
the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.-Prvided, That writs
of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they
are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are
committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be
brought into court to testify.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82; see Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
75 (1807); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 448-49 (1806); United State v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795).
19 Ch. 646, 62 Star. 964 (1948). In 1948, Congress codified the exhaustion of state
remedies requirement from Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), and Ex parte Hawk, 321
U.S. 114 (1944), in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16
(1982).
20 Pub. L. No. 89-590, 80 Stat. 811 (1966); Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105 (1966).
The current principal statutes-28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2244 and 2254-authorize the
grant of the writ by federal courts for state prisoners within broad and ambiguous limits.
Consolidating three sections of the earlier code, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 authorizes the grant of
the writ when the prisoner "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3) (1988). Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a),
descending from the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act, grants broad habeas jurisdiction for a

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:5

At least two contrasting views of the proper function of federal habeas corpus have predominated in Supreme Court opinions
and scholarly commentary over the past forty years. One view is
that the proper function of the writ is limited to testing the lawfulness of a prisoner's confinement where state procedural remedies are either unavailable or violate basic notions of due process.
In this view, state interests in finality, in the criminal justice process, and in federalism must be weighed against interests in affording state prisoners federal oversight of state proceedings. A second
view is based on an expansive reading of common law history, of
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and of Supreme Court precedent.
Habeas corpus is viewed as a federal safeguard supplementing
both state appeal and collateral relief. As such, it can be used by
any prisoner to fully relitigate any constitutional right that may
have been violated at any stage of the state criminal justice process-investigation, arrest, indictment, conviction, or sentencing-regardless of whether any violations relate to guilt determination or whether the prisoner has had a full and fair opportunity
21
to litigate these claims in state court.

state prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States."
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or
the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the
right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1988).
21 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 518 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("settled
principle that federal habeas relief is available to redress any denial of asserted constitutional rights, whether or not denial of the right affected the truth or fairness of the
factfinding process.") (emphasis in original); Liebman, supra note 1, at 2012 (habeas
should "function as a substitute for the review the petitioner would have received had
the Supreme Court the resources to review the case."); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal
Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579, 690-91 (1982) (federal habeas
corpus should be available "for all constitutional claims regardless of the extent of prior
state court litigation."); Curtis R. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1315, 1316 (1961) ("It is a fundamental purpose of the
habeas corpus jurisdiction to secure the federal rights of state prisoners through an independent proceeding in a federal forum. Even when the highest state court has ruled on
the merits of the federal questions, principles of res judicata do not bar this further
litigation.").
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Supreme Court justices have articulated variations on these
two themes. Justice Harlan would have limited habeas to cases
where a state prisoner had been denied a "full and fair opportunity" in the state court to raise his constitutional claims.22 Justice
Powell considered the modem expansion of federal habeas jurisdiction to be unjustified, but would have made it available for
"redressing an unjust incarceration."' Justice O'Connor considers
"finality, federalism and fairness" to be the touchstones of habeas
jurisprudence.24 Like Justice Harlan, Justices Scalia and Thomas
would limit all federal habeas review for state prisoners to federal
constitutional claims according to the rule of Stone v. PowelF and
dismiss federal habeas claims where there had been a "full and
fair adjudication" of the prisoner's claims in the state courts.
Justice Brennan, author of the Court's opinion in Fay v. Noia,
espoused a full relitigation position.
Although this continuing turmoil is due to several factors, one
key factor is a continuing debate over the writ's history-in particular, the historical scope of habeas corpus at common law, the
historical purposes of the Reconstruction Congress in enacting the
1867 Habeas Corpus Act, and the historical boundaries of the
Court's habeas jurisprudence which has evolved over the last century. Professor Paul Bator's landmark 1963 article largely determined the boundaries of the modem debate over the appropriate
role of federal habeas corpus by directly challenging the Court's
decisions in Brown v. Allen and Fay v. Noia and the modem expansion of federal habeas.' Since then, Bator's work has been supported or challenged by important historical studies by Professors
Gary Peller, William Duker, James Liebman, and Ann
Woolhandler, but these have not yet brought definitive resolution
to the debate. 28 This is evident from the conflicting opinions of

22 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Desist v.
United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harlan, J.,dissenting); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1973).
24 Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1756 (1993) ("finality, federalism, and fairness" are "the principles that inform our habeas jurisprudence"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) ("fundamental fairness is the central concern of the writ
of habeas corpus"); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982).
25 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
26 Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1765-69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
27 Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L REV. 441 (1963).
28 WILLIAM DuKER,A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980); Liebman,
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the Justices in Wright v. West.'
This Article reassesses the common law history, the interpretation of the text of the 1867 Act, the historical circumstances that
gave rise to the 1867 Act, and the evolution of the Court's interpretation of the 1867 Act until 1953 when the Court issued its
landmark' decision in Brown v. Allen, significantly expanding the
availability of federal habeas for state prisoners.' With the assistance of new evidence of the purposes of Congress in enacting
both the 1867 Act and the Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction Act of
1885, and closer examination of the contemporary analyses of the
Court's habeas jurisdiction doctrine, this Article endeavors to synthesize the historical studies and resolve points of disagreement to
provide a firmer basis for continuing legal analysis as the Court's
habeas jurisprudence evolves and Congress addresses habeas corpus reform.
II. THE

SCOPE AND FUNCTION OF

HABEAS CORPUS IN ENGLISH LAW

In construing and applying statutes, judges must necessarily
resort to history because the legislature's purpose is set in history.
Determining and applying that purpose is the ultimate end of
judicial decisionmaking because the legislature as a body is constitutionally endowed with the political authority to make law."1 The

supra note 1; Peller, supra note 21; Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 575 (1993).
29 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
30 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
31 See, e.g., Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 192 (1990)("Just as 'we are not at
liberty to seek ingenious analytical instruments' to avoid giving a congressional enactment
the broad scope its language and origins may require ....
so too are we not at liberty
to recast this statute to expand its application beyond the limited reach Congress gave
it.") (quoting Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432 (1973)); HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) ("[R]ewriting . . . is a job for Congress, if
it is so inclined, and not for this Court."); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S.
504, 508 (1989) ("Our task in deciding this case, however, is not to fashion the rule we
deem desirable but to identify the rule that Congress fashioned."); Commissioner v.
Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984) ("Our duty then is 'to find that interpretation which
can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested.'")
(quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957)); Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of
a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process
of interpreting a statute."); Braden v. 39th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 509-10
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The result reached today may be desirable from the
point of view of sound judicial administration . . . . It is the function of this Court,
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member's, sponsor's, or committee's purpose is relevant
only inso32
far as each accurately reflects the legislature's purpose.
This does not mean that defining the legislative purpose is
simple, and the Supreme Court's historical analysis and conclusions, in both constitutional and statutory construction, have been
often subject to withering criticism. 3 The Court has been on
weakest ground when it has resorted to general history to construe
the Constitution or Congressional legislation.' The Court has
sometimes failed to determine if, or explain why, the general
history accurately and authoritatively reflects the legislature's purpose.
Nevertheless, the rules for accurately and authoritatively determining the legislature's purpose are neither odd nor novel, but
have been worked out through 300 years of Anglo-American jurisprudence, with the ultimate purpose of faithfully respecting the
legitimate law-making authority in a constitutional democracy.
Judges, whose duty it is to serve justice, have a surpassing obligation to accurately interpret and apply the law. Some would disparage the notion that judges have an obligation to accurately discern
history.ss But insofar as judges purport to derive their authority
from the law, and a democratic people expect them to do so, they
have an obligation to respect the legislative purpose and to apply
it faithfully.3 " That necessarily involves an accurate interpretation
however, to ascertain the intent of Congress ....
Having completed that task... it is
the function of Congress to amend the statute if this Court misinterpreted congressional
intent or if subsequent developments suggest the desirability, from a policy viewpoint, of
alterations in the statute."); United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 681-82 (1950) ("The
most important thing to be determined is the intent of Congress.").
32 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. "1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("It is our task . . . not to enter the minds of the Members
of Congress . . . but rather to give fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the United States Code, adopted by various Congresses at various times."); United States v.
Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (examining "leading purpose").
33 See, e.g., MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965);
CHARLEs A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HLTORY (1969); Alfred H.
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119; Lewis Mayers, The
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 31
(1965); Dallin H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L REV.
451, 463-64 (1966).
34 See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L
REV. 527, 529 (1947) ("I should say that the troublesome phase of construction is the
determination of the extent to which extraneous documentation and external circumstances may be allowed to infiltrate the text on the theory that they were part of it,
written in ink discernible to the judicial eye.").
35 See, e.g., John P. Reid, Law and Histry, 27 LOYOtA L.A. L REV. 193 (1992).
36 Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 100 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
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of history, because there can be no faithful interpretation of legislative purpose without an accurate interpretation of history. Good
judges must be good historians.
A.

Common Law Origins

The common law history of habeas corpus is important because general principles of statutory construction dictate that Congress knows the common law and incorporates it into federal
legislation when it legislates in that area of law, unless there is
express legislative intent to the contrary.3 7 In Justice Frankfurter's
colorful aphorism, "[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from
another legal source, whether the common law or other legisla-

and concurring in the judgment) ("an interpretation of the statute that is reasonable,
consistent and faithful to its apparent purpose"); Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation:
Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOM-'TRA L. REV. 1125, 1125 (1983) ("The conscientious
judge searches for the 'true' meaning of a statute, because the constitutional separation
of powers assigns to the legislative branch the central responsibility for the statutory management of social policy in the substantive areas allocated to it under the applicable
constitution . .
").
37 See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1885 (1992) ("'[W]here Congress
borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached
to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case,
absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.'") (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246, 264 (1952)); Astoria Federal Say. & Loan v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2169 (1991)
("Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory
principles"); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990)("maxim that a statutory
term is generally presumed to have its common-law meaning."); United States v. Bailey,
444 U.S. 394, 415 n.11 (1980) ("Congress in enacting criminal statutes legislates against a
background of Anglo-Saxon common law . . . ."); United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407,
411 (1957)("We recognize that where a federal criminal statute uses a common-law term
of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the general practice is to give that
term its common-law meaning"); Shaw v. North Pennsylvania R. Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565
(1879) ("No statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words
import. It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law which
it does not fairly express."); Ross v. Jones, 89 U.S. 576, 592 (1874)("Where the expression is in general terms, statutes are to receive such a construction as may be agreeable
to the rules of the common law in cases of that nature, for statutes are not presumed to
make any alteration in the common law, beyond what is expressed in the statute."); Ex
parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 311 (1855) ("We must then give the word ["pardon"
in Art. II. Sec. 2] the same meaning as prevailed here and in England at the time it
found a place in the constitution."); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420, 545 (1837) (adopting rules for construction from English common law);
Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623 (1812) ("The common
law . . . ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless the language of a statute be
clear and explicit for this purpose.").
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don, it brings the old soil with it."ss When Congress extended
federal habeas jurisdiction to state prisoners for the first time in
1867, it enacted that jurisdiction against the background of the
common law. Indeed, the Court has specifically held that federal
statutes authorizing the writ must be read against the background
of the common law, which gave the Great Writ its heritage and
provides an important perspective for the development of modern
habeas law. The Court emphasized the importance of historical
guidelines in Ex parte Park&9 when it applied the federal habeas
statute to federal prisoners:
The general principles upon which the writ of habeas corpus is
issued in England were well settled by usage and statutes long
before the period of our national independence, and must
have been in the mind of Congress when the power to issue
the writ was given to the courts and judges of the United
States. These principles, subject to the limitations imposed by
the Federal Constitution and laws, are to be referred to for our
guidance on the subject.'
The Great Writ is great precisely because of its traditional, common law function of requiring sufficient legal cause for detaining
or jailing someone. The Great Writ is great because the common

38 Frankfurter, supra note 34, at 537.
39 93 U.S. 18 (1876).
40 Id. at 21; see also Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 330 (1915) ("The rule at the
common law, and under the act 31 Car. II, chap. 2 [the English Habeas Corpus Act of
1679], and other acts . . . ."); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879) ("There are
other limitations of the jurisdiction, however, arising from the nature and objects of the
writ itself, as defined by the common law, from which its name and incidents are derived."); Ex pane Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807).
This same point was made on the eve of the 1885 Jurisdiction Act by a prominent
critic of the expansive view of the 1867 statute given by some lower federal courts. In
one of the papers that made up the Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association in 1883, Seymour Thompson criticized lower federal court habeas
decisions issued after the 1867 Act was enacted and before the Court's appellate jurisdiction over the 1867 Act was reinstated in 1885:
It is a well settled principle of statutory construction that statutes relating to a
subject founded upon the common law are to be construed with reference to
the rules and principles of the common law, and are not to be extended beyond the plain import of their terms, when in derogation of that law. This principle forbids that the act of 1867, should be extended to the overthrowing, in
collateral proceedings by the summary process of habeas corpus used by the inferior federal judges, of the judgments and decrees of the courts of the several
states.
Seymour Thompson, Abuses of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 6 Ann. Rep. Amer. Bar. Assoc.
243, 263 (1883), reprinted in 18 AM. L. REV. 1 (1884).
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law made it so.
Early on, the Marshall Court held in Ex parte Bollman4" that
the federal courts had no inherent power to issue a writ of habeas
corpus and that such authority must be conferred by Congress
through statute. 2 The Court appealed to the common law to
construe the federal statute applicable to federal prisoners in Ex
parte Watkins.4" Even sixty-seven years after the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1867, the Court resorted to the common law to determine the
meaning and scope of habeas corpus. In McNally v. Hill," the
Court said:
To ascertain its meaning and the appropriate use of the writ in
the federal courts, recourse must be had to the common law,
from which the term was drawn, and to the decisions of this
Court interpreting and applying the common law principles
which define its use when authorized by statute.4
41 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
42 Otherwise, the Court held, "for the meaning of the term habeas corpus, resort may
unquestionably be had to the common law; but the power to award the writ by any of
the courts of the United States, must be given by written law." Id. at 93-94.
43
No law of the United States prescribes the cases in which this great writ shall be
issued, nor the power of the Court over the party brought up by it. The term is
used in the [C]onstitution, as one which was well understood; and the judicial
act authorizes this [C]ourt, and all the courts of the United States, and the
judges thereof, to issue the writ "for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of
commitment" This general reference to a power which we are required to exercise, without any precise definition of that power, imposes on us the necessity of
making some inquiries into its use, according to that law which is in a considerable degree incorporated into our own.
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-02 (1830). Marshall then proceeded to examine the common
law and the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 which "enforces the common law." Id. at
202. As justice Frankfurter acknowledged in his dissent in Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174,
184 (1947), in reference to the 1789 Act, "[S]ince the scope of the writ was not defined
by Congress, it carried its common law implications."
44 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934), overrded an other grounds, Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54
(1968).
45 McNally, 293 U.S. at 136.
Originating as a writ by which the superior courts of the common law and the
chancellor sought to extend their jurisdiction at the expense of inferior or rival
courts, it ultimately took form and survived as the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, by which the legality of the detention of one in the custody of another
could be tested judicially.
Id. (citing 9 WILLIAM HOLDswORTH, A HISTORY OF THE ENGUSH LAw 108-25).
Its use was defined and regulated by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. This legislation and the decisions of the English courts interpreting it have beeh accepted by this Court as authoritative guides in defining the principles which control
the use of the writ in the federal courts.
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Although the study of the English common law is a continuing discipline with new records continually coming to light, much
already has been written on the history of the writ of habeas corpus.' Habeas corpus arose out of the social and legal process of
Magna Carta-the effort to constrain the rule of men by the rule
of law.47 In the earliest years of English law, citizens could be
restrained or imprisoned by both public and private authorities for
crimes or debts.4" Over several centuries, habeas corpus developed to require that such detention be justified by law, rather
than mere personal whim. Because its function was limited to
determining whether there was "sufficient cause" in law for detention, habeas corpus was not directly related to guilt determination.
However, by requiring "sufficient cause" for detention, habeas corpus addressed the factual basis for the legal violation that permitted detention.4 9
Id. (citations omitted).
46 See, e.g., WILLIAM S. CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (2d
ed. 1893); DUKER, supra note 28; ROLLIN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Albany, W.C. Little & Co. 1858);
JAMES A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS (1923); ROBERT J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF
HABEAS CORPUS (2d ed. 1989); RONALD P. SOKOL, A HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS (1965); ROBERT S. WALKER, THE AMERICAN RECEPTION OF THE WRIT OF LIBERTY
(1961); ROBERT S. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY (1960); HORACE WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LEGAL REMEDIES OF MANDAMUS, PROHIBITION, HABEAS CORPUS, CERTIORARI, AND QUO WARRANTO (3d
ed. 1896); Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modern Writ-I,
18 CAN. B. REV. 10 (1940); Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Copus Cum Causa-The Emergence of
the Modern Writ-H, 18 CAN. B. REV. 172 (1940); Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for
Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CAL. L REV. 335 (1952); Edward
Jenks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 Aw Q. REV. 64 (1902).
47
Whether or not the famous clause [sec. 39] of Magna Carta [1215], which enacted that "no free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or
in any way destroyed except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land," was intended to safeguard the principle that no man should be
imprisoned without due process of law, it soon came to be interpreted as safeguarding it.
9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 104 (3d ed. 1944, reprinted 1966).
Section 39 of Magna Carta provided:
No free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled,
or anyways destroyed; nor will we go upon him, nor will we send upon him,
unless by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.
THOMAS P. TAswELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTrruTIONAL HISTORY 130 (1886). Four hundred years later, the Commons held that the writ of habeas corpus was directly derived
from the Magna Carta. DUKER, supra note 28, at 45.
48 See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 127-40.
49 Cf Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 257 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)
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Although habeas corpus as a protection of the liberty of the
person against the state did not culminate until the seventeenth
century, several types of writs of habeas corpus developed at least
by the end of the reign of Edward I (1307). Today's term, habeas
corpus, is short for habeas corpus ad subficiendum. An early reference to habeas corpus can be traced back to Henry II's Assize of
Clarendon in 1166, which "made great changes in the administration of the criminal law" and, in part, ordered sheriffs to bring
certain prisoners before the justices." Professor William Duker
writes that by the fourteenth century, there were instances of habeas corpus similar to habeas corpus ad respondendum instituted on
the petition of the prisoner for the purpose of examining the
cause of the imprisonment." By the middle of the fourteenth
century, two existing writs-habeas corpus and a writ which inquired into the cause of detention-were aggregated to form habeas corpus cum causa or corpus cum causa. These were used in cases
throughout the last half of the fourteenth century during what
one commentator calls the "emergence of the modem writ.""
Thus, habeas corpus at this stage was a mechanism used by courts
in both civil and criminal proceedings to bring prisoners or parties before them.
By the end of the fourteenth century, the use of habeas corpus as a way to compel sheriffs to bring persons before the courts
embroiled contending English courts in jurisdictional disputes."
Initially, these disputes were solely between the courts, not between the courts and the King. Chancery was able to defeat the
jurisdiction of inferior courts, and Parliament responded with
legislation in an attempt to correct the situation in the fifteenth
century. The justices of the King's Bench and of the Common
Pleas also began to use habeas corpus to bring cases and prisoners
before them throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
The Constitution speaks of the "Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus." Although Professor Duker does not specifically say, it

(stating that "history reveals no exact tie of the writ of habeas corpus to a constitutional
claim relating to innocence or guilt.").
50 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HIsToRY OF ENGLISH
LAW 137 (2d ed. 1968).
51 DUKER, supra note 28, at 24.
52 Id. at 25; Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modern
Writ-I, 18 CAN. B. REV. 10, 13 (1940); Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa-7The
Emergence of the Modem Writ-l, 18 CAN. B. REv. 172 (1940).
53 DUKER, supra note 28, at 27; see also 9 HoLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 109-13.
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seems that this language may originate from the combination of
the writ of privilege and the writ of habeas corpus. Writs of privilege were granted to certain classes of persons-including members of Parliament, the King's ministers, and officers of the Crown
courts-to be tried for violations of law in special courts, out of
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Duker writes that habeas
corpus was used to "enforce the notion of privilege. " '
The combined use of the writs of privilege and corpus cum
causa provided the ideal deterrent to encroachments on the
jurisdiction of the superior courts. Inevitably this mechanism of
defense was used by some as an offensive weapon to disrupt
the just operation of the lower courts. Determined to enjoin
this abuse, the superior courts would refuse to grant a writ of
corpus cum causa based upon privilege if they perceived that the
petition was an attempt by the applicant to evade his lawful
obligations ....
In sum, the superior courts' efforts to maintain and extend their jurisdiction had the unintended effect of changing
the nature of the prerogative writ of habeas corpus; for in so
using the writ, the superior courts were questioning the validity
of an imprisonment. This "liberalization" of the writ was accelerated when the jurisdictional contest shifted from the arena of
the local courts to that of the superior courts.s

This occurred between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries
with the common law courts (including the King's Bench) and the
courts of equity."

When the King's Bench was held to be the

superior court, the result, in effect, was that "the King's prerogative writ issued to defeat, technically that is, the King's own authority as embodied in the Chancery."57 The common law courts
also got involved in jurisdictional conflicts with the Court of High
Commission, using writs of prohibition and habeas corpus. "The
writ of prohibition was issued to enjoin the ecclesiastical judges
from continuing the trial of a given case on the ground that it in-

54 DUKER, supra note 28, at 31 (citing Vandevelde v. Lluellin, 83 Eng. Rep. 910
(K.B. 1661); Peter's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 628 (KB. 1587); Skrogges v. Coleshil, 73 Eng.
Rep. 386 (KB. 1560); Anon., 145 Eng. Rep. 113 (Ex. 1487)).
55 Id. at 32-33.
56 Id. at 33-35 (citing Blackwell's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 1057 (K.B. 1626); Apsley's Case,
72 Eng. Rep. 940 (KB. 1616); Russwell's Case, 81 Eng. Rep. 445 (K.B. 1616); King v. Dr.
Gouge, 81 Eng. Rep. 98 (K.B. 1615); Glanville v. Courtney, 80 Eng. Rep. 1139 (KB.
1615) (Coke, J.); Addis' Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 190 (KB. 1610)); 1 HoLDswoRTH, supra note
47, at 461-63.
57

DUKER, supra note 28, at 35.
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volved temporal matters. The writ of habeas corpus issued to free
those imprisoned by the Commission. " ' Jurisdictional conflicts
also erupted between the common law courts and the Court of
Admiralty 9 and the Court of Requests.' The common law
courts also conflicted with the Privy Council, an agency of the
King.6 In most of these jurisdictional disputes, the Court of
Common Pleas prevailed.
In 1627, a landmark developed in the Case of the Five Knights
or Darnel's Case.62 Five knights, including Thomas Darnel, were
imprisoned for refusing to grant King Charles what was in reality a
"forced loan." While the court ruled for the King, not the knights,
the losing arguments were ahead of their time according to
Duker. Counsel for the knights, in losing, contended:
[T]he Writ of Habeas Corpus is the only means the subject has
to obtain his liberty, and the end of this Writ is to return the
cause of the imprisonment, that it may be examined in this
court, whether the parties ought to be discharged or not: but
that cannot be done upon this return: for the cause of the
imprisonment of this gentleman at first is so far from appearing particularly by it, that there is no cause at all expressed in
it.,

Darnel's Case sparked intense debates in Parliament and something
of a "political backlash." The House of Commons passed three
resolutions supporting the writ of habeas corpus for those imprisoned without a showing of cause. Pamphlets containing the arguments by defense counsel were printed and distributed.
The historic Petition of Right of June 7, 1628 furthered the
development of habeas corpus by limiting the ability of the King,

58 Id. at 36 (citing Anon, 79 Eng. Rep. 1097 (KB. 1641); Torle's Case, 79 Eng.
Rep. 1100 (K.B. 1641); Codd v. Turback, 81 Eng. Rep. 94 (L.B. 1616); Bradstone v.
High-Commission Court, 80 Eng. Rep. 1138 (K.B. 1615); Chancey's Case, -77 Eng. Rep.
1360 (K.B. 1612); Lady Throgmorton's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1347 (K.B. 1611); Roper's
Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1326 (K.B. 1608); Fuller's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1322 (1607); 74 Eng.
Rep. 1091 (K.B. 1607)); see also 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 47, at 605-11:
59 Hawkeridge's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1404 (1617); Thomlinson's Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
1379 (1605).
60 Humfrey's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 513 (C.P. 1572); 1 HOLDS;WORTH, supra note 47, at
414.
61 Case of the City of London, 77 Eng. Rep. 658 (K.B. 1610); Howel's Case, 74
Eng. Rep. 66 (C.P. 1588); Peter's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 628 (C.P. 1587); Helyard's Case, 74
Eng. Rep. 455 (C.P. 1587); Hinde's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 701 (C.P. 1577); 1 HoLDSWoRTH,
supra note 47, at 477-78, 492.
62 3 State Trials 1-59 (KB. 1627).
63 DUKER, supra note 28, at 44 (quoting Darnel's Case, 3 State Trials at 6-7).
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through the Privy Council, to. imprison without a showing of
cause." Habeas corpus was only one part of the Petition of Right,
which represented the culmination of several grievances against
Charles I during a time of growing tension between Parliament
and the King. The Petition also purported to limit the forced
housing of soldiers, taxation without Parliament's consent, and the
use of martial law against civilians. The incorporation of habeas
corpus within the Petition demonstrated the essential function of
habeas corpus as a measure of the rule of law versus rule by arbitrary will.
Two years later, in the landmark Chamber's Case,' counsel
contended that the cause shown was not in accord with the Petition of Right. After being imprisoned for refusing to pay certain
merchants' taxes, Chambers was granted a writ of habeas corpus
by the King's Bench. The customary "return" that came back, describing the cause which justified Chambers' imprisonment, was
held to be insufficient. Duker concludes:
Chamber's Case confirmed that the writ of habeas corpus had
assumed a new role. No longer was it primarily an instrument
employed by the common-law courts to protect their jurisdiction. The questioning of the validity of commitments, previously an incidental effect of the writ, now became the major object. It was at this point, then, that the writ of habeas corpus
embarked upon its journey as 'the highest remedy in law, for
any man that is imprisoned.'"
The next stage in the development of habeas corpus came
with the Habeas Corpus Act of 1641,67 enacted after Parliament
had been suspended from 1629 to 1640 during the reign of Oliver
Cromwell. This Act purported to limit the privy council and the
64

The Petition stated in part:

V. Nevertheless, against the tenor of the said statutes, and other the good laws
and statutes of your realm . . . divers of your subjects have of late been imprisoned, without any cause shewed; and when for their deliverance they were
brought before your justices, by your majesty's Writs of Habeas Corpus, there to
undergo and receive as the court should order, and their keepers commanded
to certify the causes of their detainer no cause was certified, but that they were
detained by your majesty's special command, signified by the lords of your privycouncil, and yet were returned back to several prisons, without being charged
with any thing to which they might make answer according to the law.
Petition of Right, 1627, 3 Car. 1, ch. 1, reprinted in DuKER, supra note 28, at 86-87 n.362.
65 79 Eng. Rep. 717 (KB. 1629).
66 DUKER, supra note 28, at 46-47.
67 Habeas Corpus Act, 1641, 16 Car. 1, ch. 10 (Engl.).
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infamous Star Chamber. A person detained could apply for a writ
of habeas corpus to the proper court. The Act required the sheriff
(or other person with custody) to whom the writ was directed to
file a "return," stating the factual and legal ground for the detention. At common law, the allegations in the "return" were deemed
conclusive and could not be controverted by the prisoner.68
When the court examined the return, it could bail, discharge, or
remand the prisoner to custody. In this way, the Act of 1641
streamlined the process of habeas corpus that English courts had
formulated.
The 1670 Bushell's Case,6" although famous and frequently
cited, hardly stands as precedent for broad federal habeas jurisdiction in criminal cases or for granting the writ after conviction.
Bushell involved jurors imprisoned for contempt by an inferior
court for delivering a verdict that allegedly ignored the evidence
in a case involving trespass and disturbing the peace. They were
brought before a superior common law court, Common Pleas, by
habeas corpus and discharged because of a defective return.7"
Bushell's Case stands for the independence of juries, 1 not the use
of habeas as a post-conviction remedy.72

68
69
70

39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 98-99 (1976).
124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).

The Court hath no knowledge by this retom [sic], whether the evidence given
were full and manifest, or doubtful, lame, and dark, or indeed evidence at all
material to the issue, because it is not retorn'd what evidence in particular, and
as it was deliver'd, was given. For it is not possible to judge of that rightly,
which is not expos'd to a mans [sic] judgment.
Id. at 1007; see ROBERT J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 38-40 (1976).
71 See, e.g., Mark Cammack, The Jurisprudence of Jury Tials: The No Impeachment Rule
and the Conditions for Legitimate Legal Decisionmaking, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 61 (1993);
John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the
English Civil Juror, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 206 (1988); Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding
and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital Defendant's Right to Jury Trial 65 NOTRE DAME
L REV. 1, 9 (1989).
72 Justice Brennan's reliance on Bushell in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 404 (1963) to
refute the notion that "habeas corpus was available only to inquire into the jurisdiction,
in a narrow sense, of the committing court," was thoroughly disparaged by Professors
Oaks and Duker. DUKER, supra note 28, at 274 n.20; Oaks, supra note 33, at 463-64.
Professor Duker found Bushell "completely consistent with the concept of jurisdiction."
DUKER, supra note 28, at 227.
Professor James Liebman falls into a similar misconstruction of Bushell, stating that
it shows that "the writ served in England to review post-trial, judicially sanctioned incarceration." Liebman, supra note 1, at 2042 n.241. This is the only English case he cites
for this proposition. Liebman's language is misleading-the jurors were obviously not
held after their trial; they were not tried. They were imprisoned for contempt after the

1995]

FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW

B.

The English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679

The English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 is the most significant part of the English law of habeas corpus for its impact on
American law at the Founding." When the Supreme Court first
applied the Judiciary Act of 1787-granting the writ for federal
prisoners only-the Court looked not only to the common law but
also to the Act of 1679, which, as Chief Justice Marshall wrote,
"enforces the common law."74 Blackstone called the Act of 1679
"the famous habeas corpus act.

. .

which is frequently considered

as another magna carta of the kingdom."75 James Kent considered the Act of 1679 to be "the basis of all the American statutes
on the subject."76 The Act of 1679 remained in force and unal-

trial of another.
73 The Act stated in pertinent part:
[W]hensoever any person ... shall bring any habeas corpus directed unto any
sheriff... for any person in his or their custody . . . that the said officer . . .
shall within three days after the service thereof, as aforesaid (unless the commitment aforesaid were for treason or felony, plainly and especially expressed in
the warrant of commitment), upon payment . . . of the charges of bringing the
said prisoner . . . make return of such writ; and bring or cause to be brought
the body of the party so committed or restrained, unto or before the lord chancellor or lord keeper of the great seal of England . . . . or the judges or barons of the said court . . . ; and shall then likewise certify the true causes of his
detainer or imprigonment ....
. . . [AInd if any person or persons shall be or stand committed or detained as aforesaid, for any crime, unless for felony or treason, plainly expressed
in the warrant of commitment, in the vacation time and out of term, it shall
and may be lawful to and for the person or persons so committed or detained
(other than persons convict or in execution by legal process), or any one in his
or their behalf, to appeal or complain to the lord chancellor or lord keeper ....
Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. II, ch. 2, § 58, reprinted in CHURCH, supra note 46, at
48-50.
74 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) (citing Habeas Corpus Act,
1679, 31 Car. II, ch. 2 (Eng.)). For Blackstone's survey of the provisions of the law, see
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES '136-37.
75 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at '135.
76 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 28 (2d ed. 1832); see also 2
THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAl. LIMITATIONS 718 (8th ed. 1927) (agreeing that the Act of 1679 is basis of American habeas corpus statutes).
Members of the Reconstruction Congress in 1866 were familiar with Kent's explication of English law and with the derivation of American habeas laws from the English
Act of 1679. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2056-59 (1866) ("How is it in Virginia and North Carolina? Their habeas corpus act is a copy of the habeas corpus act of England, from which we have borrowed the common law and the writ of habeas corpus.")
(statement of Doolittle).
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tered until 1816. Thus, however complex and ambiguous the
common law development of habeas corpus may seem, the 1679
Act provides clear and specific guidance for American courts on
the law of habeas corpus at the time of the Judiciary
Act of
7
1789-as the Supreme Court held in Ex parte Watkins.
The merit of the Act of 1679-also called Shaftesbury's Act
after the principal sponsor, Lord Shaftesbury-was that it clarified
the English law of habeas corpus, codified it, and compelled sheriffs and others who kept persons in custody to justify that custody
by reference to law rather than personal will. 79 The Act also

made habeas available during times of vacation by English courts.
But the Act did not enlarge the scope of the writ in English law.
Henry Hallam, in his ConstitutionalHistoy provides:
It is a very common mistake, and that not only among foreigners, but many from whom some knowledge of our constitutional laws might be expected, to suppose that this statute of
Charles II enlarged in a great degree our liberties, and forms a
sort of epoch in their history; but though a very beneficient
enactment, and eminently remedial in many cases of illegal
imprisonment, it introduced no new principle, nor conferred
any right upon the subject."
The Act also contained significant limitations." The Act did
not apply
if it appear to the authority issuing the writ that the prisoner is
detained by legal process, order, or warrant out of some court
that hath jurisdictionin criminal matters, or by legal warrant for
such matters or offenses for which, by the law, the prisoner is

not bailable; or if he be committed for treason or felony, plainly expressed in the warrant of commitment, or if he be convict
or in execution by legal process, or if he be charged with process in any civil suit.82
Thus, the central concept of the jurisdiction of the committing
77 SHARPE, supra note 46, at 20.
78 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
79 PAUL M. BATOR Er AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1427 (2d ed. 1973).
80

HENRY HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 500 (London, 5th ed.

1847); see also Jenks, supra note 46, at 64 ("[T]he famous Habeas Corpus Act of 1679
created no new remedy, but merely strengthened and perfected an engine which had
been used with effect in the great struggle between Crown and Parliament in the earlier
years of the century.").
81 See generally CHURCH, supra note 46, at 25-33, 48-58.
82 CHURCH, supra note 46, at 27 (emphasis added).
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court, which figured so prominantly in Supreme Court decisions
from 1807 until the 1930s, goes back at least as far as this seminal
act.8
Moreover, the Act only applied to commitment in criminal
cases. As one of the most prominent habeas treatise authors of the
nineteenth century, Rollin Hurd, wrote, "The common law writ of
habeas corpus ..
was not taken away by the act of 31 Car. II;
but was left wholly untouched by it in all cases where the detainer
was not for criminal or supposed criminal matter."' All civil instances
excepted from the Act were required to rely on remedies that
might otherwise be available by the common law.'
Finally, the most significant limitation of the Act was that it
applied only before conviction. As Professor Dallin Oaks accurately
summarized:
At common law and under the famous Habeas Corpus Act of
1679 the use of the Great Writ against official restraints was
simply to ensure that a person was not held without formal
charges and that once charged he was either bailed or brought
to trial within a specified time. If a prisoner was held by a
valid warrant or pursuant to the execution or judgment of a
proper court, he could not obtain release by habeas corpus.6
As Chief Justice Marshall noted in Ex parte Watkins,17 and Justice

83 Duker suggests that the courts of chancery, with their equity powers, used habeas
corpus as a means of "correcting" the decisions and "defeating the jurisdiction" of inferior courts by the end of the 14th century. DUKER, supra note 28, at 27-29. In support of
this proposition, he cites "three cases decided in the latter part of the fourteenth century" and several other cases. Some of the cases were civil, not criminal, and in one case,
John Walpole's, the writ was directed to the sheriff and seems to have involved no "correction" of any court. In any case, Duker's use of the term "correction" does not mean
that these courts overturned convictions or acted as appeals. Rather, the cases dealt with
detention before any conviction and obviously go no farther than the Act of 1679.
84 HURD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS 199 (2d ed.) (emphasis added); see also ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSITrUTION 216-19 (9th ed. 1939); 9 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 47, at 110-25; Sir John Eardley Wilmot, Opinion on the Wit of Habeas Corpus,
97 Eng. Rep. 29, 36, 85-86, 89, 105 (1758); Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa,
The Emergence of the Modern Writ II, 18 CAN. B. REV. 172, 186 (1940) ("the effect was to
leave what may be termed civil detentions to the vagaries of the common law procedure.").
85 But .f. Brief for Respondent at 30, United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952)
(No. 23) (stating without citation, "[T]he Act of 1679 ... did not mark the full extent
of the privilege of habeas corpus even at that time.").
86 Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Copus in the States-1776-1865, 32 U. CHI. L REV. 243,
245 (1965).
87 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
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Bradley noted in Ex parte Parks,8" the 1679 Act "excepts from
those who are entitled to its benefit, persons committed for felony
or treason plainly expressed in the warrant, as well as persons
convicted or in execution."89 ("In execution," in this context,
does not refer to capital punishment but means the carrying out
of any sentence.) Thus, the rule under the common law provided
that persons convicted were excluded from the privileges of the
writ. This rule was part of the Act of 1679 and was incorporated
into early American state statutes.'
The Act of 1679 remained unamended and the essential statement of English habeas law until 1816, through the time of the
American Founding and the Judiciary Act of 1789. Blackstone
summarized the law in the 1760's. He described habeas corpus as
a remedy for the violation of personal liberty. In the context of
his third volume on private wrongs, in a chapter on the remedies
respecting the rights of private persons, Blackstone addressed "the
violation of the right of personal liberty" by false imprisonment.9
The "injury" of false imprisonment, which Blackstone called "a heinous public crime," was defined as the unlawful detention of a
person. Unlawful was defined as "without sufficient authority." The
law provided punishment for the violator, private reparation for
the injured party by removing the confinement, and a civil action
for damages against the violator.92 According to Blackstone, there
were four "means of removing the actual injury of false imprisonment," all four being writs. One of those writs was habeas corpus
(by which he referred to habeas corpus collectively), which
93
Blackstone called "the most celebrated writ in the English law."

After reviewing the various forms of habeas corpus, Blackstone

88 93 U.S. 18 (1876).
89 Id. at 21. Likewise, in Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879), Justice Bradley looked
to the 1679 English Act in considering the propriety of the practice of one Supreme
Court Justice postponing consideration of a writ filed with him and referring it to the
whole Court. Id. at 403.
90 2 SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 52 (1797); DICEy,
supra note 84, at 217-18; Collings, supra note 46, at 338; Oaks, supra note 86, at 254
("The legislation in the twelve original states that followed the English Act was uniform
in providing that the benefits of the act should not extend to persons properly charged
with felony or treason or to 'persons convict' or in execution under civil or criminal
process.").
91 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at '127.
92 Chief Justice Marshall noted in Ex parte Watkins that if the judgment of a court
in support of imprisonment "be a nullity, the officer who obeys it is guilty of false imprisonment." 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830).
93 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at "129.
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emphasized habeas corpus ad subjiciendum (ad subjiciendum meaning to "submit to") as being "the great and efficacious writ in all
manner of illegal confinement."94 It is:
directed to the person detaining another, and commanding
him to produce the body of the prisoner with the day and
cause of his caption and detention ... to do, submit to, and
receive, whatsoever the judge or court awarding such writ shall
consider in that behalf. This is a high prerogative writ, and
therefore by the common law issuing out of the court of king's
bench not only in term-time, but also during the vacation, by a
fiat from the chief justice or any other of the judges, and running into all parts of the king's dominions: for the king is at
all times intitled [sic] to have an account, why the liberty of
any of his subjects is restrained, wherever that restraint may be
inflicted. 5
Blackstone confirmed the function of habeas corpus as a
protection against the deprivation of liberty by arbitrary will unsupported by law.
Next to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts,
and preserves the personal liberty of individuals. This personal
liberty consists in the power of loco-motion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own
inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law... the laws of England have never
abridged it without sufficient cause; and, that in this kingdom
it cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion of the magistrate,
By 16 Car. I. c. 10.
without the explicit permission of the laws ....
[the Act of 1679] if any person be restrained of his liberty by
order or decree of any illegal court, or by command of the
king's majesty in person, or by warrant of the council board, or
of any of the privy council; he shall, upon demand of his
counsel, have a writ of habeas corpus, to bring his body before
the court of king's bench or common pleas; who shall determine whether the cause of his commitment be just, and thereupon do as justice shall appertain ....
Of great importance to the public is the preservation of
this personal liberty: for if once it were left in the power of

94 Id. at "131.
95 Id. A "prerogative writ" referred to "certain judicial writs issued by courts only
upon proper cause shown, but never as a mere right," and included writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus. DUKER, supra note 28, at 63 n.2; see also SA. De Smith, The
Prerogative Writs, 11 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 40 (1951); Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE LJ. 523 (1923).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:5

any, the highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or
his officers thought proper.. . there would soon be an end of all
other rights and immunities.'
As this survey demonstrates, the common law function of the
writ was to require sufficient legal cause to prevent detention
merely by the arbitrary will of a public official. The common law
rule made habeas available before conviction; a convicted person
was not entitled to the privilege of the writ because appeal was
the remedy for a conviction contrary to law.9' As one commentator concluded: "Certainly nothing in the historical background
provides any indication that a prisoner convicted according to the
course of the common law by a court of general criminal jurisdiction was ever entitled to the writ."98
Accordingly, there is no basis under the common law or the
English Act of 1679 for contemporary, sweeping declarations that
habeas corpus "has been the judicial method of lifting undue restraints upon personal liberty"' or that habeas corpus "is a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness""° or
that the historic function of the writ was "to provide a prompt
and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints"'"' or that "the historic office of the Great Writ was
the ultimate protection against 'fundamental unfairness'" '
or
that the "ancient principles of the writ ... embodied in the Federal Constitution" served as a "remedy for restraints contrary to
the Constitution." °3
Similarly, the common law has been used to suggest that
because habeas corpus was not intended to determine guilt or
innocence, modern procedural rules respecting habeas corpus
petitions should not be concerned with guilt or innocence. But
this reasoning is misleading. It is true that habeas corpus at common law-as received by the Supreme Court in Bollman and
Watkins-was not concerned with establishing guilt or innocence.
However, this was because the function of habeas was narrower

96 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, "130-31 (emphasis added).
97 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
98 Collings, supra note 46, at 345.
99 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 269 (1948).
100 Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982).
101 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963).
102 Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 541 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103 Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 544 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Fay, 372 U.S. at 433-34, 438-39).
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than this, not broader.Habeas was available only before conviction
and for the purpose of establishing that sufficient legal cause
existed for the prisoner's detention. It was for a court with competent jurisdiction to establish guilt or innocence, and habeas corpus
was not intended to disturb that. The appellate process was the
exclusive remedy for legal errors. The great writ was called "great"
because of its more limited function: to protect against detention
by the arbitrary will of a public official without sufficient legal
cause. The real source of the expansive notion that "fundamental
fairness" is the function of the writ is Fay v. Noia, decided only
thirty years ago and since overruled. It is not surprising, therefore,
that Professor Henry Hart confessed quite plainly in 1959:
It seems likely that the men who wrote the guarantee against
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus into the Constitution... would have said that the writ does not lie at all to
inquire into the validity of the detention of a person who is
held pursuant to a judgment of conviction .... "I
This was the writ of habeas corpus inherited by the Framers
and the authors of the Judiciary Act of 1789. English law, as received by the American colonies at the time of the Founding,
does not by itself provide historical precedent or legal authority
for the much broader scope of habeas jurisprudence exercised
today in our federal system. As one modem Canadian commentator has written, "The American use of the writ as a post-conviction
remedy contrasts markedly with the English practice."1"5
III. THE TEXT AND LEGISLATVE HISTORY
OF THE HABEAS CoRPus ACT OF 1867
A.

The Text

Until Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, no
statute provided federal courts with jurisdiction to hear petitions
for habeas corpus from state prisoners except in very narrow circumstances. The 1867 Act provided, in pertinent part:
[T]he several courts of the United States ...

within their re-

spective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already con-

104 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 103 (1959).
105 SHARPE, supra note 70, at v.
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ferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus
in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law
of the United States .... 106
Because the Court has held, since Bollman, that the term "habeas
corpus" incorporated the common law rules, the language must be
read against the backdrop of habeas law in 1867.
This backdrop provides several guidelines. First, the phrase "in
addition to the authority already conferred by law" is also contained in the 1833 and 1842 Acts. The phrase cannot refer to the
common law, or expand the common law, because, as the Court
in Bollman held, the federal courts had no inherent power to
grant writs of habeas, only that authority conferred by federal
statute. Thus, the only "authority already conferred by law" was
conferred by statute. Moreover, in Cunningham v. Neagle,11 7 the
Court construed the word "law" in the 1833 Act to refer to
statutes.'
Four federal habeas statutes were in effect in 1866:
the original 1789 Act granting habeas jurisdiction for federal prisoners; the 1833 Act allowing habeas for federal officials imprisoned under state law;" 9 the 1842 Act applicable to foreign nationals held in state custody;"0 and the Act of March 3, 1863"'

106

The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.

107

135 U.S. 1 (1890).

108

Id. at 8 (Lamar, J.,dissenting) (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591,

657-58 (1834)).
109

Force Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, §7, 4 Star. 634-35, provided:

That either of the justices of the Supreme Court or a judge of any district court
of the United States, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall
have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner or prisoners, in jail or confinement, where he or they shall be committed or confined
on, or by authority or law, for any act done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree, of any
judge or court thereof.
Id. (emphasis added).
110 Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539, provided:
That either of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, or judge
of any district court of the United States, in which a prisoner is confined, in
addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant
writs of habeas corpus in all cases of any prisoner or prisoners in jail or confinement, where he, she, or they, being subjects or citizens of a foreign State,
and domiciled therein, shall be committed or confined, or in custody, under or
by any authority or law, or process founded thereon, of the United States, or of
any one of them, for or on account of any act done or omitted under any
alleged right, tile, authority, privilege, protection, or exemption, set up or
claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction, of any foreign State or
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ratifying the suspension of the writ by President Lincoln. The
phrase must refer to authority "already conferred" by federal statute.
Second, as the Court held in Bollman, when Congress incorporated the term "habeas corpus" into the federal statute, the grant
of power, by use of that term, was read to incorporate the common law writ of habeas corpus, which carried its own limitations.
To the extent that the common law nature and procedure of
habeas corpus was left unchanged by the 1867 Act, it was incorporated into the 1867 Act. The two most important limitations
were the jurisdiction doctrine and pre-conviction availability.
Third, the 1867 Act uses the phrase "any person... restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution,"
rather than "prisoners in jail or confinement" as used in the 1789,
1833, and 1842 habeas corpus statutes. The Act does not refer to
"convictions," and, despite the breadth, of the "restrained" language at first blush, nothing in the "restrained" language suggests
a desire to alter or overturn the "conviction" limitations in the
1679 English Act. Blackstone used the same term "restrained" in
referring to the application of habeas corpus before conviction.11 2 Other sources also used the "restrained" language in reference to habeas corpus when it was fully recognized that the writ

Sovereignty, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations, or
under color thereof.
111 Ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755; see Neagle 135 U.S. at 70-71 (reviewing purposes of the 1833
and 1842 acts); Ex parteJenkins, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 521, 529 (1853) (on the purposes of
the 1833 Act); George F. Longsdorf, The Federal Habeas Corpus Acts Original and Amended,
13 F.R.D. 407 (1953).
Professor Peller's attempt to derive support for expansive federal habeas jurisdiction
for state prisoners from judicial interpretations of these statutes is futile. Peller, supra
note 21, at 611, 616-17. By their terms, they were clearly limited in their scope in form
and substance to a narrow class of cases. As the Court acknowledged in Ex pate
McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867), the 1842 Act applied to "a small class of cases
arising from commitments for acts done . . . under alleged authority of foreign governments." Id. at 325.
The Reconstruction Construction also clearly understood this. For example, in
March, 1866, Congressman Cook of Illinois called up H.R. 298 from the House Judiciary
Committee, which purported to enlarge the protection for federal officers acting under
authority of the United States or the President under the Force Bill and the Habeas
Corpus Act of March 3, 1863. The limited scope of the 1842 Act was clearly recognized.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1387-90 (1866). Federal court review was provided for
trial of the question whether the federal officers were acting under authority of federal
law. Id. at 1423-26, 1523-30. (The bill passed the House on March 20. Id. at 1530. The
Senate took up the 'bill on April 18.)
112 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, * 131.
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was not available after conviction."' Thus, the "restrained in violation of the constitution" language must be read consistently with
the limitations of the 1679 English Act to refer to "restraints" prior
to conviction that violate the Constitution or federal statutes. As we
will see, it was exactly this kind of restraint that posed a vivid
problem in the Reconstruction context of the Act."4
Thus, a proper textual analysis confirms Justice Harlan's reading of the Act in his dissent in Fay v. Noia. "the change accomplished by the language of the Act related to the classes of prisoners (in particular, state as well as federal) for whom the writ
would be available."" 5 The ostensible purpose of the 1867 Act
was to encompass state prisoners, not to change the nature of the
writ itself.
Finally, the change in habeas procedure made in the 1867
Act, enhancing the inquiry into the "cause of commitment," implies no change in the .common law conviction limitation. Congress added a fact determination provision, presumably taken from
an 1816 English statute which did not apply to criminal cases."'
This allowed the person in custody to "deny any of the material
facts set forth in the return," allege facts under oath to show that
"the detention is in contravention of the Constitution or laws of
the United States," and ordered the court to "proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the case, by hearing testimony
and the arguments of the parties interested."" 7 This provision
applied, however, only after the court had examined the petition,
determined that the petition itself did not show that the person
was lawfully held, and issued the writ to the custodian. The procedural change only relates to the inquiry into the cause of restraint
beyond the face of the return and says nothing about the cause or
timing of the restraint; it implies nothing about any change in the

113 See, e.g., In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 147 (1852) (Nelson, J., dissenting)
("This writ has always been justly regarded as the stable bulwark of civil liberty, and undoubtedly, in the hands of a firm and independent judiciary, no person, be he citizen or
alien, can be subjected to illegal restraint, or be deprived of his liberty, except according
to the law of the land.").
114 Cf Frankfurter, supra note 34, at 531 ("[Holmes'] habit of mind . . . had a natural tendency to confine what seemed to him familiar language in a statute to its familiar
scope.")
115 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 452 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
116 See DUKER, supra note 28, at 193.
117 The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86; DUKER, supra note
28, at 216 n.79.
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common law conviction limitation."' Thus, when the plain language is read against the backdrop of existing common law, habeas statutes, and case law, the language is incompatible with the full
review model of habeas relitigation and post-conviction application
explicitly adopted in Brown v. Allen."
In Fay, Justice Brennan justified an expansive interpretation of
the 1867 statute with the following reasoning:
Although the Act of 1867, like its English and American predecessors, nowhere defines habeas corpus, its expansive language
and imperative tone, viewed against the background of postCivil War efforts in Congress to deal severely with the States of
the former Confederacy, would seem to make inescapable the
conclusion that Congress was enlarging the habeas remedy as
previously understood, not only in extending its coverage to
state prisoners, but also in making its procedures more efficacious.12°
None of these factors justifies-in fact, they all weigh against-the
conclusion that the 1867 Act applied post-conviction. That the Act
"nowhere defines habeas" means that the common law procedures
and limitations are incorporated unless specifically changed, as the
Court held in Bollman and Watkins. The language of the 1867 Act
is no more "expansive" than the 1789, 1833, or 1842 Acts, except
in a few particulars, none of which relate to the common law
post-conviction limitation. The changes relate to its application to
state prisoners, its invocation of constitutional law, and its broader
fact-finding provisions. In addition, the '1867 Act is no more "imperative" than the prior federal acts. The "backdrop" of the postCivil War efforts suggests, if anything, a limitation of the class of
prisoners to freedmen and loyal Unionists. Finally, the fact that
the 1867 Act enlarged the class of prisoners and expanded the
factual inquiry does not imply that it dropped the pre-existing
limitation against post-conviction relief. Justice Brennan's reasoning, therefore, fails.
Contemporary scholars have had to supply a rationale for the
Court's expansive decision in Brown v. Allen because little can be
found in the Court's decisions between Moore v. Dempsey'2' and
Brown. 22 The Court never closely examined the language of the
118 Cf Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 330-31 (1915).
119 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
120 Fay, 372 U.S. at 415.
121 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
122 See, e.g., United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (federal case); Jennings v.
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Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951) ("Where the state does not afford a remedy, a state prisoner may apply for a writ of habeas corpus . .. ."); Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook,
340 U.S. 206 (1951); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 205 (1950) (state case; cursory examination of 1867 Act; "writ . . . commands general recognition as the essential remedy to
safeguard a citizen against imprisonment by State or Nation in violation of his constitutional right" (citing Hawk, 326 U.S. at 274)); Young v. Ragan, 337 U.S. 235 (1949) (reviewing availability of state habeas corpus as remedy for due process violations); Loftus v.
Illinois, 334 U.S. 804 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (state right to counsel
case; no consideration of language or history of 1867 Act); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S.
266, 283 (1948) (5-4 decision) ("to afford a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of
illegal restraint upon personal liberty"); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Sunal
v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); Eagles v. U.S. ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946); Carter
v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 217 (1946) ("[I]f
the State of Illinois should at all times deny all remedies . . . the federal courts would
be available to provide a remedy . . . ."); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); Rice v.
Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) (state case; reversing denial of writ for review of right to
counsel claim); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42
(1945); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945) (state case; reversing denial of writ to
review claim of deprivation of counsel under Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)); Ex
parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944) (per curiam) (state case; "where resort to state court
remedies has failed to afford a full and fair adjudication . . . either because the state
affords no remedy . . . or because in the particular case the remedy afforded by state
law proves in practice unavailable or seriously inadequate . . . a federal court should entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be remediless." (citing Moore)); Adams v. United States ex reL McCann, 317 U.S 269, 274 (1942) (federal prisoner, "the
writ . . . should not do service for an appeal"); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215 (1942)
(state case; knowing use of perjured testimony (citing Mooney)); Cochran v. Kansas, 316
U.S. 255 (1942); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-105 (1942) (per curiam) (federal
prisoner, allegedly coerced by FBI agent to plead guilty; "In such circumstances the use
of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for
crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want
of jurisdiction . . . . It extends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has
been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ is the
only effective means of preserving his rights." (citing Moore, Mooney, Bowen)); Holiday v.
Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941) (federal indictment; referring to hearing procedure from
1867 Act, remanded case for hearing of testimony); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275
(1941) (federal prisoner, applying hearing procedure from 1867 Act; no voluntary waiver
of counsel, allegedly coerced into pleading guilty); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 23
(1939) (federal prisoner, habeas corpus cannot be used as writ of error;, scope of review
limited to examination of jurisdiction, but "if it be found that the court had no jurisdiction . . . or that in its proceedings his constitutional rights have been denied, remedy of
habeas corpus is available" (citing Watkins)); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (federal prisoner; ordered federal court on habeas corpus to determine on the merits whether the defendant had made an effectual waiver of 6th Amendment right to counsel, id.
at 465; "Congress has expanded the rights of a petitioner for habeas coipus" (citing 28
U.S.C. § 451), id.; "Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction
and sentence" id. at 468); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935) (federal prisoner);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 (1935) (per curiam) (conviction obtained solely
through knowing use of perjured testimony results in a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law;, Court not satisfied that state failed to provide corrective judicial process,
no exhaustion of remedies); McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934) (federal case); Knewel
v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442, 445 (1925) ("habeas corpus calls in question only the jurisdiction
of the court whose judgment is challenged" (citing Frank)); Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393,
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1867 Act until Fay v. Noia. Its first consideration of the Act, in Ex
parte McCardle (McCardle1), was clearly dictum, given its later decision in McCardle II that the Court lacked jurisdiction." In 1876,
in Ex parte Parks,'24 Justice Bradley stated that the 1867 Act was
"passed in consequence of the state of things that followed the
late rebellion," but this idea was never further developed."z In
Ex parte Royal4l2" the Court's first consideration of the statute after restoration of its appellate jurisdiction, a careful analysis might
have been expected. Instead, Justice Harlan's meandering opinion
in Royall-a state, pre-conviction case involving an attack on the
constitutionality of a Virginia business law-implies almost befuddlement with the language and contains no close analysis.127 Jus-

tice Black, in applying the habeas statute for federal prisoners in
Johnson v. Zerbst128 suggested that Congress intended a broadening of habeas, but cited no authority for this notion. Likewise,
Justice Frankfurter, in his opinion in Brown v. Allen," contended
that the 1867 Act compelled the result in Brown-that any constitutional questions could be relitigated on federal habeas. But

402 (1924) (conviction by territorial court, did not fall within exceptional cases of pressing need or where the process or judgment is wholly void (citing Watkins)); Salinger v.
Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924) (federal case; prior refusal to grant habeas is not without bearing or weight when a later petition raising same issues is considered); United
States v. Valante, 264 U.S. 563, 565 (1924) (federal case, habeas cannot be used as substitute for writ of error); Rodman v. Pothier, 264 U.S. 399, 402 (1924) (murder on military reservation; "consideration of many facts and seriously controverted questions of
law . . . must be determined by the court where the indictment was found"); Craig v.
Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 277 (1923) (federal case; "habeas corpus cannot be utilized for the
purpose of proceedings in error"); Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335 (1923) (habeas
cannot be used as a substitute for writ of error (citing Frank)); Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 (1923) (state case; 1867 Act not cited, only habeas precedent cited is Frank).
123 McCardle I, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867). The Court simply denied a motion to dismiss, holding that it had jurisdiction of a case involving a prisoner in the
custody of military authorities. However, in a later opinion, Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1868), the Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The earlier
opinion is cited thereafter in only a very few habeas cases and in no case applying the,
1867 Act. Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868), was a federal case.
124 93 U.S. 18 (1876).
125 Id. at 22.
126 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
127 See, e.g., id. at 251 ("We cannot suppose that Congress intended to compel those
courts . . . to draw to themselves, in the first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions . . . ."); id. at 253 ("It was further observed, in the same case [Ex parte Bridges,
4 F. Cas. 98 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875) (No. 1,862)], that while it might appear unseemly that
a prisoner, after conviction in a State court, should be set at liberty by a single judge on
habeas corpus, there was no escape from the act of 1867 . . .
128 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
129 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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Frankfurter's expansive reading in Brown was not supported by any
analysis of the language of the Act, its legislative history, or by
citation to any authority. 3 ° In his dissent in Sunal v. Large,''
Frankfurter apparently felt he could dispose of the 115 year old
rule of Ex Parte Watkins that habeas could not be used as a writ of
error (a rule repeatedly stated by the Court) by calling it a "wellworn formula."3i 2 From Moore to Brown, the Court never considered the plain language or legislative history of the 1867 Act. Instead, it expanded the writ in federal prisoner cases and imported
that expansion into state prisoner cases without analysis. The
Court did not closely examine the language or legislative history
until Fay v. Noia 33
B.

The Legislative History

Beyond its plain language, it is helpful to read the 1867 Act
in the context of its legislative history. Although the use of legislative history in statutory construction has come under substantial
criticism by Justice Scalia of late,"M other Justices regularly consult legislative history. There are just reasons to be concerned with
the use of legislative history, especially when it sweeps beyond
official congressional documents into a general history of the "spirit" of the times. In the case of the 1867 Act, the thrust of the
legislative history is more compelling in refuting any post-conviction application of the Act than in narrowing the class of persons
seemingly encompassed by the plain language.
In what is apparently the only thorough review of the legisla-

130 Frankfurter's opinion in Brown was foreshadowed by his dissenting opinion in
Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184 (1947), where he asserted that the "writ was greatly
enlarged after the Civil War" by the 1867 Act. For this proposition, he cited only
Holmes' dissent in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 345 (1915), that habeas was "available to cut through forms and go 'to the very tissue of the structure.'" Sunal 332 U.S.
at 184 (quoting Frank 237 U.S. at 346). But Frankfurter took Holmes out of context, for
Holmes never referred to the 1867 Act in Frank or suggested that the 1867 Act enlarged
habeas corpus.
131 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
132 Id. at 184; cf Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991,
1017 (1985) (referring to the Watkins doctrine as "traditional rhetoric"). There is reason
to believe that Frankfurter's views on habeas were shaped more by his intense involvement in the Sacco-Vanzetti case than by the text of the 1867 Act or its history. See
EDMUND

WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES

WAR 777-78 (1962)

IN THE LITERATURE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL

(describing Holmes-Frankfurter interaction regarding case).
133 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
134 See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning' Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of
Strict Statutoy Construction, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994).
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five history, Professor Lewis Mayers described the Act as "a measure drafted in vague terms ... reported only orally, explained in
one way in the house in which it originated and in an entirely
different way in the other house, and passed without debate and
with only the most casual attention in either chamber."'35 The
legislative history begins with a joint resolution signed by President
Lincoln on March 3, 1865, designed to grant freedom to some
former slaves serving in the Union forces and their wives and children." On December 18, 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment was
ratified and became effective. The next day, December 19, the
House passed a new resolution, ordering the House Judiciary
Committee to formulate legislation that would enforce the March
3 Joint Resolution:
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be directed to
inquire and report to this House, as soon as practicable, by bill
or otherwise, what legislation is necessary to enable the courts
of the United States to enforce the freedom of the wives and
children of soldiers of the United States under the joint resolution of Congress of March 3, 1865, and also to enforce the
liberty of all persons under the operation of the constitutional
amendment abolishing slavery.'37
Three weeks later, on January 8, 1866, the chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, Representative James F. Wilson of Iowa, introduced a "bill to secure the writ of habeas corpus to persons held
in slavery or involuntary servitude contrary to the Constitution of
the United States," but the bill was never reported out of his
committee.'3
A different bill, H.R. 605, was drafted and introduced in the
House by Representative William Lawrence (R.-Ohio), a member
of the House Judiciary Committee.'3 Lawrence called up the bill
for discussion on July 25, 1866. The first and second sections of

135 Mayers, supra note 33, at 32.
186 J. Res. 29, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. (1865); see DUKER, supra note 28, at 18999, 215
n.57; Mayers, supra note 38, at 33 & n.12.
137 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1865).
138 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1866); Mayers, supra note 33, at 33.
Mayers reports that Wilson's bill was never printed, but that the original handwritten bill
is in the National Archives. Id. at 34 n.16. The Congressional Globe headlines Wilson's bill
as "Protection of Emancipated Slaves." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1866).
139 Professor William Wiecek states that Wilson's bill was "replaced" by Lawrence's,
but Wiecek does not give the reasons for this replacement. William M. Wiecek, The Great
Writ and Reconstruction: The Habeas Gopus Act of 1867, 36 J. SOUTH. HIST. 530, 538 (1970).
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the bill were read. A Democratic opponent, Representative
LeBlond, asked "whether in case a person who is not bound to
perform service in the Army or Navy is taken possession of by the
Government, he is 'cut off from the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus' under this bill." 4 ' LeBlond was concerned that the secLawond section exempted those held by military authorities.'
rence replied, "I think not .... This has no relation to that sub-

ject at all," and then immediately explained "the object of the
bill":
On the 19th of December last, my colleague [Mr. Shellabarger]
introduced a resolution instructing the Judiciary Committee to
inquire and report to the House as soon as practicable, by bill
or otherwise, what legislation is necessary to enable the courts
of the United States to enforce the freedom of the wife and
children of soldiers of the United States, and also to enforce
the liberty of all persons. Judge Ballard, of the district court of
Kentucky, decided that there was no act of Congress giving
courts of the United States jurisdiction to enforce the rights
and liberties of such persons. In pursuance of that resolution of
my colleague this bill has been introduced, the effect of which
is to enlarge the privilege of the writ of hobeas [sic] corpus, and

make the jurisdiction of the courts and judges of the United
States coextensive with all the powers that can be conferred.
upon them. It is a bill of the largest liberty, and does not interfere with persons in military custody, or restrain the writ of
habeas corpus at all.'

Without further debate, the bill was passed.
Lawrence's stated purpose relates to a specific, limited class of
people and not at all to state prisoners imprisoned for or convicted of crimes. His reference to "all persons" relates, in the context
of the same sentence, to the persons encompassed by the December 19 Resolution (i.e., "all persons under the operation of the
constitutional amendment abolishing slavery"),"' because Lawrence said he introduced the bill "[iin pursuance of that

140 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866).
141 Mayers, supra note 33, at 38 & n.34 (citing Proclamation 51, 13 Stat. 774 (1865)).
Mayers reports that, by a presidential proclamation of December 1, 1865, Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus on September 15, 1863 was terminated "in all the loyal states
except Kentucky," and that the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for habeas corpus for
persons in federal military custody where the writ was not suspended. Id. at 38 n.34.
142 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866) (emphasis added).
143 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 87 (1865).

1995]

FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW

resolution."' He did not need to quote the Resolution word for
word because Congress was familiar with it. Justice Brennan, in Fay
v. Noia, quoted only part of the very last sentence ("a bill of the
largest liberty"), but one must read this phrase in the context of
the entire statement, the Resolution, and the brief debate, to refer
to the military custody question.14 Although Wilson's and
Lawrence's bills were separate, Lawrence makes a direct tie back
to the December 19 Resolution. In the context of existing law and
the status of habeas corpus in the loyal states except Kentucky,
Mayers interpreted Lawrence's statement that it was "a bill of the
largest liberty" as meaning that "it extended the federal habeas
jurisdiction to freedmen yet in no way constricted the existing
federal habeas protection of federal prisoners. " "
Lawrence's reference to "Judge Ballard" 4 ' has gone unexamined by every commentator on the Act of 1867 except William
Duker." Immediately after referring to "all persons," Lawrence
refers to Judge Ballard and the enforcement of "the rights and

144 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866).
145 Wiecek's reading is similarly superficial and incomplete. Wiecek, supra note 139,
at 538.
146 Mayers, supra note 33, at 38; see also DUKER, supra note 28, at 190; William M.
Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 333,
344 (1969). Professor Wiecek writes that "Wilson's bill was replaced by a new two-part bill
and reported out," referring to Lawrence's bill. Id. He refers to Lawrence's statement,
without quoting it in full, asserting that Lawrence:
who reported out the bill, stated that it was originally desikned to protect the
wives and children of freedmen who served in the Union army, but that, in its
revised version, its 'effect is to enlarge the privilege of the Writ of habeas corpus, and to make the jurisdiction of the courts and judges of the United States
coextensive with all the powers that can be conferred upon them."[']
Id. at 344-45. Wiecek called this a "sweeping explanation of the jurisdiction conferred by
the bill . . . ." Id. at 345. Wiecek, however, reads into Lawrence's statement a contrast
between the "originally designed" bill and its "revised version" that Lawrence never
makes. Id. at 344. In fact, Lawrence said that "this bill" was introduced "in pursuance of
that resolution" of December 19th. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866).
Moreover, Lawrence's reference to expansive jurisdiction is made in direct response to
Rep. LeBlond's concern that the second section of the bill exempted those held by military authorities.
147 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866).
148 According to Duker, the Ballard reference involves the case of Corbin v. Marsh,
63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 193 (1865) (combined with Hughes v. Todd, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 188
(1865)). See DUER, supra note 28, at 190, 215 n.58. Judge Bland Ballard was a federal
district judge in Kentucky between 1861-1879. BIOGRAPHIcAL NOTES OF THE FEDERAL JUDGES, 30 F. Cas. 1361, 1362 (1897). However, he %as not associated with the Corbin decision
in the Kentucky Reports, unless the case also came to his court. If so, that decision has
not been identified.
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liberties of such persons."' The reference to Ballard is a specific
and concrete example of the type of problem to which the bill
was addressed. It is well known that Reconstruction involved a prolonged period during which violence was committed against the
freedmen and their families, and their civil rights were denied. All
of this was the subject of an 800 page Congressional report issued
by the Committee on Reconstruction early in 1866.1' Violence
and civil rights violations also occurred in Kentucky."'1 It is estimated that "65,000 men, women and children remained slaves in
Kentucky after March, 1865," and white landowners continued to
hold freedmen over concern about their labor supply. 15 2 The
Freedman's Bureau was established in March, 1865, and announced that it would begin operations in Kentucky in December,
1865. The Civil Rights Act was passed over President Johnson's
veto on April 9, 1866. A new Freedman's Bill was passed in June,
1866, and the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress
that month. Beginning in February, 1866, "[i]ntervention by the
bureau into legal proceedings prevented Louisville officials from
153
sending Afro-Americans to jail on several occasions.
Federal District Judge Ballard, who had a reputation for protecting the rights of freedmen, had communicated with the
Freedman's Bureau about its work in Kentucky and had corresponded with Senator Trumbull in March, 1866, concerning the
Civil Rights Bill and the need to protect the rights of freedmen.TM With the passage of the Civil Rights Act in April, and
the Kentucky state courts denying blacks the right to testify in
court cases, the Bureau "consistently moved cases to the United
States district court in Louisville under the jurisdiction of Judge

149
150
Cong.,
151

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess 4151 (1866) (emphasis added).
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. REP. No. 30, 39th

1st Sess. (1866).
GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865-1940, at 19 (1990); see

also VICTOR B. HOwARD, BLACK LIBERATION IN KENTUCKY: EMANCIPATION AND FREEDOM,
1862-1884 (1983); DONALD G. NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868, at 140 (1979); HAMBLETON TAPP &
JAMES C. KLOTTER, KENTUCKY: DECADES OF DIScORD, 1865-1900, at 50 (1977); ROSS A.

WEBB, KENTUCKY IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA (1979).
152 WEBB, supra note 151, at 39-40.
153 WRIGHT, supra note 151, at 23.
154 HOWARD, supra note 151, at 133-34, 201 n.27. Ballard wrote to Trumbull, "I have
a strong desire that Congress shall pass the Civil Rights Bill over the President's veto. If
this bill cannot be passed then some other bill must be. It will not do to leave the civil
rights of the Negroes unprotected." Id. at 134.
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Bland Ballard."'55 In light of the Ballard example, the "such persons" that Lawrence referred to were clearly freedmen.
There is no evidence to indicate, as some have argued, that
the difference in language between Wilson's bill and Lawrence's
meant that Congress consciously intended to drop all common law
constraints and adopt a full relitigation model for federal habeas.' 5 Lawrence's "any person ... restrained of his or her liberty... in violation of the Constitution" language is not significantly broader than Wilson's "persons held in slavery or involuntary
servitude contrary to the Constitution." Congress was specifically
concerned with freedmen, or their children, held under apprenticeship laws.'5 7 It is reasonable to conclude that Wilson's narrower language might not encompass all the myriad ways in which
freedmen might be "restrained," and thus, it is reasonable to conclude, as Mayers suggested, that it was designed to make the law
"more serviceable" to freedmen and their families. Although the
different language in Lawrence's bill may be taken as relevant to
the breadth of the class affected, neither Wilson's nor Lawrence's
language justifies any conclusion that Congress intended to drop
common law pre-conviction limits on habeas.
Discussion in the Senate on July 27, 1866, two days after
House passage, was abbreviated, but, at first blush, may suggest a
different purpose. 58 Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, the
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, called up the bill for
consideration. There was a brief debate. The first and second
sections of the bill were described, including the exemption for
"any person who is or may be held in the custody of the military
authorities."'59 Senator Davis then objected to the diminution of
state authority. Trumbull apologized that it was "a House bill; it

155 Id. at 134; WRIGHT, supra note 151, at 23.
156 See Wiecek, supra note 146, at 344-45. Professor Steiker, for example, contends
that Mayer, supra note 33, has trouble "explaining why Congress chose to express its
purportedly narrow purpose in such expansive language." Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the
Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?,
92 MIcH. L. REv. 862, 885 (1994). The issue, however, is-expansive as to what? While
the language may be expansive regarding the class affected ("any person"), the language
does not suggest any expansion of the common law function except to allow habeas
(with its pre-conviction limitation) to test such restraints against the Constitution.
157 See, e.g., NIEMAN, supra note 151, at 76, 78-82, 92-95, 137-38; see also In re Turner,
24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247) (Chief Justice Chase, on circuit, granting
habeas to ex-slave held by ex-master under Maryland apprenticeship act).
158 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4228 (1866).
159 Id. at 4229.
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was not prepared in the Senate," and said that he was "sorry that
the Senator from Maryland (Mr. Johnson) is not here; he examined it in committee, and is in favor of its passage."'" He replied that the military exemption meant that military cases would
not be taken away from the military authorities. He denied that
the bill would "interfere at all with any existing condition o persons held in confinement in consequence of the rebellion" and
would not object to such an express amendment.'61 He then
gave what Justice Brennan in Fay construed as a broader statement
of the purpose of the bill:
I will state to the Senator from Kentucky, which he is probably
aware of, that the habeas corpus act of 1789, to which this bill is
an amendment, confines the jurisdiction of the United States
courts in issuing writs of habeas corpus to persons who are held
under United States laws. Now, a person might be held under
a State law in violation of the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and he ought to have in such a case the benefit
of the writ, and we agree that he ought to have recourse to
United States courts to show that he was illegally imprisoned in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 6 2
Trumbull also noted that he had received "a note from one of the
members of the Judiciary Committee of the House .

.

. requesting

upon."'63

Trumbull made no mention
me to have the bill acted
of the December 19 resolution.'
Contrary to the suggestion of some proponents of broad habeas that the Senate passed the bill based on Trumbull's statement, further debate was postponed and the bill was ultimately
held over at the request of Kentucky Senator Davis and not taken
up again until January 25, 1867, a full five months later."6 On
that day, a colloquy occurred between Senators Trumbull and
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 To the extent that Trumbull's explanation of the bill may appear to conflict with
Lawrence's, Wiecek concludes that Trumbull "had obviously not done his homework . . . ." Wiecek, supra note 139, at 539.
165 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 729 (1867). Proponents of broad habeas review have a habit of hanging on Trumbull's statement to the exclusion of almost all else
in the legislative history. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Judicial Revision of the Habeas Corpus
Statutes: A Note on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 484, 489-90; Habeas Corpus Reform, Hearings on S. 238 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
137 (1985) (statement of Larry Yackle) ("the bill was passed in the Senate on the basis
of the explanation offered by Trumbull.").
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Johnson, in which Senator Johnson objected that the bill might be
construed to allow any federal judge to grant habeas corpus for a
prisoner located in another part of the country. Trumbull agreed
that this would be objectionable and agreed to postpone consideration.' Debate was again taken up three days later on January
28, 1867.6 The bill was amended to confine judicial authority to
"respective jurisdictions" and then passed." The House concurred on January 31.69 It is true that the House passed the bill
immediately after Lawrence's explanation, but the Senate passed
the bill five months after Trumbull spoke.
One year later, Congress suspended the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction to review habeas cases under the 1867 Act
because of the pending case of Ex parte McCardle17 ' This jurisdiction was not restored until 1885.Y17 During the March 25, 1868
debate that led to the suspension of the Court's appellate jurisdiction under the Act, Senator Trumbull's construction of the 1867
Act is exactly in line with Representative Lawrence's statements the
year before:
The act of 1867 was not the first act which authorized writs of
habeas corpus to be issued by the United States courts. The act
of 1789 authorized the issuing of all such writs in cases where
persons were deprived of their liberty under authority or color
of authority of the United States. Why, then, was the act of
1867 passed? It was passed to authorize writs of habeas corpus to
issue in cases where persons were deprived of their liberty
under State laws or pretended State laws. It was the object of
the act of 1867 to confer jurisdiction on the United States
courts in cases not before provided for, and it was to meet a
class of cases which was arising in the rebel States, where, under pretense of certain State laws, men made free by the Constitution of the United States were virtually being enslaved, and
166 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730 (1867).
167 Id. at 790.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 899. Another habeas corpus bill, H.R. 755, was also proceeding through
Congress at this time. It amended a bill passed on May 11, 1866, H.R. 238, which
amended the Habeas Corpus Act of March 3, 1863 (suspending the writ) (12 Stat. 755),
and restored the writ in some areas. (There seems to be some confusion in the Globe
Index between "H.R. 238" and "H.R. 298" and between "H.R. 755" and "H.P. 775.") H.R.
755 was passed by the Senate on January 25, 1867. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.
729 (1867).
170 Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44; see Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 318 (1867) (upholding the Court's jurisdiction and denying a motion to dismiss).
171 Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437.
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it was also applicable to cases in the State of Maryland where,
under an apprentice law, freedman were being subjected to a
species of bondage. The object was to authorize a habeas corpus
in those cases to issue from the United17States
courts, and to be
2
taken by appeal to the Supreme Court.

Statements made by Senator Johnson during the 1868 debate on
repealing the Court's jurisdiction have been taken out of context
by some to suggest that the Act allowed full federal relitigation of
any constitutional claim. When these statements are read in the
context of the entire debate, however, it is clear that Johnson was
arguing that the Act protected Union officers as well as freedmen,
and no more.' 73
Accordingly, there is a strong and consistent record that can
be read to understand the 1867 Act as referring to the Thirteenth
Amendment and the Reconstruction laws designed to enforce it.
Indeed, the purpose of protecting the freedmen seems to dominate the entire course of the bill, and, as we will see, it was said
to be the "well known origin" of the 1867 Act by the House Judiciary Committee when the Court's appellate jurisdiction was restored in 1884-85. And, aside from the class of persons protected,
there is nothing in the legislative history that alters the conclusion
from the text that the Act did not change the English limitations
except in the mode of factual inquiry.
Charles Warren, in his history of the Supreme Court pub-

172
2165.

CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2096 (1868); see also id. at 2095, 2115, 2127,

It should be noted that Trumbull was counsel for the Government in the Supreme
Court in McCardl. Id. at 2096. He restated the same purpose of the 1867 Act in the
Court:
What was the purpose of that act> We all know. It is a matter of legislative, nay,
of public history. It was to relieve persons from a deprivation of their liberty
under State laws; to protect loyal men in the rebel states from oppression under
color of State laws administered by rebel officers; to protect especially those who
had formerly been slaves, and who, under color of vagrant and apprentice laws
in some of the States, were being reduced to a bondage more intolerable than
that from which they had been recently delivered. It was to protect such persons
and for such a purpose that the law of 1867 was passed ....
McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 322.
Because Trumbull was counsel for the Government in the McCardle case, it may be
argued that he was inclined to construe the 1867 Act narrowly. This might be persuasive
if Trumbull's argument was novel, but it was exactly in line with Lawrence's argument of
the year before.
173 Even here, Johnson retreated from his statement and seemed to confuse the
habeas act and the indemnity act. See Weicek, supra note 139, at 540 (citing CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2120 (1868)).
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lished in 1926, supports Congressman Lawrence's construction of
the 1867 Act. In his history of the McCardle case, Warren describes
the Act as "enacted by Congress for the protection of Federal
officials and other loyal persons against adverse action by the
Courts and officials in the late Confederate States." 74 He noted
the irony that, with the McCardle case, "this Act designed to enforce the Reconstruction measures was now seized upon as a weapon to test their validity."17
The March 3, 1865 resolution, the December 19, 1865 resolution, the Ballard example and the historical conditions behind the
Act, the statements of Lawrence in 1867, the statement of
Trumbull in 1868 when Congress suspended the Court's jurisdiction, and, as we shall see, the 1884 report of the House Judiciary
Committee that accompanied the 1885 restoration of the Court's
jurisdiction, all support each other in demonstrating that the intent of the 1867 Act was to extend to the specific condition of the
freedmen and loyal Unionists in the South.1 76 Any broader construction sweeps beyond the purposes of Congress expressed in
the public record.
C.

The 1885 Habeas CorpusJurisdictionAct

The purpose and legislative history of the 1885 Act that restored the Court's appellate jurisdiction over the 1867 Act is also
revealing. Yet, that purpose has never been fully illuminated. Nevertheless, the purpose of the 1885 Act directly bears on Congress's
understanding of the 1867 Act and on contemporary understanding of the Court's habeas jurisprudence.
The 1885 Act was developed against a backdrop of criticism of
expansive interpretations of the 1867 Act by lower federal courts

174 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 464 (1926).
175 Id. at 465.
176 Cf William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13
AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 333 (1969). Wiecek baldly asserts that Congress "transformed the
nature of the Great Writ itself" in the 1867 Act. Id. at 333. By this he means that "the
writ became a means of reviewing judicial confinement" Id. at 342. While Wiecek acknowledges that the 1867 Act came to be broadly construed, he does not provide any
evidence that it was intended to apply beyond the condition of the freedman and federal
officials in the South. In fact, in his unique, backhanded way, he confirms that the 1867
Act may have evolved to encompass any constitutional claims of any state prisoner, notwithstanding that that was not the purpose of the 39th Congress ("Most congressmen
and senators, however, did not foresee the ultimate consequences of that act. Possibly no
federal statute of equivalent importance had such an inconspicuous beginning; probably
none was enacted so inadvertently."). Wiecek, supra note 139, at 538.
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which disregarded the jurisdiction of the state courts. '7 At the
August, 1883 annual meeting of the American Bar Association
(ABA), Judge Seymour D. Thompson presented a paper that was
critical of the expansive interpretation of the 1867 Act applied by
lower federal courts in trumping state court judgments. 8
It is a well settled principle of statutory construction that statutes relating to a subject founded upon the common law are
to be construed with reference to the rules and principles of
the common law, and are not to be extended beyond the plain
import of their terms, when in derogation of that law. This
principle forbids that the act of 1867 should be extended to
the overthrowing, in collateral proceedings by the summary
process of habeas corpus used by the inferior Federal judges, of
the judgments
and decrees of the courts of the several
79
States.

Thompson proposed that the Court's appellate jurisdiction over
the 1867 Act be restored for the specific purpose of curtailing
expansive federal court applications of the Act.'
Around the same time, Vermont Congressman Luke P. Poland, a member of the House Judiciary Committee, was studying
the expansive application given to the 1867 Act by some lower
federal courts.' Poland was Vermont's U.S. Senator at the time

177 Between 1868 and 1883, the lower federal courts had continued to apply the
1867 Act, but the Supreme Court did not consider habeas cases under the 1867 Act
because its appellate jurisdiction had been suspended.
178 Thompson, supra note 40, at 243. The paper was referred to the ABA's Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform for further analysis and became part of the Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the ABA.
Seymour D. Thompson (1842-1904), a veteran of the Civil War, was admitted to the
bar in 1869 and became a master in chancery in St. Louis. He became the associate
editor of the Central Law Journal, when it was founded in 1874, and served as editor
from 1875-78. Between 1883 and his death in 1904, he was co-editor of the American Law
Review. Between 1880 and 1892, he was a judge of the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
Thompson published a number of treatises, perhaps the most distinquished being COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

(7 vols. 1895-99)

(D. Malone ed.,

1936).
179 Thompson, supra note 40, at 263.
180 His paper was published as the lead article in the January-Febnsray 1884 issue of
the American Law Review, of which Thompson was a co-editor. Thompson had and would
publish other articles involving or relating to habeas corpus. Seymour D. Thompson,
Habeas Corpus in Controversies Touching the Custody of Children, 7 CRIM. L. MAO. & REP. 1
(Jan. 1886); Seymour D. Thompson, Note on Habeas Corpus, 18 F. 68 (1883) (after In re
Brosnahan, 18 F. 62 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1883) cited in Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Seymour D. Thompson, Void Sentences, 4 CRIM. L
MAG. & REP. 797 (Nov. 1883).
181 Poland (1815-1887) was a justice of the Vermont Supreme Court between 1850-
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of the passage of the 1867 Act and told the 1884 ABA annual
meeting that he "had something to do with the passage of that
act," though he did not elaborate. 82 He was motivated to further
examine the matter by an expansive federal habeas case in Vermont.a Significantly, Poland was also the chairman of the Executive Committee of the AB.
In 1883-84, Poland, on behalf of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced various bills to curtail the 1867 Act.18 4 One of
Poland's bills was referred to a subcommittee of the Judiciary
Committee, made up of Poland and Congressman James 0.
Broadhead of Missouri. On behalf of the House Judiciary Committee, Poland filed House Report Number 730 in March 1884 which
criticized the expansive interpretation given the 1867 Act by certain federal courts."s Some of the bills would have specifically
amended the 1867 Act and significantly limited habeas corpus for
state prisoners, but the Report indicated that the Committee fa-

1865, when he resigned to serve as Vermont's U.S. Senator from November 1865 to
March 1867. "At once assigned to the committee on judiciary, he quickly won respect by
his able arguments on constitutional questions, his resistance to extreme partisan demands, and his proposals for constructive legislation-especially for a new bankruptcy law
and the compilation and revision of all the statute laws of the United States." 15 DiCTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 33 (Dumas Malone ed., 1935). In 1867, he exchanged
seats with Vermont Congressman Justin Morrill and served in the House until 1875. In
the 40th Congress, he would eventually serve as Chairman of the Committee on Revision
of the Laws and as chairman of three select committees, including one in 1871 that
investigated the Ku Klux Klan in the South and issued a report that influenced congressional legislation. Id. (citing H. REP. No. 22, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1871)). Poland returned to the practice of law in 1875, except for service in the 48th Congress. Id. at 34.
182 7 ANN. REP. AmER. BAR AssOC. 31 (1884) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORTS].
183 This is presumably Ex parte Houghton, 7 F. 657 (C.C.D. Vt. 1881). This is one of
the lower federal decisions criticized in the House Judiciary Committee's 1884 Report.
H.R. REP. No. 730, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1884).
184 15 CONG. REG. 118 (1883) (introducing H.R. 1582, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884)
which limited the use of the writ of habeas corpus); 15 CONG. REC. 292 (1884) (introducing H.R. 2841, 48th Cong., Ist.Sess. (1884) which regulated proceedings and appeals
in writs of habeas corpus); 15 CONG. REC. 1,719 (1884) (introducing H.RL 5691, 48th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1884) which amended Rev. Stat. § 764). Poland also introduced H.R.
4308, a bill that would have allowed a writ of error in certain criminal cases. 15 CONG.
REc. 738 (1884).
185 H.R. REP. No. 730, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1884) (citing Ex pane Houghton, 7
F. 657 (C.C.D. Vt. 1881); In re Wong Yung Qui, 6 Sawyer 237 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880); In re
Ah Lee, 6 Sawyer 410 (D. Or. 1880); In re Lee Tong, 1 West Coast Rep. 35 (1884)).
This Report was cited by Justice Harlan in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 453 n.8 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), and by Justice Powell in Schneckloth, v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 225 n.9 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring), but neither explained (or perhaps realized)
that it was the official House Report that accompanied the Habeas Jurisdiction Act of
1885.
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vored restoring the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in the belief that
the Court would, in turn, restore the proper scope of the 1867
Act. The Report summarized all federal laws granting habeas jurisdiction and then noted that the 1867 Act was "the act which has
had the effect of greatly enlarging the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts and judges, in granting writs of habeas corpus."' The Report noted:
The condition of things caused by the late civil war is the well
known origin of this act. In that portion of the country which
had been in revolt against the national authority, and which
had been largely the theater of hostile military movements,
there existed a very anomalous and unsettled condition of
society. A minority of the former citizens had adhered, so far
as lay in their power, to the old Government, and rendered as
little aid and allegiance as possible to the Confederacy.
The overthrow of slavery and the conferring of citizenship
upon the colored population were results of the war, and
could not be expected to meet favorable consideration by the
people of the States mainly affected by these changes. It was
felt that these classes could hardly expect to get fair and impartial justice at the hands of the local tribunals, and many
acts of Congress were passed to extend to them, as far as possible under the Constitution, the protection of the Federal
courts. This act of 1867 was of that class of statutes. It may be
that the danger and necessity of such legislation was overestimated, but that it did exist to some extent was apparent from
the condition of things and the ordinary operation of human
18 7
motives and passions.
After criticizing various federal decisions which expansively construed the 1867 Act,"a the Report stated:
These cases, and some others that might be cited, show
that under this act of 1867, the early and long-established idea
of keeping the jurisdictions of national and State tribunals distinct and separate, as to this class of cases, is entirely overturned.
The committee do not believe that Congress, in passing
the act of 1867, intended any such thing, or that the true construction of the act warrants any such thing. Nor does there
seem to have been any occasion for such action, or to stretch

186
187
188

H.R. REP. No. 730 at 3.
Id.
See genralUy cases cited supra note 185.
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Federal jurisdiction into the clear domain of State jurisdiction,
as has been done. In the Vermont case, if the petitioner
claimed that the Vermont statute under which he was convicted
conflicted with a national statute, a writ of error would have
carried his case to the Supreme Court of the United States, if
the State court decided against his contention. So, if he did
not raise the question on his trial, but the court had no juris-

diction, so that the conviction and sentence were void, the
State courts and judges had ample jurisdiction to relieve him
on habeas corpus.
The same may be said in substance of the other cases. But
if the act of 1867 intended to allow interference in cases of arrests by State officers, under State authority, the committee do
not believe that it was contemplated by its framers or can properly be construed to authorize the overthrow of the final judgments of the State courts of general jurisdiction, by the inferior
Federal judges, whose judgments shall be final, and thus make
them a court of errors over the highest tribunals of the
States."s
The Report cited the Supreme Court's decision in Watkins as establishing the correct rule of law, "that when a court has pronounced judgment in a case where it has general jurisdiction of
the subject-matter, that judgment, unless reversed in a direct proceeding for that purpose, pronounces the law of the case.""9
The Report concluded by recommending a substitute bill
(H.R. 5691)-which would restore the right of appeal to the Supreme Court under the 1867 Act-for the Committee bill (H.R.
2841), which would have specifically curtailed federal habeas for
state prisoners. This substitute became the bill that restored the
Court's appellate jurisdiction in 1885.191 The Report explained:
The bill referred to the committee [H.R. 2841] attempts to
curtail and restrain to a certain extent the powers assumed by
the Federal judges under the act of 1867. The committee find
this a nice and difficult task. The special causes which were deemed
sufficient to make the act of 1867 necessaiy may exist yet to some
extent, so that the committee do not feel justified in recommending its
repeal They deem it advisable now to do no more than to
recommend the restoration of the right of appeal to the Su-

189
(citing
190
191

H.L REP. No. 730 at 5; see also Fay, 372 U.S. at 453 n.8 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
Report without examination or comment).
H. REP. No. 730 at 5.
15 CONG. REc. 1,719 (1884).
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preme Court, just as the act of 1867 gave it, and therefore
report a bill to that effect as a substitute for the bill referred
to them. With this right of appeal restored, the true extent of the act
of 1867, and the true limits of the jurisdiction of the Federal courts
and judges under it, will become defined, and it can then be seen
whetherfurther legislation is necessary.'92

Congressman Poland repeated this purpose in the House on
May 31, 1884, the day the bill was debated and passed:
The Judiciary Committee have made a full report upon this
subject and have pointed out the evils that have grown out of
this taking away of the right of appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States. Inferior Federal judges have taken a very
wide jurisdiction and have overthrown the decisions of the
highest courts of the States, and have made themselves really a
court of error over the decisions of the highest State tribunals.
The object of this bill is to restore this right of appeal to the
Supreme Court, so that the proper exercise of its decision may
be brought about.'

In response to a question by Congressman Hammond whether
"this legislation do[es] anything more than restore the law to what
it was prior to the McCardle case," Poland responded, "Nothing
more. It makes the act of 1867 just as it was when it was
passed."194 The bill passed the House unanimously and was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. 5
Two months after the House passed the substitute bill, the
ABA held its 1884 Annual meeting in August, which Congressman
Poland attended as Chairman of the Executive Committee. Judge
Thompson's paper of the previous summer was discussed at length
and Poland participated.'9 6 During the discussion of Thompson's
paper, Poland reported on the purpose and status of the legislation before Congress:
The case that was decided in my own state two or three years
ago-and one that is alluded to by Judge Thompson in his paper-caused me to give some attention to it, before that paper
was read .... What troubled me in reference to it was, that
the lowest class of federal judges, district judges, were thereby
turned into courts of error, to overthrow the final judgments of

192
193
194
195

H.R. REP. No. 730 at 5-6 (emphasis added).
15 CONG. REc. 4,710 (1884).
Id.
15 CONG, REc. 4,733 (1884).

196

See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 182, at 12-44.
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the highest jurisdiction of the state; and from them there is no
appeal. There have been other instances in other parts of the
United States of far more flagrant cases than this in Vermont.
Within the last year, the United States District Judge in the
state of Oregon, released a man who had been convicted and
sentenced for keeping a gambling house, in violation of an
ordinance of some town in that state.[197] That man was
brought before the judge on a writ of habeas corpus. The judge
decided that the ordinance was invalid because it went beyond
what the general law of the state authorized. But the way that
he obtained jurisdiction, was by putting it upon the ground
that the man was unlawfully imprisoned, because the ordinance
was invalid, and, therefore, he was imprisoned in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
That interpretation would give to a United States judge
the most unlimited jurisdiction. So I gave my attention to this
subject in the last session of Congress, and considered a good
many ways of reaching the difficulty, but I finally satisfied myself that all that could practically be done was to restore the
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which was
given by this broad act of 1867.'
Working independently of Poland since the ABA's 1883 Annual meeting, the ABA's Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform analyzed Thompson's paper and suggested reforms at the
August 1884 meeting."9 The ABA proceeded to approve a motion instructing the Committee "to advocate the passage of a bill,

by Congress, restoring the right of appeal in habeas corpus cases to
the Supreme Court as given by the act of 1867. "2° The House
bill was favorably reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee in
1884 and was finally enacted in 1885, with virtually no debate in
the Senate.2"'

197 This is presumably In re Lee Tong, 1 West Coast Rep. 35 (1884) (decision filed
November 3, 1883).
198 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 182, at 29-30.
199 The Committee reported that "the complaint that the process, judgments, and
decrees of state courts are improperly interfered with by writs of habeas corpus issued by
federal tribunals" was "a just one, and the abuse still remains as a mischief in our jurisprudence which surely demands a remedy by the passage of an act of Congress, whereby it may be provided that when a prisoner under a writ from a state court is discharged under a habeas corpus issued by circuit or a district court, an appeal may be
taken by the proper state authorities to the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. at
17.
200 Id. at 43.
201 16 CONG. REc. 2481 (1885).
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In Ex parte Royal42 °2 the first case applying the 1867 Act after
its jurisdiction was restored, the Court adopted the exhaustion
doctrine and the jurisdictional principles of Watkins that would be
applied for the next forty years. The Court's focus on the primacy
of "jurisdiction" accorded exactly with the Judiciary Committee's
invocation of Watkins as the true interpretation of the law, thus effectively precluding "further legislation" that the Committee Report contemplated. The Court came to read the Act in line with
the habeas corpus principles of the 1679 English Act and the
Court's decisions in Bollman and Watkins.
Professor Wiecek con20 3
cluded that the Court "took the hint.
IV.

A.

THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
AND ITS CRITICS

Challenging Court Jurisdiction Before Brown v. Allen

The importance of the jurisdiction of the committing court in
defining and limiting the scope of the writ extends back at least
to the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. o' The Act of
1679-which, as the Court held, "enforces the common
law" 2 5-expressly excluded "those committed or detained for
treason or felony plainly expressed in the warrant, and persons
convict, or in execution by legal process."2" A number of common law authorities confirmed, as the general rule, that the writ
of habeas corpus for illegal detention was not available to persons
convicted or in execution by legal process. 7

202 117 U.S. 241 (1886); see also Ex pare Royall, 117 U.S. 254 (1886) (original).
203 Wiecek, supra note 139, at 544-45.
204 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
205 Ex part Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830).
206 Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 21 (1876).
207 Coke "excepted from the privilege of the writ persons imprisoned upon conviction for a crime, or in execution." Parks, 93 U.S. at 21 (citing 2 Inst. 52). Hale stated,
"If it appear by the return of the writ that the party be wrongfully committed, or by one
that hath not jurisdiction, or for a cause for which a man ought not to be imprisoned,
he shall be discharged or bailed." Parks, 93 U.S. at 21-22 (citing 2 Hale's H. P. C. 144);
see also Parks, 93 U.S. at 22 ("[W]hen a person is convict or in execution by legal process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, no relief can be had."); Lx parte Lange,
85 U.S. (1 Wall.) 163, 187 (1873) (Clifford, J., dissenting) ("[N]or is it true that the writ
of habeas corpus was ever intended to operate as the means of delivering a prisoner
from his imprisonment if he had been duly indicted, convicted, and sentenced, and is in
prison by virtue of a lawful conviction under a valid indictment and a legal sentence
passed in pursuance of a constitutional law of the jurisdiction where the offence was
committed."); The King v. Suddis, 102 Eng. Rep. 119 (1801) ("It is a general rule, that
where a person has been committed under the judgment of another Court of competent
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The seminal case of the nineteenth century on the jurisdiction doctrine is Ex parte Watkins,"8 where the Court followed the
doctrine in applying the Judiciary Act of 1789 to federal prisoners.
There, Marshall wrote for a unanimous court that the writ of
habeas corpus was "in the nature of a writ of error, to examine
the legality of the commitment" and "brings up the body of the
prisoner, with the cause of commitment."2" The Court could "inquire into the sufficiency of that cause" but the judgment of a
court of "competent jurisdiction" was sufficient to uphold the com210
mitment and refuse the writ.
A judgment, in its nature, concludes the subject on which it is
rendered, and pronounces the law of the case. The judgment
of a court of record, whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive
on all the world as the judgment of this court would be. It is
as conclusive on this court as it is on other courts.
It puts an
2
end to inquiry concerning the fact, by deciding it. 11
Watkins' counsel contended that these principles were true for "a
case in which the indictment alleges a crime cognizable in the
court by which the judgment was pronounced," but not to a case
"in which the indictment charges an offence not punishable criminally according to the law of the land." Marshall denied that the
Court could "look into the indictment," because "[a]n imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment
be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity, if the court has
general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be errone2 12

ous."

criminal jurisdiction, this Court [King's Bench] cannot review the sentence upon a return
to a habeas corpus ....
In such cases this court is not a court of appeal.").
208 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
209 Id. at 202.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 203. Moreover, "[i]f its judgment was erroneous, a point which this court
does not determine, still it is a judgment, and, until reversed, cannot be disregarded"
and "the judgments of a court of record, having general jurisdiction of the subject, although erroneous, are binding, until reversed." Id. at 206-07.
Marshall reasoned that the Watkins case was analogous to Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173 (1809), involving a writ of error to a judgment, in which the
court was held to have no jurisdiction and its judgment held to be an "absolute nullity."
"If the jurisdiction does not appear upon the face of the proceedings, the presumption
of law is, that the court had not jurisdiction, and the cause was coram non judic; in
which case no valid judgment could be rendered." Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193,
204 (1830).
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It is universally understood, that the judgments of the courts of
the United States, although their jurisdiction be not shown in
the pleadings, are yet binding on all the world; and that this
apparent want of jurisdiction can avail the party only on a writ
of error. This acknowledged principle seems to us, to settle the
question now before the court. The judgment of the circuit
court, in a criminal case, is, of itself, evidence of its own legality, and requires for its support, no inspection of the indictments on which it is founded. The law trusts that court with
the whole subject, and has not confided to this court the power of revising its decisions. We cannot usurp that power, by the
instrumentality of the writ of habeas corpus. The judgment informs us that the commitment is legal, and with that information, it is our duty to be satisfied."'
The Court held that "the judgment of a court of general criminal
jurisdiction justifies his imprisonment, and that the writ of habeas
corpus ought not be awarded." 1 " Thus, the importance of the
committing court's jurisdiction stems from Watkins, which derived
it from the English Act of 1679. Watkins became the seminal
American decision, cited by state and federal courts for the next
100 years. 5
Between the Civil War and Frank v. Mangum,"6 the Court
consciously adhered to the jurisdiction doctrine of Watkins, even as
it evolved. The most significant part of that evolution involved the
concept that a court's jurisdiction was eliminated by a void judgment and the corresponding distinction between void and voidable
judgments. This concept was elaborated and extended through a
series of cases until the Court tried to make some sense of the
exceptions in Henry v. Henkef 17 on the eve of Frank. Frank and
Moore v. Dempsey 8 significantly broadened the Court's habeas jurisprudence, and the Court's jurisdiction doctrine was further
diluted over the ensuing thirty-five years leading up to Brown v. Alen.2" 9 The evolution of the Court's doctrine has been the subject
of continuing debate within the Court and by legal scholars since
Brown v. Allen. The various schools of thought, in turn, continue

213
214
215
216
217
218
219

Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 207.
Id. at 209.
See infra note 267.
237 U.S. 309 (1915).
235 U.S. 219 (1914).
261 U.S. 86 (1923).
344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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to shape Supreme Court doctrine, as is indicated by the colloquy
Thomas and O'Connor in their opinions in
between Justices
0
Wright v. West.2
Contemporary advocates of broad habeas jurisdiction rely on
cases like Ex parte Lange,22 1 decided during the period that the
Court's appellate jurisdiction was suspended under the 1867 Act.
Lange involved a federal indictment for stealing mailbags and was
decided under the Judiciary Act of 1789. The prisoner had been
sentenced to a fine of $200 and one year imprisonment when the
statutory authority allowed only the power to punish by fine or
imprisonment. The district court vacated the judgment and imposed another punishment on the same verdict. The Supreme
Court held that the power of the court came to an end when the
judgment had been executed, "when the prisoner.., by reason
of a valid judgment, had fully suffered one of the alternative punishments to which alone the law subjected him, the power of the
court to punish further was gone. " M The Court "[d]isclaim[ed]
any assertion of a general power of review over the judgments of
the inferior courts in criminal cases, by the use of the writ of
habeas corpus or otherwise . . . ."' It is important to point out
that Lange involved a federal prisoner and the action of a federal
circuit court, not a state prisoner or state court. Lange exemplifies
no more than the Supreme Court's exercise of discretionary review over the federal courts, as one commentator suggested. 4
The Court in subsequent cases denied a broad interpretation
of Lange.2's Even when the Court expanded habeas in Frank and

220 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
221 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
222 Id. at 176. The holding in Lange is specifically supported by other state and federal cases of the era construing the concept of jurisdiction. See ROLUN C. HURD, A TREATISE ON PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON-THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPus 327-30 (2d ed., Albany,
W.C. Little & Co. 1876).
223 Lange, 85 U.S. at 166.
224 Thompson, Void Sentences, supra note 180, at 832-33. In fact, the Court said exactly
this in Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 21 (1876): "This [a writ of habeas corpus] is one of
the modes in which this court exercises supervisory power over inferior courts and tribunals; but it is a special mode, confined to a limited class of cases."
225 See, e.g., Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442 (1910). The Court noted:
We find nothing in these cases [citing Lange; In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887);
In re Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887); Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 (1889)] to conflict
with the well established rule in this court that the *writ of habeas corpus cannot
be made to perform the office of a writ of error.. . . The attack is thus not
upon the jurisdiction and authority of the court to proceed to investigate and
determine the truth of the charge, but upon the sufficiency of the evidence to
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Moore, it never relied on Lange. For example, the Court in Ex parte
2 26 interpreted Lange as
Park
being consistent with the general
rule of jurisdiction and distinguishable. Parks involved a federal
forgery conviction and an application for habeas under the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Court denied the writ, holding that the district court "had plenary jurisdiction" of the matter:
In Ex parte Lange we proceeded on the ground, that, when the
court rendered its second judgment, the case was entirely out
of its hands. It was functus officio in regard to it. The judgment
first rendered had been executed and satisfied. The subsequent
proceedings were, therefore, according to our view, void.
But, in the case before us, the District Court had plenary
jurisdiction, both of the person, the place, the cause, and everything about it. To review the decision of that court by
means of the writ of habeas corpus would be to convert that writ
into a mere writ of error, and to assume an appellate power
which has never been conferred upon this court." '
Advocates of broad federal habeas, like Professor Gary Pelldr,
would take the last phrase to mean that the lack of appellate
jurisdiction was the reason for denying habeas. But the Court said
something quite different-that the use of habeas in such a manner would "convert" it and make it something it was not. It was
only stated as an additional reason why that conversion would
make it into an appellate power that had not been conferred, and
that additional reason simply confirmed why habeas could not be
used in that manner.
The Court's early doctrine was stated quite plainly in Parks.
"[W]hen a person is convict or in execution by legal process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, no relief can be had.
Of course, a superior court will interfere if the inferior court had
exceeded its jurisdiction, or was not competent to act."22 Here

show the guilt of the accused. This has never been held to be within the province of a writ of habeas corpus. Upon habeas corpus the court examines only the
power and authority of the court to act, not the correctness of its conclusions.
Id. at 447-48. See also Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S. 219, 228 (1914) (referring to Lange as
.exceptional").
226 93 U.S. 18 (1876).
227 Id. at 23.
228 Id. at 22. The Court also stated:
[W]here the prisoner is in execution upon a conviction, the writ ought not to
be issued, or, if issued, the prisoner should at once be remanded, if the court
below had jurisdiction of the offence, and did no act beyond the powers conferred upon it. The court will look into the proceedings so far as to determine
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again, the Court focused on the nature of habeas and distinguished it from a writ of error. The Court denied habeas because
"the court below had power to determine the question before
it

..

"229

Likewise, the Court in Ex parte Bigelow" construed Lange as
consistent with the general rule of jurisdiction and distinguished
it:
In that case [Lange] the petitioner had been tried, convicted,
and sentenced for an offence for which he was liable to the
alternative punishment of fine or imprisonment. The court
imposed both. He paid the fine, and made application to the
same court by writ of habeas corpus for release on the ground
that he was then entitled to his discharge. The Circuit Court,
on this application, instead of releasing the prisoner, set aside
its erroneous judgment, and sentenced him to further imprisonment. This court held that the prisoner, having been tried,
convicted, and sentenced for that offence, and having performed the sentence as to the fine, the authority of the Circuit
Court over the case was at an end, and the subsequent proceedings were void.
In the present case no verdict, nor judgment was rendered, no sentence enforced, and it remained with the trial
court to decide whether the acts on which he relied were a
defence to any trial at all."'
Bigelow involved an action for a writ under the Court's original
jurisdiction. The Court denied habeas for a prisoner whose conviction and sentence for embezzlement were affirmed by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The petitioner contended that he had been subjected to double jeopardy contrary to the
Fifth Amendment, that the court below exceeded its jurisdiction,
and that the sentence was therefore void. Justice Miller, for a

this question. If it finds that the court below has transcended its powers, it will
grant the writ and discharge the prisoner, even after judgment. [citing Kearney,
Wells and Lange] But if the court had jurisdiction and power to convict and
sentence, the writ cannot issue to correct a mere error.
Id. at 23.
229 Id. at 23.
230 113 U.S. 328 (1884).
231 Id. at 331; see also Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442, 447-48 (1910) (citing Lange
as an example of a case "where collateral attacks have been sustained through the medium of a writ of habeas corpus, the grounds were such as attacked the validity of the judgments, and the objections sustained were such as rendered the judgment not merely
erroneous, but void").
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unanimous Court, commented on the concept of jurisdiction:
This Article V of the Amendments, and Articles VI and
VII, contain other provisions concerning trials in the courts of
the United States designed as safeguards to the rights of parties. Do all of these go to the jurisdiction of the courts? And
are all judgments void where they have been disregarded in
the progress of the trial? Is a judgment of conviction void
when a deposition has been read against a person on trial for
crime because he was not confronted with the witness, or because the indictment did not inform him with sufficient
clearness of the nature and cause of the accusation?
It may be confessed that it is not always very easy to determine what matters go to the jurisdiction of a court so as to
make its action when erroneous a nullity. But the general rule
is that when the court has jurisdiction by law of the offence
charged, and of the party who is so charged, its judgments are
not nullities." 2
Similarly, Justice Bradley stated the general rule very clearly in
1879 in Ex parte Siebold,23 also involving a federal prisoner:
The only ground on which this court, or any court, without
some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas
corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another
court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person
or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings
void.2"
He sought to distinguish the instance of an erroneous judgment
from an illegal or void judgment by reference to Lange and Parks.
In the former case [Lange], we held that the judgment was
void, and released the petitioner accordingly; in the latter
[Parks], we held that the judgment, whether erroneous or not,
was not void, because the court had jurisdiction of the cause;
and we refused to interfere."5
However, the Court in Siebold, stated, in dictum, that if acts of
Congress were unconstitutional, the Court could consider that
question on habeas jurisdiction:
If this position is well taken, it affects the foundation of the

232

Bigelow, 113 U.S. at 330-31.

233

100 U.S. 371 (1879).

234
235

Id. at 375.
Id.
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whole proceedings. An unconstitutional law is void, and is as
no law. An offence created by it is not a crime. A conviction
under it is not merely erroneous, but is illegal and void, and
cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment. It is true, if no writ
of error lies, the judgment may be final, in the sense that
there may be no means of reversing it .... We are satisified
that the present is one of the cases in which this court is authorized to take such jurisdiction. We think so, because, if the
laws are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court acquired
no jurisdiction of the causes. Its authority to indict and try the
petitioners arose solely upon these laws.'
Siebold stated a general rule in line with the Court's precedents
because an unconstitutional statute as the sole basis for conviction
deprived the court of jurisdiction and rendered its sentence void,
"not merely erroneous." Like Lange, Siebold is relied on by modem
advocates of broad habeas jurisdiction, but the Court itself denied
such an expansive view of Siebold.2 7 And when the Court expanded habeas in Frank and Moore, it never relied on Siebold. In fact,
the Court in Frank cited Siebold for the proposition that the writ
may not be used "as a substitute for a writ of error. " ss

Professor Paul Bator suggested that the Court's decision in
Siebold was uniquely influenced by the fact that, in the case of federal prisoners in criminal cases, no appeal to the Court was available by statute at that time, and that the Court pragmatically
reached out, through its habeas jurisdiction, to address the underlying issues of constitutionality. 9 This inference was also voiced
and criticized in a contemporaneous article by Judge Seymour
Thompson,2 4 but Thompson also pointed out, like Bator, that

236 Id. at 376-77. In the companion case of Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879), the
Court also considered and upheld the constitutionality of certain acts of Congress and
held that "the cause of commitment [of the petitioner] was lawful and sufficient." Id. at
404.
237 See, e.g., Ex parte Crouch, 112 U.S. 178, 180 (1884) (denying writ, citing Lange
and Siebold for the proposition that the "office of a writ of habeas corpus" is not to correct errors committed in determining the sufficiency of defense).
238 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915). Not until Fay was Siebold relied upon
to expand habeas jurisdiction. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 408 (1963).
239 Bator, supra note 27, at 473 (citing Act of April 29, 1908, ch. 31, § 6, 2 Stat.
159; Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 517, § 1, 17 Stat. 196).
240
The Supreme Court of the United States, which, as already pointed out, has insensibly drifted into the habit of using the writ of habeas corpus as a substitute
for the writ of error in criminal cases, has lately promulgated the opposite doctrine, and the ground on which they place their conclusion is thus stated by Mr.
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this tendency was subsequently discouraged by the Court, starting
with Ex parte Reed 4' In fact, as Bator noted, the Court itself
seemed to acknowledge this temporary tendency in retrospect in
Salinger v. Loise.242
A significant element of this modem debate over habeas jurisdiction is a reluctance to understand the nineteenth century doctrine on its own terms, and an inclination to superimpose the
hundred years of succeeding constitutional criminal procedure on
to the language of the 1867 Act. Almost all modem commentators
view the Court's jurisdiction doctrine as arcane. Contemporary
commentators were less skeptical, however, and gave the doctrine
serious consideration within the context of then-prevailing views of
jurisdiction. Judge Seymour Thompson's exhaustive 1883 article,
published four years after the Siebold decision, sought to clarify the
law.243 Thompson wrote that the law distinquished between court
judgments which are "merely void and those which are voidable in
a direct proceeding instituted for the purpose of vacating them,
setting them aside, or reversing them. A void judgment is, in law,
a nullity. It is as nothing."244 If a void judgment was enforced by

imprisoning a defendant, it could be attacked collaterally and the
prisoner discharged through habeas corpus. However, if the error
did not render the judgment "absolutely void," collateral relief was

Justice Swayne [Thompson's quotation from Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23
(1879) omitted here] ....
The reasons which uphold this use of the writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of the United States do not apply in the state courts. No writ of
error is allowed to remove criminal cases from the inferior federal courts to the
Supreme Court of the United States. If the inferior federal judicatories abuse
their powers, the only direct remedy which is afforded to the defendant is an
appeal from the District to the Circuit Court, which, in most cases, is simply an
appeal from one judge to another. The absolute need of some superintending control
on the part of the federal court of last resort seems lately to have induced it, contrary to
its decision in the earlier case of Watkins, to extend the writ of habeas corpus to the
case which we are now considering.
Thompson, Void Sentences, supra note 180, at 832-33 (emphasis added); see also id. at 806
(suggesting same reason for Siebold decision).
241 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
242 265 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1924) ("In early times when a refusal to discharge was not
open to appellate review, courts and judges were accustomed to exercise an independent
judgment on each successive application, regardless of the number. But when a right to
an appellate review was given the reason for that practice ceased and the practice came
to be materially changed,-just as when a right to comprehensive review in criminal
cases was given the scope of inquiry deemed admissible on habeas corpus came to be
relatively narrowed.").
243 Thompson, Void Sentences, supra note 180.
244 Id. at 798.
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not available and the defendant could only seek to correct the
error by appeal or writ of error. Thompson demonstrated that
there were many "irregularities," such as change of venue, which
did not render the sentence void. Some courts made finer distinctions between errors which" were illegal-which "for want of
power or jurisdiction [] are wholly illegal and void"-and those
which were irregular-"voidable only in direct proceedings by
appeal, writ of error, certiorariand the like."245
When, therefore, the judgment of the court in which a prisoner is held in confinement is called in question in a proceeding
by habeas corpus, the question is to be, Is the judgment "contrary to the principles of law, as distinquished from the rules of
procedure?" Or, is there a complete defect in it? Or, is there
something which the law deems material and requires to be

stated, and which is altogether omitted? 46
Thompson cited Watkins as denying the distinction and Siebold as
upholding it.
Thompson cited five types of error which rendered criminal
judgments "absolutely void." First, "pretended judgments rendered
by persons usurping the functions of lawfully-constituted courts."
These would be upheld against collateral attack when the act was
by a de facto officer. Second, judgments by courts with no jurisdiction. Under the general rule derived from the 1679 English Act,
"where it appears by the return of a writ of habeas corpus that the
prisoner is held in execution under the judgment of a court hav24
ing competent jurisdiction, he must be remanded to custody." 7
Third, judgments for "offenses" which are not offenses under the
law. These resulted in a conflict of judicial opinion over whether a
court could inquire into the basis for such offense on habeas corpus review. Citing Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Watkins,
Thompson concluded:
[T]he only rule capable of vindication upon principle, is that if
the crime of which the prisoner stands convicted is a crime of

245 Id. at 805. For example, "to sentence a man in his absence, when the absence
was occasioned by the order of the court pronouncing the sentence, would be an irregularity merely, reviewable alone on error, while to sentence him to imprisonment for a
crime punishable by a pecuniary fine only, would be illegal, and hence, wholly void." Id.
(citing ROLLrN HURD, HABEAS CoRPus 333 (lst ed. 1858)). This example supports the
Supreme Court's analysis in Lange and Siebokd
246 Thompson, Void Sentences, supra note 180, at 806.
247 Id. at 810.
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which the court convicting him would have had jurisdiction if
it were a crime in point of law, the judgment of the court
cannot be assailed collaterally under the writ of habeas corpus,
but if the court has committed error in adjudging that to be a
crime which is, in point of law, no crime, the error can only
be corrected by a direct proceeding for that purpose.24

Thompson noted that Watkins had been reaffirmed in Ex parte
249
Parks.
Fourth, sentences which are not authorized by law.
Thompson held these to be assailable only on direct review. Although Thompson considered the Supreme Court to have "insensibly drifted into the habit of using the writ of habeas corpus as a
substitute for the writ of error in criminal cases," he pointed to Ex
parte Reed" as reaffirming the opposite rule. Finally, "sentences
which are so informal and uncertain that they cannot be carried
into execution." Unless an express enabling statute allowed discharges, as some states provided, Thompson held that habeas
corpus was not available in such cases. Similar discussions of jurisdiction were replicated in the leading treatises of the day."

248
249
250
251

Id. at 820.
93 U.S. 18 (1876).
100 U.S. 13 (1879).
See, e.g., HURD, supra note 46, at 327:
The jurisdiction over the process being only collaterally appellate, the habeas
corpus, as before intimated, cannot have the force and operation of a writ of
error or a certiorari; nor is it designed as a substitute for either. It does not,
like them, deal with errors or irregularities which render a proceeding voidable
only; but with those radical defects which render it absolutely void ....
A
proceeding defective for irregularity and one void for illegality may be reversed
upon error or certiorari; but it is the latter defect only which gives authority to
discharge on habeas corpus.
An irregularity is defined to be the want of adherence to some prescribed
rule or mode of proceeding;, and it consists either in omitting to do something
that is necessary for the due and orderly conducting of a suit, or. doing it in an
unreasonable time or improper manner ....
It is the technical term for every
defect in practical proceedings or the mode of conducting an action or defence
as distinguishable from defects in pleadings.

Id. at 332-33 (citations omitted); 3

JOSEPH CHnrY, THE PRACTICE OF THE LAw 509 (2d
ed. 1835) (discussing irregularities and nullities); 1 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 170 (2d ed. 1902) (distinction between voidable and void
judgments); id. at § 255 (errors and irregularities not reviewable on habeas corpus).

The writ of habeas corpus is very frequently sued out to obtain the release of a
person held in custody under the judgment or sentence of a court, and in a
great many instances the attempt has been made to impeach such judgment on
grounds going to its legality or regularity, or even upon objections to the anterior proceedings. But the courts have resolutely set their faces against this
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After Congress restored the Court's appellate jurisdiction in
1885, Ex partne Royal 2 was the first habeas case concerning state
prisoners that the Court considered. There was no careful examination of the text or legislative history of the 1867 Act in the
context of the contemporary body of habeas law. Instead, the
Court imported principles of comity and federalism into its construction of the 1867 Act. The petitioner was a commercial agent
indicted and held in custody pretrial for violating a Virginia law
against selling public bonds without a license, which he alleged to
be unconstitutional. The Court unanimously affinned the denial of
habeas corpus. Citing Siebold for the proposition that a conviction
under an unconstitutional statute "is not merely erroneous, but is
illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment,"
the Court held that "the Circuit Court has jurisdiction upon writ
of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of appellant's commitment, and to discharge him, if he be held in custody in violation
of the Constitution.""3 However, the Court also wrote that "while
the Circuit Court has the power to do so, and may discharge the
accused in advance of his trial if he is restrained of his liberty in
violation of the national Constitution, it is not bound in every case
to exercise such a power immediately upon application being
made for the writ." 4
We cannot suppose that Congress intended to compel those
courts, by such means, to draw to themselves, in the first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions commenced in
State courts exercising authority within the same territorial
limits, where the accused claims that he is held in custody in

practice, refusing to look beyond the judgment itself, except in the single case
where a want of jurisdiction is alleged.
Id. at § 254. See also 1 JOEL PRENTIss BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1410 (3d ed. 1880).
Bishop states:
There are circumstances in which release from imprisonment in a criminal cause
may be had under the great writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. Where the restraint proceeds from a judgment erroneous but not void, it will not lie. Nor,
under it, can the party impeach a judgment as contrary to the facts. And, in
general, this is not the remedy where the imprisonment is on a judicial sentence. But where the sentence is void, not merely voidable, or the term of imprisonment under it has expired, relief may be had by habeas corpus.
Id. at 818.
252 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
253 Id. at 250.
254 Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
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violation of the Constitution of the United States."5

Royall adopted a notion of "special circumstances." The Court
held that the circuit courts should use discretion in exercising
their jurisdiction in light of principles of federalism and comity in
special cases involving foreign states, the law of nations, "cases of
urgency[] involving the authority and operations of the General
Government" or foreign relations or federal court administration.
The Court noted that no such special circumstances were involved
and that the state court had jurisdiction, in the first instance, to
consider the constitutionality of the state law. The Court held:
[W]here a person is in custody, under process from a State
court of original jurisdiction, for an alleged offense against the
laws of such State, and it is claimed that he is restrained of his
liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the
Circuit Court has discretion, whether it will discharge him,
upon habeas corpus, in advance of his trial in the court in

which he is indicted; that discretion, however, to be subordinated to any special circumstances requiring immediate action. When
the State court shall have finally acted upon the case, the Circuit Court has still a discretion whether, under all the circumstances then existing, the accused, if convicted, shall be put to
his writ of error from the highest court of the State, or whether it will proceed, by writ of habeas corpus, summarily to determine whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States. 6
The Court then cited Ex parte Bridge -7 to suggest that a state

prisoner was required to seek a writ of error unless the state court
proceeding was void for "want of jurisdiction."" Hence, although somewhat meandering, this dictum did not contradict the
Watkins jurisdiction doctrine.
The Court's application of the jurisdiction rule between the
Civil War and Frank and Moore involved exceptions, or expansions,
to the rule of jurisdiction in various cases. Much has been written
about the Court's elasticity in interpreting the concept of "jurisdiction" of the inferior courts during these years. 9 Yet, for nearly

255 Id. at 251.
256 Id. at 252-53 (emphasis added).
257 Brown v. United States ex re. Bridges, 4 F. Cas. 98 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875) (No.
1,862), affid sub nom., Ex parte Bridges, 2 Woods Cir. Ct. Rep. 428 (5th Cir. 1875).
258 Roya/, 117 U.S. at 253 (citing Bridges, which cited Lange).
259 Bator, supra note 27; Peller, supra note 21; Liebman, supra note 1; Hart, supra
note 104, at 104-07; Woolhandler, supra note 28.
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seventy years after the passage of the 1867 Act, the Court adhered
to the general rule that habeas corpus was available only to challenge a court's jurisdiction. What is important is that the Court
saw and described its jurisprudence as either fitting within the
concept of jurisdiction or falling within limited exceptions, as
Henry v. HenkeP clearly demonstrates.2 6 On the eve of Frank,
in a unanimous opinion by Justice Lamar, the Court in Henry
adhered to the general rule of jurisdiction. A congressional committee investigating the national banks summoned Henry for testimony. After indictment by a grand jury for refusing to answer
questions, Henry was arrested and sought habeas corpus. The
Court consciously identified the exceptions to the jurisdiction
doctrine, but reaffirmed it nevertheless:
But, barring such exceptional cases,[2"2] the general rule is

that, on such applications, the hearing should be confined to
the single question of jurisdiction, and even that will not be
decided in every case in which it is raised. For otherwise the
"habeas corpus courts could thereby draw to themselves, in the
first instance, the control of all prosecutions in state and Federal courts." To establish a general rule that the courts on habeas
corpus, and in advance of trial, should determine every jurisdictional question would interfere with the administration of the
criminal law ....

The question has been before this court in many cases-some on original application and others on writ of error;
in proceedings which began after arrest and before commitment; after commitment and before conviction; after conviction
and before review. The applications were based on the ground
of the insufficiency of the charge, the insufficiency of the evidence, or the unconstitutionality of the statute, state or Federal, on which the charge was based ....
But in all these instances, and notwithstanding the variety
of forms in which the question has been presented, the court,
with the exceptions named, has uniformly held that the hearing on habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error nor
is it intended as a substitute for the functions of the trial

260 235 U.S. 219 (1914).
261 Professor Duker agrees that the exceptions to the jurisdiction doctrine were limited. DuKE, supra note 28, at 230-34, 240, 247.
262 The exceptional cases to which the Court referred were: Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 163 (1873); Ex Pale Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); In Re Loney, 134 U.S. 372
(1890); New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89 (1894).
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2
court. 63

The Court refused to address the jurisdictional questions and
affirmed the denial of habeas. The modem claim that the exceptions to the Court's jurisdiction doctrine consumed the rule is directly rebutted by the Court's conscious categorization of the case
law in Henry. It may be that the exceptions were vague and ambiguous, and the Henry opinion may imply a self-conscious need for
judicial housecleaning, but clearly the Court did not believe that
the exceptions consumed the rule. Nor did the Court imply anything to the contrary in any case leading up to Brown v. Allen."
It may have ignored the jurisdiction doctrine after Moore, but the
Court never repudiated it.
Given this line of cases, contemporary commentators emphasized the prominence of jurisdiction in the scope of habeas corpus. 21 One treatise writer, W.F. Bailey, wrote in 1913, on the eve
of Frank: "The underlying principle which controls [the] use [of
habeas corpus] is that of jurisdiction."2 Many state courts also
emphasized the centrality of the jurisdiction of the committing
267
court, often citing Watkins.
263 Henry, 235 U.S. at 228-29.
264 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). For example, in Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S.
255 (1923), the United States (citing Henry) contended that that case did not fall within
any of the "five classes of cases in which the court on habeas corpus will go beyond the
question of jurisdiction." Id. at 265. These five were defined as: "(1) Where there is a
conflict of jurisdiction between a State and the United States; (2) where the authority
and operations of the Federal Government are or may be interfered with by state action;
(3) where rights or obligations of the United States under a treaty are involved; (4)
where the petitioner is held under state process based upon state law which is in violation of the Constitution; and (5) where the judgment or order under which he is held
is a nullity because in excess of the power of the court." Id.
265 Thompson, Void Sentences, supra note 180 at 798-802; see also 1 JOSEPH CHrIY, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 126 (1841); HURD, supra note 46, at 332.
266

W.F. BAILEY, 1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS AND SPECIAL REMEDIES

iii (1913). After surveying state and federal cases, Bailey "found that the majority of cases, where the writ of habeas corpus was issued, involved the question of contempts." Id.
at v; see also Thompson, Void Sentences, supra note 180, at 802.
267 See Ex parte Chandler, 22 So. 285, 285 (Ala. 1896) ("[I]t is not the office of habeas corpus to review and correct errors or irregularities, however gross, of a trial court of
competent jurisdiction."); Lx parte Perdue, 24 S.W. 423 (Ark. 1893); Ex parte Noble, 31 P.
224 (Cal. 1892); Ex parte Gibson, 31 Cal. 620 (1867) (citing Watkins); Russell v. Tatum,
30 S.E. 812 (Ga. 1898); People ex rel. Wayman v. Zimmer, 96 N.E. 529 (I11. 1911) (citing
Watkins); McGuire v. Wallace, 10 N.E. 111 (Ind. 1887); Platt v. Harrison, 6 Iowa 79
(1858) (citing Watkins); Sennott v. Swan, 16 N.E. 448 (Mass. 1888) (citing Watkins); In re
Undenvood, 30 Mich. 502 (1875); State ex rel. Jackson v. MacDonald, 128 N.W. 454
(Minn. 1910); In re Mitchell, 16 S.W. 118 (Mo. 1891), Ex parte Toney, 11 Mo. 420 (1848)
(judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be examined by habeas, but not
citing Watkins) (for a Missouri case with a different outcome see Ex parte Lucas, 160 Mo.
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Given Henry v. Henke there is no real break with the Court's
jurisdiction doctrine that cannot be logically explained as merely
and
an expansion of that doctrine until Frank v. Mangur
Moore v. Dempsey.269 The defendant in Frank appealed his state
court conviction alleging that the trial court had been dominated
by the mob. After thoroughly reviewing the evidence for error, the
state supreme court affirmed."' The Supreme Court denied habeas, but said that habeas could be available if the state failed to
provide "corrective process." Although the Supreme Court introduced this new principle in Frank, it did not apply it in that case.
Not until Moore was decided in 1923 did the Court apply the principle that Frank introduced. Certainly, Moore represents a judicial
expansion of the Court's habeas jurisdiction. Justice Holmes' dissent in Frank fails to cite even one American or English opinion
involving habeas let alone any that would justi habeas under the
facts of Frank.21' The only precedent Holmes cites in his majority
opinion in Moore is Frank's dictum that "if the State, supplying no
corrective process, carries into execution a judgment of death or
imprisonment based upon a verdict thus produced by mob domination, the State deprives
the accused of his life or liberty without
272
due process of law."
The Court's refusal to reverse the detention in Frank is often
considered reversed by Moore. But it is more appropriate to view
Moore as an application of the rule stated in Frank and not as
overturning Frank itself 3 The proposition that Moore overruled
Frank does not survive close scrutiny. It does not account for the
different facts in the two cases, or how much Moore relied on and
incorporated Frank, or that the Court subsequently cited Frank as
good law on several occasions. In Ashe v. United States ex rel.

218 (1900) (54 decision, can contest constitutionality of act by habeas corpus)); Ex parte
Edgington, 10 Nev. 215 (1875); People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N.Y. 559 (1875); Lx
parte Watson, 72 S.E. 1049 (N.C. 1911); Ex parte Shaw, 7 Ohio St. 81 (1857); Lx parte
Millsap, 118 P. 135 (Okla. 1911); Merriman v. Morgan, 7 Or. 69 (1879); Ex parte Bond, 9
S.C. 80 (1877) (citing Watkins); Winnovich v. Emery, 93 P. 988 (Utah 1908); In re
French, 51 N.W. 960 (Wis. 1892); Hovey v. Sheffner, 93 P. 305 (Wyo. 1908); see generally,
Oaks, supra note 86; Thompson, Void Sentences, supra note 180, at 802 & n.1. Shepard's
Citations reveals that courts in 46 states have cited Watkins with approval.
268 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
269 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
270 Frank v. State, 80 S.E. 1016 (Ga. 1914) (29 page opinion).
271 Frank, 237 U.S. at 345-50 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
272 Moore, 261 U.S. at 90-91 (quoting Frank, 237 U.S. at 335).
273 See Faye v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 457 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Valotta,"4 a unanimous Court overturned a grant of habeas to a
state prisoner.7 5 In an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court
concluded:
There was not the shadow of a ground for interference with
this sentence by habeas corpus [citing Frank]. Extraordinary cases
where there is only the form of a court under the domination
of a mob, as was alleged to be the fact in Moore v. Dempsey,
offer no analogy to this. In so delicate a matter as interrupting
the regular administration of the criminal law of the State by
this kind of attack, too much discretion cannot be used, and it
must be realized that it can be done only upon definitely and
narrowly limited grounds. 6
Likewise, the general rule of jurisdiction was upheld by the Court
2
in 1925 in Knewel v. Egan: 11
It is the settled rule of this Court that habeas corpus calls in
question only the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is
challenged [citing Frank].
A person convicted of crime by a judgment of a state
court may secure the review of that judgment by the highest
state court and if unsuccessful there may then resort to this
Court by writ of error if an appropriate federal question be
involved and decided against him; or, if he be imprisoned
under the judgment, he may proceed by writ of habeas corpus
on constitutional grounds summarily to determine whether he
is restrained of his liberty by judgment of a court acting without jurisdiction [citing Royall]. But if he pursues the latter
remedy, he may not use it as a substitute for a writ of error
[citing Parks]. It is fundamental that a court upon which is
conferred jurisdiction to try an offense has jurisdiction to determine whether or not that offense is charged or proved. Otherwise every judgment of conviction would be subject to collateral
attack and review on habeas corpus on the ground that no of-

274 270 U.S. 424 (1926).
275 The district court granted habeas on the rationale that the state court lost jurisdiction "by the denial of the prisoner's fundamental right to a separate trial . . . " which
denied him due process. United States ex rel. Valotta v. Ashe, 2 F.2d 735, 743 (W.D. Pa.
1924). The court cited both Frank and Moore but did not suggest that Moore overruled
Frank.
276 Ashe, 270 U.S. at 426 (citation to Frank, 237 U.S. at 326 omitted).
277 268 U.S. 442 (1925). The defendant's conviction under state law for filing a false
insurance claim was upheld by the state supreme court and the defendant sought federal
habeas corpus on grounds that the state information did not "describe a public offense"
and that the trial court had no jurisdiction because the information did not provide for
venue. Id. at 443.
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fense was charged or proved. It has been uniformly held by
this Court that the sufficiency of an indictment cannot be reviewed in habeas corps proceedings [citing Watkins and other
cases].2'8

The Court held "that the judgment of state courts in criminal
cases will not be reviewed on habeas corpus merely because some
right under the Constitution of the United States is alleged to
have been denied to the person convicted. The proper remedy is
by writ of error."2 ' Finally, in Ex parte Hawk, the Court identified

Moore as a case where "the remedy afforded by state law proves in
practice unavailable or seriously inadequate."2'
In addition to the changes brought about by Frank and Moore,
the jurisdiction doctrine is generally considered to have been
further weakened in Bowen v. 'Johnston,st Walker v. Johnston282
and Waley v. Johnston.25" Although Waley is cited as having explicitly rejected
the principle of jurisdiction, Waley had a limited
scope. 2 14 Johnson v. Zerbs - widened the conflict in 1938, but

278 Id. at 445-46 (citations omitted).
279 Id. at 447. Although Justice Brennan regarded this history as "revisionist," in
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 517 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), many Justices of the
Court-former and present-have generally assented to this historical survey, as first analyzed in Professor Bator's 1963 article. In his dissent in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963),
Justice Harlan saw only two exceptions to the doctrine of jurisdiction until Frank was
decided in 1915.
The expansion of the definition of jurisdiction occurred primarily in two classes
of cases: (1) those in which the conviction was for violation of an allegedly
unconstitutional statute, and (2) those in which the Court viewed the detention
as based on some claimed illegality in the sentence imposed, as distinguished
from the judgment of conviction.
Id. at 451 -(Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan and, later, Justice Powell also viewed
Frank and Moore similarly. In Frank, the state provided a "corrective process" that was absent in Moore "In no case prior to Brown v. Allen," Harlan concluded, "was there any
substantial modification of the concepts articulated in the Frank decision." Id. at 457. In
Stone v. Powell, Justice Powell saw the significant expansion of the jurisdiction doctrine
come in Frank. He construed Frank as broadly holding that "if a habeas corpus court
found that the State had failed to provide adequate 'corrective process' for the full and
fair litigation of federal claims, whether or not Jurisdictional,' the court could inquire
into the merits to determine whether a detention was lawful." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 476 n.8 (1976).
280 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944) (distinguishing Moore from Hawk).
281 306 U.S. 19 (1939).
282 312 U.S. 275 (1941) (holding that a habeas petitioner who alleged a coerced
confession was entitled to a federal hearing).
283 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
284 Wale involved a federal prisoner who alleged that his guilty plea had been coerced by threats from an FBI agent. The district court denied the writ without hearing
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the constraints on federal habeas jurisdiction were not entirely
thrown off until Brown v. Allen." 6 It is important to note that
Bowen, Walker, Waley, and Zerbst were all federal prisoner cases, involving no interpretation of the 1867 Act. In the wake of the
widening of habeas jurisdiction in these cases, however, the Court
simply imported that development into state prisoner cases without
analysis.8 7
If decisions after the 1867 Act had limited federal habeas
corpus review of state convictions to examining the jurisdiction of
the court-with growing exceptions after Frank and Moore -the
Supreme Court's 1953 decision in Brown v. Allenss was the modern landmark decision which expanded the availability of habeas
corpus. Even if Frank and Moore broke new ground by allowing
federal habeas review when the state failed to provide an adequate
"corrective process," Brown broke further ground by allowing a
federal court to reexamine all constitutional claims raised by a
state prisoner, even when there was no apparent objection to the
state appellate proceedings and no claim that the state failed to
provide an adequate "corrective process." Recent commentators
have contended that Brown was insignificant, and that the Court
had really assumed all constitutional claims within habeas jurisdiction before Brown. But contemporary scholars, like Professor
Henry Hart, have concluded that Brown "manifestly broke new
ground" in holding that "due process of law in the case of state
prisoners is not primarily concerned with the adequacy of the
evidence and without directing the production of the prisoner in court. 38 F. Supp. 408
(N.D. Cal. 1941). The court of appeals affirmed. 124 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1941). The Government then confessed error on the basis of Walker and the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded for "a hearing in conformity" with Walker. Waley, 316 U.S. at 105:
In such circumstances the use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where
the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to
render it. It extends also to those exceptional cases where the conviction has
been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the writ
is the only effective means of preserving his rights.
Id. at 104-05 (citing Moore Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), and Bowen, 306
U.S. at 24).
285 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (authorizing a federal habeas court to reexamine de novo a
Sixth Amendment waiver of counsel claim in a capital case).
286 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge apparently first asserted
broad habeas jurisdiction to be the intent of Congress in the 1867 Act, and questioned
the viability of the Watkins jurisdiction doctrine in Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184-92
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
287 See supra note 122, surveying cases between Frank and Brown.
288 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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state's corrective process or of the prisoner's personal opportunity
to avail himself of this process . . . but relates essentially to the
avoidance in the end of any underlying constitutional error ....

."'

Likewise, Professor Paul Bator concluded that the

Court affirmed the convictions not on the basis of Frank-that the
state had provided an adequate corrective process-but by reaching and rejecting on the merits the federal claims presented which
had been previously adjudicated by the state courts." Brown assumed, for the first time, that the purpose of habeas is to make
sure that no constitutional error has been made, and thus effectively overruled the nearly 130 year old rule of Watkins that habeas
291
corpus is not to serve as an appeal.
In 1963, the Supreme Court in Fay v. NoiaP2 significantly
expanded the scope of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners,
just as Brown had changed the function. If Brown held that virtually
any constitutional claim justified federal habeas jurisdiction, Fay
(and the companion case of Townsend v. Saine5 ) went further
procedurally by effectively eliminating the "adequate and independent state ground" rule which applied on direct review. Thus,

289 Hart, supra note 104, at 106.
290
The Court did so without any explicit discussion of the question of jurisdiction
or any apparent understanding of how radical this step was: with only Mr. Justice Jackson disagreeing, eight of nine Justices assumed that on habeas corpus
federal district courts must provide review of the merits of constitutional claims
fully litigated in the state court system ... . And ever since Brown v. Allen the
Supreme Court has continued to assume, without discussion, that it is the purpose of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to redetermine the merits of federal constitutional questions decided in state criminal proceedings.
Bator, supra note 27, at 500.
291 Cf Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV.'247, 252 (1988):
The divorce of the writ of habeas corpus from a satisfactory rationale explaining
the purposes of the writ can be traced back to the Court's seminal decision in
Brown v. ALen. In that case the Court acknowledged an expansion of the scope
of the writ of habeas corpus from its traditionally narrow focus on jurisdictional
errors to encompass any claim of constitutional error raised by a prisoner in
state custody. The expansion of the scope of the writ in Brown, however, took
place in a most peculiar fashion. Rather than explicitly discussing the expansion
in the scope, and thus the nature, of the writ, the Brown Court simply presumed
the enlarged scope of the writ. Because the change in habeas corpus occurred
sub silentio, the Court never provided a rationale for the writ's expansion. Since
Brown, habeas corpus has been in search of a rationale.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
292 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
293 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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federal collateral review was made even broader than federal direct review.
B.

Revisionist Criticisms of the Jurisdiction Doctrine

Shortly before Fay v. Noia, the Court's jurisdiction doctrine
was systematically reviewed by Professor Paul Bator, in the most
influential article ever written on federal habeas jurisdiction.'
Professor Bator's 1963 article, though dismissed by the majority
opinion in Fay, nevertheless anticipated the rationale of Fay. The
article constituted a thorough critique that proved more persuasive
and enduring than the majority opinion in Fay, and, consequently,
was adopted by Justice Harlan and subsequent Justices." Bator's
article is a classic because it identified the most important questions in the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction, anticipated
many of the questions that the courts have addressed since then,
attempted to comprehensively answer them, and influenced Supreme Court doctrine. Bator sought to determine when "a federal
district court on habeas corpus [has] the power to redetermine
the merits of federal questions decided by the state courts in the
course of state criminal cases. " " Although he touched on history
and statutory construction, Bator's article emphasized procedure
and policy. Bator stressed the need for finality in the administration of criminal justice. Because the "possibility of mistake always
exists," the function of habeas corpus cannot be to ensure that no
mistakes are ever made. No state court or federal court can fulfill
that purpose. Justice Jackson captured this common sense in his
famous aphorism from Brown: "We are not final because we are
infallible. We are only infallible because we are final. "n 7 As Bator
wrote:
[1]f the lawfulness of the exercise of the power to detain turns
on whether the facts which validate its exercise "actually" hap294 See Bator, supra note 27.
295 See, e.g., Wright v. West, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 2486 (1992); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467, 478, 491 (1991); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 & n.14 (1986); Reed v.
Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 15 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 nn.32-33 (1982); Rose v.
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 580 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
476 n.7 (1976); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 421 n.30 (1963); Id. at 449 n.1 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Liebman, supra note 1; Mayers, supra note 33, at 38 n.31; Peller, supra note
21; Woolhandler, supra note 28, at 583.
296 Bator, supra note 27, at 443.
297 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953). H.L.A. Hart expressed the same idea
in another way- "It is impossible to provide by rule for the correction of the breach of
every rule." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 139 (1961).
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pened in some ultimate sense, power can never be exercised
lawfully at all, because we can never absolutely recreate past
phenomena and thus can never have final certainty as to their
existence ....
.. . If any detention whatever is to be validated, the concept of "lawfulness" must be defined in terms more complicated than "actual" freedom from error; or, if you will, the
concept of "freedom from error" must eventually include a
notion that some complex of institutional processes is empowered definitively to establish whether or not there was error,
even though in the very nature of things no such processes can
give us ultimate assurances . ... "
The process for which freedom from error in trial court decisions
is to be sought, as much as humanly possible, is the appeal or writ
of error. Perhaps it was just this truth that early Supreme Court
habeas jurisprudence sought to incorporate when the Court repeatedly held that habeas jurisdiction could not be used as a writ
of error.29
Bator surveyed the most important of the Court's decisions
between Watkins and Brown and concluded that the evolution in
the Court's jurisdiction doctrine was limited and pragmatic-occurring in cases in which due process was violated and no
corrective process appeared-moving the Court to reach beyond
precedent to change the law. Bator sought to understand the
Court on its own terms, not construct a "model" for federal habeas. Bator concluded that federal habeas review was justified under
the full and fair litigation standard of Ex parte Hawk" when the
state failed to provide its own corrective process for state trial
court errors. Thus, if it is alleged that the trial judge was bribed,
that a mob dominated the trial, that the prisoner was tortured to
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Bator, supra note 27, at 447. This same truth was recognized by Hart & Wechsler.

[L]aw is not a simple concept ...
consisting as it does of rules distributing
authority to make decisions as well as rules that govern the decisions to be
made. There is a sense, therefore, in which a prisoner is legally detained if he
is held pursuant to the judgment or decision of a competent tribunal or authority, even though the decision to detain rested on an error as to law or fact.
That there must be some room for limiting conceptions of this kind seems
clear enough: the writ cannot be made the instrument for re-determining the
merits of all cases in the legal system that have ended in detention.
HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1238-39 (1953); see also Hart, supra note 104, at 103 (citing part of the same passage).
299 See infra note 314.
300 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
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plead guilty, that there was knowing use of perjured testimony by
the prosecution, or that the defendant was entirely deprived of
the assistance of counsel, and "the state provided no fair process,
direct or collateral, for the testing of these allegations themselves,
the habeas court should proceed to inquire into them and, if it
finds the allegations true, set aside the trial court's conclusions. " "'
1. Peller: Jurisdiction Review As Merits Review
The most thorough scholarly response to Bator's influential
article is Professor Gary Peller's 1982 article, In Defense of Federal
2
Habeas Corpus Relitigation11
A full relitigation standard for habeas
is justified, in Peller's view, "by the actual refusal of state courts to
vindicate federal rights during various periods in American history."3 3 Peller made five general criticisms of Bator's analysis of
the Court's jurisdiction doctrine: (1) that Bator's interpretation of
Watkins was wrong; (2) that state courts are not able or willing to
"vindicate federal law" and that the 39th Congress in 1867 knew
it; (3) that Bator ignored Ex parte McCardlV and the lower federal court decisions decided between 1867 and 1885; (4) that the
Court's doctrine was really based on the notion that its lack of
appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases precluded habeas corpus
jurisdiction; and, (5) that exceptions to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction doctrine consumed the rule. Although thorough and creative, Peller's revisionist view of Watkins and its jurisdiction doctrine is at odds with the evidence, the purpose of Congress's 1885
Supreme Court jurisdiction bill, and the contemporary understanding of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction doctrine. Peller's thesis is
"revisionist" in the sense that he retrospectively imputes to the
Court a doctrine that was consciously rejected by the Court, Congress, and leading commentators of the day. It is one thing to
offer a new interpretation of historical events that challenge the
interpretation of other observers; it is quite another to offer a new
interpretation that directly challenges the Court's own explicit
statement of what its case law meant at the time.

301 Bator, supra note 27, at 457.
302 Peller, supra note 21. Peller's thesis is criticized in many respects by Liebman,
supra note 1, and Woolhandler, supra note 28.
303 Peller, supra note 21, at 582.
304 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867) (McCardle J); 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (McCardle
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Peller bases much of his argument on his revisionist interpretation of Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Watkins that a writ
of habeas corpus was "in the nature of a writ of error." 5 Peller
contends that this (combined with the fact that the Court had no
appellate jurisdiction in criminal proceedings at the time) meant
that the Court's "lack of appellate jurisdiction; not a narrow view
of the habeas remedy, prevented review of the merits."" However, there are three sufficient responses that effectively rebut this
contention.
First, Peller failed to distinquish a writ of habeas from a writ
of error. He pointed out Marshall's statements, but failed to closely analyze them. Marshall's specific statements were that habeas
(1) "is in the nature of a writ of error, to examine the legality of
the commitment" and (2) is "in the nature of a writ of error
which brings up the body of the prisoner with the cause of commitment."0 7 Peller assumed that Marshall's phrase "in the nature
of a writ of error" equated habeas with a writ of error. But "in the
nature of" does not mean "the same as." It means "having the
characteristics of."
Thus, a writ of error is "in the nature of'
an appeal, a writ of certiorari, and a writ of habeas corpus to the
extent that it has similar characteristics to any of those.' One
way in which habeas and a writ of error had similar characteristics,
for example, was that they were both writs, which at common law
was simply "a short written command issued by a person in authority." 10° Another way in which habeas, under section 14 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, had a characteristic similar to a writ of error
was that both could bring up the case to a superior court.3

305 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-02 (1830). The Court did not have
appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases until 1891. See In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891).
306 Peller, supra note 21, at 611.
307 Watkins, 28 U.S. at 201-02.
308 "Nature" means "a kind of class usu[ually] distinguished by fundamental or essential characteristics." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIoNARY 789 (1987).

309 See, e.g., 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 9, at 65-72 (1993) (distinguishing writ of error
from writ of certiorari, writ of review, writ of right, and appeal).
310 Jenks, supra note 95, at 523.
311 3 BLACESTONE, supra note 74, °405; see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 349 (1816) ("A writ of error is, indeed, but a process which removes the
record of one court to the possession of another court, and enables the latter to inspect
the proceedings, and give such judgment as its own opinion of the law and justice of
the case may warrant.").
Another way they were similar was in the scrutiny called for by the superior court.
Blackstone wrote that a writ of error "only lies upon matter of law arising upon the face
of the proceedings; so that no evidence is required to substantiate or support it. .. ." 3
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However, these common characteristics were limited; habeas and
writs of error were not similar in all respects. Elsewhere in
12
Watkins, Marshall distinquished habeas from a writ of error.
Whatever similarities writs of error and habeas corpus had, they
also had significant differences. The most important, which
Watkins specifically affirmed, was that habeas was limited by the
jurisdictional limitation of the 1679 English Act, which, Marshall
held in Watkins, "enforces the common law" and "excepts from
those who are entitled to its benefit, persons committed for felony
or treason plainly expressed in the warrant, as well as persons
convicted or in execution.""'3 (Peller did not review the common
law or the English Habeas Act of 1679 which established the jurisdiction doctrine.)
Second, even if Marshall's statements are ambiguous to modem commentators, such as Peller, they were not ambiguous to the
Court or contemporary commentators. The Court consistently
stated in numerous cases throughout the nineteenth century and
extending as late as 1938-often citing Watkins-that habeas could
not serve as a writ of error. 14

supra note 74, "405. A writ of habeas corpus was similar at common law,
because a court was required to make a decision based on the face of the return, which
could not be controverted by the defendant.
312 Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 206 (1830):
BLACKSTONE,

The cases are numerous, which decide that the judgments of a court of record
having general jurisdiction of the subject, although erroneous, are binding until
reversed. It is universally understood that the judgments of the courts of the
United States, although their jurisdiction be not shown in the pleadings, are yet
binding on all the world; and that this apparent want of jurisdiction can avail
the party only on a writ of error. This acknowledged principle seems to us to
settle the question now before the court. The judgment of the circuit court in a
criminal-case is of itself evidence of its own legality, and requires for its support
no inspection of the indictments on which it is founded. The law trusts that
court with the whole subject, and has not confided to this court the power of
revising its decisions. We cannot usurp that power by the instrumentality of the
writ of habeas corpus. The judgment informs us that the commitment is legal,
and with that information it is our duty to be satisfied.
313 Id. at 201-02.
314 See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S 458, 465 & n.15 (1938) ("True, habeas corpus
cannot be used as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities-not involving
the question of jurisdiction-occurring during the course of trial; and the 'writ of habeas
corpus cannot be used as a writ of error.'" (citing Watkins and Knewal v. Egan)); Riddle v.
Dyche, 262 U.S. 333, 335 (1923) (citing Frank for the proposition that habeas cannot be
used as substitute for writ of error); Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S. 219, 229 (1914) ("[T]he
court, with the exceptions named, has uniformly held that the hearing on habeas corpus
is not in the nature of a writ of error . . . "); Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420, 428
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Professor Peller also contended, based on his review of eight
Supreme Court cases between 1873 and 1906, that the Court narrowly construed its habeas jurisdiction only because it lacked appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases until 1889."'i Since- it

(1912) ("The writ of habeps corpus cannot be made to perform the office of a writ of
error."); Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442, 447-48 (1910):
We find nothing in these cases to conflict with the well-established rule in this
court that the writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the office of a
writ of error ....
The attack is thus not upon the jurisdiction and authority of
the court to proceed to investigate and determine the truth of the charge, but
upon the sufficiency of the evidence to show the guilt of the accused. This has
never been held to be within the province of a writ of habeas corpus. Upon habeas corpus the court examines only the power and authority of the court to act,
not the correctness of its conclusions.
Id.; In re Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178, 182 (1906) ("[A] writ of habeas corpus is not to be made
use of as a writ of error"); Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123, 129 (1906) ("[T]he writ cannot perform the function of a writ of error."); Crossley v. California, 168 U.S. 640, 641
(1898) ("[Nlor can the writ of habeas corpus be made use of as a writ of error."); In re
Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 552 (1897); In re Belt, 159 U.S. 95, 100 (1895) ("[G]eneral rule
is that . . . habeas corpus will not issue unless the court . . . is without jurisdiction; and
that it cannot be used to correct errors."); United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48, 63
(1894) (writ "cannot be made to perform the function of a writ of error in relations to
proceedings of a court within its jurisdiction"); In re Swan, 150 U.S. 637, 648 (1893); In
re Lennon, 150 U.S. 393, 400 (1893); In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 180 (1893); In re
Frederich, 149 U.S. 70, 75-76 (1893) (habeas "not a proceeding for the correction of
errors," and is "limited to cases in which the judgment or sentence attacked is clearly
void by reason of its having been rendered without jurisdiction, or by reason of the
court's having exceeded its jurisdiction in the premises"); In re Schneider, 148 U.S. 162,
166 (1893) ("The ground of the application does not go to the jurisdiction or authority
of the Supreme Court of the District, and mere error cannot be reviewed in this proceeding." (citing Parks, Bigelow, Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1887), Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S.
176 (1889)); In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278, 286 (1891); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 304,
305 (1888); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 758-59 (1888) (applying rule of Watkins); Ex parte
Crouch, 112 U.S. 178, 180 (1884)("The office of a writ of habeas corpus is neither to
correct such errors [in determining the sufficiency of a defense at trial] nor to take the
prisoner away from the court which holds him for trial, for fear, if he remains, they may
be committed. Authorities to this effect in our own reports are numerous." (citing
Watkins, Lange, Parks, Siebold, Virginia, Rowland, 104 U.S. 604, 612 (1881)); Ex parte
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 653-54 (1884) (applying rule of Watkins); Ex parte Curtis, 106
U.S. 371 (1882); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23 (1879) ("A writ of habeas corpus cannot
be made to perform the function of a writ of error. To warrant the discharge of the
petitioner, the sentence under which he is held must be, not merely erroneous and voidable, but absolutely void." (citing Kearney and Watkins)); Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 23
(1876) ("To review the decision of that court by means of the writ of habeas corpus
would be to convert that writ into a mere writ of error, and to assume an appellate
power which has never been conferred upon this court." (citing Watkins)); Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 166 (1873) ("Many of these decisions in the English
courts are on writs of error and have but little bearing on the question before us." (citing Watkins)).
315 Peller emphasized eight cases: In re Moran, 203 U.S. 96 (1906); In re Belt, 159
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could not review criminal cases on appeal, Peller says, the Court
declined to exercise habeas jurisdiction. The limited significance
of several of these cases has been addressed above. Virtually all are
federal cases and do not involve an interpretation of the 1867 Act.
Virtually all are encompassed by the exceptional catagories noted
by the Court in Henry v. Henkel. Virtually none are relied upon by
the Court to expand habeas jurisdiction in Frank or Moore or any
1 6 a case involving
case thereafter. The lone exception is Nielsen,"
federal prisoners and not the 1867 Act. The Court did cite Nielsen
in Johnston v. Zerbse17 and Bowen v. Johnson,"'5 both cases involving federal prisoners. Although there is much dicta that can be
cited, the actual holding in Nielsen is exactly in line with the jurisdiction doctrine developed to that time-the conviction of the
petitioner for the crime of unlawful cohabitation was a bar to a
second prosecution for adultery and "the court was without authority to give judgment and sentence in the latter case ....
"319

Peller hangs much of his argument on merely one 1861 lower
federal court decision, In re McDonald,20 for the proposition that
federal habeas jurisdiction allowed the relitigation of all constitutional claims of prisoners." Even Professor Liebman-who otherwise supports broad habeas review-recognizes the weakness of
Peller's reliance on McDonald.22 The Court never cited McDonald
and the 1884 House Judiciary Committee Report directly repudiated it.
In addition, Peller contends that the Court, in effect, actually
considered all federal constitutional claims on habeas corpus during these years. This is so, Peller maintains, because federal constitutional review of state criminal proceedings was very limited until
the expansion of due process and the advent of the incorporation

U.S. 95, 100 (1895) ("The general rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue
unless the court, under whose warrant the petitioner is held, is without jurisdiction; and
that it cannot be used to correct errors."); Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 (1889); Lx
parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887); In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887); Ex parte Bigelow, 113
U.S. 328 (1885); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163 (1873).
316 131 U.S. 176 (1899).
317 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938).
318 306 U.S. 19, 24 (1939).
319 Nielsen, 131 U.S. at 190.
320 16 F. Cas. 17 (C.C.E.D.Mo. 1861) (No. 8,751).
321 Peller, supra note 21, at 612-18.
322 Liebman, supra note 1, at 2046 n.277.
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doctrine in the twentieth century. 2 (This argument was adopted
by the American Bar Association and presented to Congress in
recent testimony against constraints on federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.2 4 ) Yet, Peller's argument here, too, is revisionist, because
it imputes a position to the Court that the Court consciously rejected in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. No further
authority is needed than the Court's decision in Knewel v.
Egan,s where the Court held that "the judgment of state courts
in criminal cases will not be reviewed on habeas corpus merely because some right under the Constitution of the United States is
alleged to have been denied to the person convicted. The proper
remedy is by writ of error."32 Likewise, Glasgow v. Moye 27 involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute making it a crime to deposit obscene books in the mails. The prisoner
filed for habeas corpus, the district court denied the writ, and the
Supreme Court affirmed. The Court cited Harlan v. McGourin for
the proposition that habeas was "confined to a determination
whether the restraint of liberty was without authority of law" and
Matter of Gregory for the rule that "'[u]pon habeas corpus the court
examines only the power and authority of the court to act, not
the correctness of its conclusions."'3 2 The Court held that these
rules were still applicable even where constitutional issues were
raised:
The principle is not the less applicable because the law which
was the foundation of the indictment and trial is asserted to be
unconstitutional or uncertain in the description of the offense.
Those questions, like others, the court is invested with jurisdiction to try if raised, and its decisions can be reviewed, like its
decisions upon other questions, by writ of error. The principle
of the cases is the simple one that if a court has jurisdiction of
the case the writ of habeas corpus cannot be employed to re-try

323 Justice O'Connor, who formerly relied on Bator's history, seemed to adopt the
Peller and Liebman theories, at least in part, in Wright v. West, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 2493
(1992).
324 See Habeas Corpus Issues: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary for the House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
448, 455 (1991) (testimony of John J. Curtin and James S. Liebman).
325 268 U.S. 442 (1925).
326 Id. at 446.
327 225 U.S. 420 (1912).
328 Id. at 428.
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Without recognizing, much less refuting, Lewis Mayers' review
of the legislative history of the 1867 Act, Professor Peller also contends that the 39th Congress believed state courts would not "vindicate federal law," and enacted the 1867 Act to allow federal
relitigation of all federal claims.3' It is quite obvious, however,
that the Civil War was not fought over the federal constitutional
rights of state criminal prisoners in either the North or the South,
and the Reconstruction legislation was obviously not directed at
that broad class of persons either."' The broad proposition that
the balance of power shifted from the states to the federal government during Reconstruction says nothing about Congress's specific
purpose for the 1867 Act. Moreover, the contemporary understanding of the 1867 Congress and the contemporaneous interpretation by the 38th Congress (and the House Judiciary Committee)
that enacted the 1885 Habeas Jurisdiction Act belies Peller's undocumented assertion. The evidence is clear that Congress was not
concerned about all state prisoners who might raise constitutional
claims. Rather, Congress was concerned with a special and limited
class of cases in the South during Reconstruction.
Professor Peller also criticizes Bator for "ignoring" the Court's
decision in Ex parte McCardle,s2 which upheld Congress's 1868
withdrawal of the Court's appellate jurisdiction over the 1867 Act.
Chief Justice Chase's opinion in McCardle I contained broad dictum which supporters of broad federal habeas often cite. 3 But
the statement from McCardle I, where the Court denied a motion
to dismiss, was obviously dictum, given the Court's dismissal of the
case for lack of jurisdiction in McCarde II. McCardles irrelevance is

329 Id. at 429.
330 Peller, supra, note 21, at 602.
331 See supra notes 135-76 and accompanying text. A number of general historians of
the period have recognized that the 1867 Act was focused on the cause of freedmen or
Unionists in the South. See Warren, supra note 174 and accompanying text; ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 440-41 (1988); see also
Neil McFeeley, Habeas Corpus and Due Process: From Warren to Burger, 28 BAYLOR L REV.
533, 535 (1976) ("Historical research indicates that the . . . [1867 Act][was] instituted to
protect the newly-freed slaves against the vagrant and apprentice laws formulated by the
southern states.").
332 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867) (McCardle 1); 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (McCard/e
11).
333 "This legislation is of the most comprehensive character. It brings within the
habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every possible case of privation
of liberty contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws. It is impossible to widen
this jurisdiction." McCardle I, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 325-26.
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confirmed by the fact that, with one exception, the Court never
invoked McCardle !'s dictum in any habeas case or in support of
any expansive interpretation of the 1867 Act until Fay v. Noia.s
Likewise, Professor Peller criticizes Bator for "ignoring" lower
federal court cases decided between the time the Act was passed
in 1867 and the time when the Court's jurisdiction was restored in
1886. However, because Peller did not discover or examine the
legislative history of the 1885 appellate jurisdiction legislation, he
did not discover the work of Thompson, the ABA, Congressman
Poland, or the House Judiciary Committee, all of which rejected
the same federal court cases which Peller relies upon as inconsistent with the intent of the 1867 Act. Their work sought to restore
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction so as to reinstate a proper interpretation of the 1867 Act, grounded in the doctrine of Watkins,
and to effectively overrule these cases. Based on the purpose of
the 1885 legislation, Ex parte Royall and the following cases adopting the doctrine of Watkins were eminently correct. Their decisions fulfilled the 48th Congress's purpose in restoring the Court's
appellate jurisdiction over the 1867 Act. Accordingly, the foundation of Bator's 1963 thesis survives Peller's criticism intact.
2.

Liebman: Habeas As Substitute For Direct Review

Recently, Professor James Liebman, author of an encyclopedic
treatise on habeas corpus, has provided a second perspective on
the Court's jurisdiction doctrine and launched a different attack
on Professor Bator's 1963 thesis.ss Although he accepts Peller's

334 Only in In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 592 (1890) (child unlawfully detained by
grandparents) is the McCardle I dictum cited and there, it was cited only in regard to
Congress's jurisdiction over federal appeals. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304,
324 (1946); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 132 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring);
Cross v. Burke, 146 U.S. 82, 86 (1892); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 497 (1885);
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 620 (1874); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 163, 166 (1873); McCardle I, 74 U.S.(6 Wall.) 506 (1869). Only in Fay is the
McCardle I dictum cited in support of broad federal habeas jurisdiction. Fay, 372 U.S. at
417.
335 Liebman, supra note 1, at 2041-55. Liebman says that Bator's article "dominates"
habeas scholarship. Id. at 2041. But while it may be true that Bator's article has influenced a number of scholars (see Woolhandler, supra note 28, at 583 n.43), his policy
conclusions have been virtually ignored. While Bator's article has influenced many Supreme Court Justices since 1963, habeas scholarship either ignores Bator's article, or relies on Peller's, without a critical understanding, to support broad habeas review. See, e.g.,
Michael Mello & Donna Duffy, SuspendingJustice: The Unconstitutionality of the Proposed SixMonth Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by State Death Row Inmates, 18
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CIANGE 451, 470 n.115 (1990-91) (accepting Peller's view of the
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ultimate conclusion calling for broad federal habeas review,
Liebman levies criticisms at both the Bator and (what he calls) the
"Brennan-Peller" theses and attempts to construct his own version
of habeas history that supports broad modem habeas review.
Liebman states his thesis as follows:
Federal habeas corpus is not a substitute for a general writ
of error or other direct appeal as of right. Since 1789, however, it has provided statutorily specified classes of prisoners with
a limited and substitute federal writ of error or appeal as of
right. That appellate procedure has been limited because it has
lain only to hear claims of particular national importance-which Congress since 1867 has defined as all constitutional claims. It has been a substitute because it has served only
in default of Supreme Court review as of right.
The limited class of nationally important claims cognizable
in habeas corpus has changed over time under the influence of
(1) constitutional and statutory limitations on the federal
courts' jurisdiction-claims arising under state law, even if
jurisdictional, have never been cognizable; (2) case law identifying the legal defects in civil cases that are subject to collateral
attack; and (3) developing notions of due process and constitutional law. At no time was the line between jurisdictional and
nonjurisdictional claims a very good proxy for this line between
important and unimportant claims.
As a substitute for federal direct appeal, habeas corpus has
never duplicated, but has always mirrored the scope of, Supreme Court review on direct appeal. Although the line between legal and factual questions has changed over time, the
scope of both modes of review has always been de novo on legal
claims and deferential-to-nonexistent on factual findings.
"Innocence" claims and their close cousins, claims that the
penal statute was not intended to reach the particular
prisoner's conduct, are both nationally unimportant because sui
genesis, and subject to little or no review because aimed at the
central fact determination at trial. For these reasons, the Court
has been particularly careful to exclude such claims from habeas corpus."'5
Like Peller's, Liebman's thesis is revisionist in imposing a
theory on the Court's habeas jurisprudence up to Frank and Moore
that the Court itself never adopted and, in fact, consciously dis-

Court's jurisdiction cases without a critical analysis).
336 Liebman, supra note 1,at 2055-56 (footnotes omitted).
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avowed. Liebman fails ultimately because, like Peller, he disregards
or misreads the Watkins decision and its influence as the seminal
habeas decision of the nineteenth century, underestimates the
coherence of the Court's jurisdiction doctrine in its nineteenth
century context, and overlooks the purpose and legislative history
of the 1867 Act and the 1885 Habeas Jurisdiction Act.
Professor Liebman acknowledges several defects in Professor
Peller's thesis. 37 For example, he points out that Peller's theory
(that the Court's grant of habeas relief was coextensive with contemporary constitutional construction of the Due Process Clause)
is undermined by the Court's 1891 decision in In re Wood,'
where the Court denied relief for a claim of racial discrimination
in a grand jury. The Court held that the issue "was a question
which the trial court was entirely competent to decide, and its
determination could not be reviewed by the circuit court of the
United States, upon a writ of habeas corpus, without making that
writ serve the purposes of a writ of error." 9 As Liebman points
out, "the equal protection claim in Wood enjoys the same explicit
constitutional status as the due process claims that Brennan and
Peller believe were consistently cognizable on habeas corpus."' 0
A general response to Liebman is set out in the foregoing
response to Peller, since part of Liebman's thesis presupposes the
correctness of some of Peller's thesis. For example, unless one
exaggerates the importance of Senator Trumbull's 1866 Senate
statement on the scope of the 1867 Bill-and ignores the text,
context, and the rest of the legislative history as some advocates of
broad habeas review are inclined to do-it is untenable to say that
in the 1867 Act Congress authorized "all constitutional claims" of
337 In his testimony before Congress, Professor Liebman wrote that Peller "seriously
challenged" the accuracy of Bator's 1963 article. Habeas Corpus Issues: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciaqfor the House of
Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 448, 459 (1991) (statement of James S. Liebman). In
his later law review article, however, he noted many weaknesses in Peller's article.
Liebman, supra note 1, at 2046-48. Liebman points out that In re McDonald, 16 F. Cas.
17 (E.D. Mo. 1861) (No. 8,751), "acknowledges that most lower federal courts on habeas
corpus considered themselves bound by the same jurisdictional constraints as the Supreme Court." Liebman, supra note 1, at 2046 n.277; see also Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking
the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appea 39 U.C.LA. L. REV. 503, 540 n.163 (1992)
(McDonald "seems less indicative of earlier practice than Peller argues[,J" concluding that
the McDonald court was "apparently influenced by the oncoming civil war, engaged in
rhetorical flights ....
").
338 140 U.S. 278 (1891).
339 Id. at 286.
340 Liebman, supra note 1, at 2047.
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all state prisoners to be reviewed on federal habeas without regard
to the jurisdictional and pre-conviction constraints of the English
Act of 1679. Moreover, in Henry v. Henkel , the Court expressly
rejected the notion that habeas was a "substitute" for a writ of
error or appeal, and as late as 1925 in Knewel v. Egan,12 the
Court expressly denied that habeas authorized review of any constitutional claim by a state prisoner.
It is'
still necessary to make some more specific responses to
Professor Liebman's most recent article. Liebman relies on two
decisions, Whitten v. Tomlinson 43 from 1895, and Ex parte Tyler
from 1893, to support what he says is "a regime of rather broad
federal review as of right . .

. .

3

However, neither case sup-

ports this nor undercuts Bator's thesis. Tyler is a federal case not
involving an interpretation of the 1867 Act. In Tyler, a federal
circuit court appointed a receiver for a railway company which
filed a bill in equity against county sheriffs, including Tyler, who
threatened to levy and seize the property of the railroad to pay
for taxes.1 6 The court issued an injunction, Tyler allegedly violated it, and he was held in contempt and arrested by a U.S.
marshal."7 The Supreme Court denied the application on the
straightforward principle of the sufficiency of the jurisdiction of
the circuit court: "Unless the order of commitment was utterly
void for want of power, this application must be denied. The writ
of habeas corpus is not to be used to perform the office of a writ
of error or appeal .

. . .""

The Court concluded that the cause

was "confessedly within [the] jurisdiction of the circuit court. " "
Chief Justice Fuller, writing for the Court, focused on the lack of
jurisdiction. He immediately went on to state, however: "[W]hen
no writ of error or appeal will lie, if a petitioner is imprisoned
under a judgment of the Circuit Court, which had no jurisdiction
of the person or of the subject matter, or authority to render the
judgment complained of, then relief may be accorded.""'0 But
this is clearly dictum. Tyler is simply an example of W.F. Bailey's

341
342
343

235 U.S. 219, 229 (1914).
268 U.S. 442, 44647 (1925).
160 U.S. 231 (1895).

344

149 U.S. 164 (1893).

345
346
347
348
349
350

Liebman, supra note 1, at 2048.
Tyler, 149 U.S. at 165.
Id. at 165-70.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 180 (citing Parks, Terry, and Neilsen).
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observation in his 1913 treatise that habeas was frequently sought
in cases involving contempt. s5' Finally, Tyler established no broader precedent that was relied on in subsequent cases. 52
Professor Liebman contends that Tyler "transcends jurisdictional questions and rather precisely track[s] the era's definition
of due process.""5 3 However, this contention mistakes coincidence
for cause and effect, and similarity for equality. The Court's jurisdictional doctrine-arising out of Watkins and the English Act of
1679-long preceded the Fourteenth Amendment and is independently supported by treatises and case law of the day. While enterprising litigants attempted to fold the jurisdiction doctrine into a
claim of denial of due process, as in Whitten, that does not mean
that the Court adopted such an equation or, much less, entertained other constitutional claims on habeas prior to Frank and
Moore. Liebman forgets In re Wood, 54 which he suggested undermined a similar claim by Peller. In Wood, a litigant claimed that a
leading due process and equal protection precedent of the day,
55 authorized
Neal v. Delaware,"
the writ. The Court rejected the
5
6
claim.
In addition to Tyler, Professor Liebman relies on Whitten v.

351 See supra note 266.
352 See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 186 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing
Tyler as standing for one of the special circumstances noted in Royalk "[djue regard for
harmonious Nation-State relations"); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 329 (1915) (citing
Tyler for importance of comity).
353 Liebman, supra note 1, at 2053.
354 140 U.S. 278 (1891).
355 103 U.S. 370 (1880) (reversing conviction on due process and equal protection
grounds because blacks were excluded by law from grand jury service).
356
We do not perceive that anything said in Neal v. Delaware would have authorized
the Circuit Court to discharge the appellant from custody, even if, upon investigation, it had found that citizens of the race to which he belongs had been, in
fact and because of their race, excluded from the lists of grand and petit jurors ....
That was a matter arising in the course of the proceedings against
the appellant, and during his trial, and not from the statutes of New York, and
should have been brought at the appropriate time, and in some proper mode,
to the attention of the trial court . . . . It often occurs in the progress of a
criminal trial in a state court, proceeding under a statute not repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States, that questions occur which involve the construction of that instrument and the determination of rights asserted under it.
But that does not justify an interference with its proceedings by a Circuit Court
of the United States, upon a writ of habeas corpus sued out by the accused either
during or after the trial in the state court.
Wood, 140 U.S. at 285-86 (emphasis added).
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Tomlinson, a state case where the petitioner challenged his state
detention and extradition. Liebman contends that the use of the
phrase "in the first instance" in Whitten means that the Court considered habeas a failsafe backup.357 Whitten invoked the exhaustion and "exceptional circumstances" doctrines of Royall. But
there is another way of reading Whitten that is entirely consistent
with both Bator's analysis and Watkins. The petitioner in Whitten
challenged his state detention and extradition pretrial, before any
conviction or any judgment by any court (with or without appropriate jurisdiction) had occurred. Consequently, it was entirely
consistent with the English Habeas Act of 1679 and Watkins for
the Whitten Court to say (as Liebman quotes) that it would not
grant habeas "in advance of any proceedings in the courts of the
State to test the validity of his arrest and detention." 58 It is a
stretch to interpret this as a hint by the Court that it would grant
habeas afterwards. Like Tyler, Whitten is never subsequently cited by
the Court for the broad proposition Liebman suggests.
Professor Liebman also contends that the legislative history of
the 1867 Act supports broad habeas review, but his review of the
legislative history is incomplete. He cites Mayers' analysis of that
history only once,359 but offers no direct response. Likewise, he
demonstrates no knowledge of the legislative history of the 1885
jurisdiction bill. He cites an article by Seymour Thompson
once,"6 but out of context and without the understanding that
Thompson was a severe critic of the lower court decisions interpreting the 1867 Act prior to 1884, and that Thompson worked
with the ABA and Congressman Poland to enact the 1885 Jurisdiction Act to restore a correct and narrow interpretation of the 1867
Act.
Liebman contends that "[t]he most common criticism" of
Bator is that he ignores "the Court's repeated statements that state
court review need only occur 'in the first instance' or 'in advance
of' habeas corpus review ....16' But the seven cases Liebman
cites-within the context of the one hundred twenty-four cases (at
least) on habeas that the Court decided between the Civil War
and Frank v. Mangum-can hardly be called "repeated statements."2 Moreover, Liebman acknowledges, in criticizing Peller's
357
358
359
360
361
362

Liebman, supra note 1. at 2053.
Id. at 2051 (quoting Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 247 (1895)).
Id. at 2041.
Id. at 2064.
Id. at 2044.
Id. at 2045 n.264 (citing Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1907) and
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thesis, that these cases also contain language suggesting that lhe
petitioner must be left -to a writ of error. 3" But, most importantly, the language in these seven cases is mere dictum. Peller and
Liebman can cite few, if any cases in which the Court actually did
review constitutional claims after a state court (with jurisdiction)
reviewed the case. Professor Bator's analysis of these cases is unimpeached. As he wrote, "the 'discretionary' nature of the trial
courts' power to postpone habeas was rather illusory, for whenever
the trial court granted the writ prior to exhaustion of state remedies ... the Supreme Court reversed."" Bator did not conclude, as Liebman says, that the Court's exhaustion doctrine was
legally "preclusive," only that the Court did not, in fact, review
constitutional claims on habeas where state courts had jurisdiction
to decide the questions."
Professor Liebman also contends that Frank and Moore are
indistinquishable because the petitioners had the "same opportunity" to litigate their claims in the state courts in both cases. While
he argues that neither Brennan-Peller nor Bator have a completely
coherent explanation for the divergent outcomes, neither does
Liebman and neither did the Court. Justices Harlan and Powell
came to see them as factually distinct, and this view was shared by
the Court in several opinions and by contemporary scholars.'

Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 195 (1892)); see also id. at 2047 n.285 (citing, in addition,
Whitten, 160 U.S. 'at 242; New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89, 93-95 (1894); Ex parte Royall,
117 U.S. 241, 251-53 (1886); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1898)).
In a similar vein, Liebman cites only three cases to support his view of the Court's
"suprisingly frequent use" of the writ on behalf of state officials. Id. at 2051 n.306.
363 Id. at 2047.
364 Bator, supra note 27, at 478 n.87 (citing Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179 (1907);
Minnesota v. Brundage, 180 U.S. 499 (1901); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899); Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898); New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89 (1894)).
Similarly, subsequent cases held that habeas should be denied while a prisoner
seeks to vindicate his federal rights in state appellate courts and through state
postconviction procedures. And still another line of cases established that even
after all state remedies were exhausted, habeas corpus should be denied and the
prisoner put to his writ of error in the. United States Supreme Court.
Id. at 479 nn.89-91.
365 Liebman, supra note 1, at 2044. Liebman himself writes that the Court's language
"in the first instance" or "in advance" suggests an "as if"-"as if a 'second instance' of
federal review was to occur in the wake-of state court review." Id. at 2044-45. But the 'as
if" did not in fact occur except in a limited number of cases like Loney and Neagle which
the Court itself called "exceptional" in Heny v. HenkeL See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
366 See supra notes 268-80 and accompanying text; see also Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S.
114 (1944). One contemporary commentator concluded that the issue in Frank and Moore
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The question for contemporary policy and jurisprudence, however,
is whether the broad federal habeas review of Brown v. Allen or
Fay v. Noia is dictated or justified by either Frank/Moore or the
Court's jurisprudence before tiem. In fact, neither Frank nor
Moore nor the Court's preceeding jurisprudence justify the break
in Brown v. Allen.
The essential problem with Professor Liebman's thesis is his
reference to jurisdictional questions as representing constitutional
due process decisions. Following Peller, Liebman conflates these
two, saying that the Court's jurisdiction doctrine, in effect, was
almost identical to the scope of its contemporary interpretation of
due process. 67 Though creative, the fatal defect in this theory is
that the Court never tied its jurisdiction doctrine to the leading
due process cases of the day. Those cases simply are not cited in
the Court's habeas jurisprudence. The connection that Peller and
Liebman would like to find was in fact never made by the
Court.s The jurisdiction cases, not the due process cases, are
relevant because they are the cases the Court relied on in its habeas decisions.
3.

Woolhandler: Habeas as Evolving Remedy

Professor Ann Woolhandler has added an additional perspective on the Court's jurisdiction doctrine."' Her thesis is that
both Peller and Bator focus too narrowly on the habeas cases and
that the analysis would profit from focusing, as she proposes, on
"the broader context of the evolving patterns of remedies against
government available in the federal courts."370 She concludes:

was "how much weight is to be given the determination of the state courts as to the
existence of due process." Charles B. Nutting, The Supreme Court, The Fourteenth Amendment
and State Criminal Cases, 3 U. CHI. L. REv. 244, 256 (1935). See also Note, Federal Habeas
Corpus as a Means of Review of State Decisions, 73 U. PA. L. REV. 430, 431 (1925) (stating
that the Court in Frank held "that there was not sufficient evidence of mob violence.").
367 The leading due process decision of the day stated that "Due process of law,
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require the state to adopt a particular form of procedure, so long as it appears that the accused has had sufficient notice of the accusation and an adequate opportunity to defend himself in the prosecution." Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 435 (1905); see also Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880) (reversing conviction on due process and equal protection grounds because blacks
were excluded by law from grand jury service).
368 See, e.g., Nutting, supra note 366, at 255-56 ("In the main it seems evident that
the limitations [on habeas] thus imposed have been adhered to in practice." (citing
Loney and Neagle)).

369

Woolhandler, supra note 28.

370

Id. at 580.
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[T]he federal habeas remedy was not uniformly available to
address all constitutional wrongs arising in criminal cases in the
nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the scope of habeas review
reflected the Court's gradual willingness to address ad hoc or
random acts of official illegality... as constitutional violations
rather than common law violations, and to provide federal
remedies for such abuses.37'
As a result, Professor Woolhandler contends that "the process of
transforming common law violations into constitutional violations
supports a full review model of habeas, even if claiming for it an
72
evolutionary rather than a static pedigree."
Professor Woolhandler is critical of Peller's analysis in several
ways. She disputes his expansive reading of Nielsen, noting that it
was "consistent with" federal habeas cases "decided before the
Court had appellate jurisdiction" and that the Nelsen Court itself
"continued to state that habeas review was more limited than direct review.""7 8 She concludes that "little evidence supports his
interpretation of the language in the [Court's jurisdiction] cases
relating to limitations on the scope of habeas review"" and that
the Court's "cross-referencing of federal and state cases is inconsistent with the view [Peller's] that in state prisoner cases writs of
habeas corpus and direct review were coextensive." 75 She points
7
out the problems with Peller's argument that Pennoyer v. Neff
was a direct review case in which the Court's due process analysis
was limited to focus on the Court's jurisdiction, noting that it
involved not direct review but "a collateral attack on a civil judgment." Thus, "the Court allowed habeas to the same extent that it
would entertain a collateral attack on a civil judgment-that is,
only on very. narrow grounds." 7 7 Professor Woolhandler also
points out that Peller overlooks the fact that the Court addressed
equal protection claims of jury discrimination on direct review
(Neal v. Delawar 78) but refused to do so on habeas review (In re

371
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373
374.
375
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377
378

Id.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 597 n.140.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 599.
95 U.S. 714 (1878).
Woolhandler, supra note 28, at 600.
.103 U.S. 370 (1881).
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that "it

is

probably correct to place habeas in the context of its historical
limitation to questions of jurisdiction and to recognize, as Bator
did, that the scope of habeas was not coextensive with direct review.""81

Unfortunately, Professor Woolhandler entirely overlooks the
common law history of habeas and Chief Justice Marshall's reliance on the English Act of 1679 in Watkins, implying that Marshall
created the jurisdiction limitation from contemporary American
case law. To this she adds musings about Chief Justice Marshall's
subjective motives for the Watkins decision, but provides no documentation.382 She finds "contradictory strands" in Watkins---"the
assertion that habeas is limited to a narrow version of jurisdictional review, and its statement that habeas is in the nature of an
appeal or writ of error"-when there is no contradiction."' And
she concludes that these "make sense in terms of the common
purpose of upholding federal judicial supremacy," when there is a
more straightforward understanding based on the English limitations on habeas to which Marshall clearly appealed. Ultimately,
then, like Peller and Liebman, Professor Woolhandler fails to take
Watkins at face value.
Essentially, Woolhandler's criticism of Bator is that he gave
"insufficient attention to the alternative definitions of 'jurisdiction,'" and "understated the importance of deviations from the
jurisdictional rule in two important respects"-mischaracterizing
both the Court's consideration of the constitutionality of statutes
and its consideration of "illegal sentences" as "narrow exception[s]
to the jurisdictional rule." 4 Professor Woolhandler provides a
well-written, lucid description of the growth of federal jurisdiction
and the Court's interpretation of unconstitutional acts after Reconstruction. The problem, however, is that she fails to tie her broad
discussion of nineteenth century jurisdiction case law to the
Court's habeas jurisprudence. They coexisted, but there is little, if

379 140 U.S. 278 (1891).
380 140,U.S. 291 (1891).
381 Woolhandler, supra note 28, at 600.
382 See, e.g., id. at 592-93 ("Indeed, to protect federal judicial supremacy, Marshall had
to decide Watkins in a way that insulated federal court judgments from merit-based collateral attacks . . . Marshall's concern in Watkins was that any ruling allowing broad collateral review of federal judgments would undermine federal judicial authority.").
383 See supra notes 305-14 and accompanying text.
384 Woolhandler, supra note 28 at 602.
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any, evidence that the Court relied on broadening notions of
jurisdiction in its habeas jurisprudence. The two developments
coincided, but Woolhandler does not show cause and effect.'
If Woolhandler's argument is that the Court's definition of
jurisdiction for purposes of its habeas jurisdiction doctrine was
expanding, this is uniformly acknowledged. She does not show
that corresponding developments in federal jurisdiction did influence the Court on habeas, nor does she show that these developments could have provided a legitimate rationale for the Court's
broadening of habeas in or after Frank or Moore. That doctrinal
developments allowed an expanded examination of constitutional
claims under other federal statutes does not show that such a result in habeas was justified by the language or legislative history of
the 1867 Act. The categories defined by the Court in Henry v.
Henkel are not explained by reference to other areas of law, nor is
the Court's implicit dispensing of the jurisdiction rationale in
Johnson v. Zerbst 6 or Waley v. Johnsons 7 justified by developments in other areas of law.
V.

CONCLUSION: HISTORY AND HABEAS

The reliance on general history rather than text by proponents of broad federal habeas review reflects, perhaps, doubt that
the 1867 Congress really intended to change the nature of habeas
corpus rather than simply expand the class of persons to encompass freedmen who might apply to federal court. The text, in fact,
does not demonstrate an intent to change the nature of habeas,
and the legislative history of the 1867 Act positively refutes the
notion. The history of the 1885 jurisdiction act confirms this view.
The Court's construction of the 1867 Act, with many fits and
starts over the years, demonstrates the problem of judges appealing to broad notions of general history in interpreting statutes.
The ultimate issue in statutory construction is one of political and
constitutional authority-what institution of government is en-

385 For example, Professor Woolhandler cites United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196
(1892). Lee is a poor example of the intersection of due process, jurisdiction, and habeas
corpus. This was a suit by Lee to recover possession of a parcel of land in Virginia.
Habeas corpus is referred to only in passing and that is dictum, and the case really
stands for the proposition that, except where Congress has provided, the United States
cannot be sued.
386 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
387 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
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dowed with the authority to create or revise the law at issue? Professor Willard Hurst's comment, made in the context of constitutional interpretation, applies, perhaps even more forcefully, to
statutory interpretation: "If the idea of a document of superior
legal authority is to have meaning, terms which have a precise,
history-filled content to those who draft and adopt the document
must be held to that precise meaning." '

Resort to unauthoritative sources from general history has led
to embarrassing arguments to support broad federal habeas review.
For example, what authority should be given to a supposed "misplaced parenthesis" in the English Act of 1679? Professor Paul
Freund was appointed by the Supreme Court in 1951 to argue
5 9 and filed a brief that supported a
United States v. Hayman,"
broad conception of the history of habeas. Freund countered the
previously unassailed (and since unchallenged) understanding that
habeas corpus was not available to convicted criminals under the
English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 by arguing that "a misplaced
parenthesis has distorted the true reading of the Act."39 Relying
only on the "misplaced parenthesis" and Bushell's Case (a contempt
case), Freund contended that habeas was available to convicted
criminals at common law.391 The Government, in reply, rightly

388 Willard Hurst, The Role of History, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 55, 57
(Edmond Cahn ed., 1954).
389 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
390 See Brief for the Respondent at 31-32, and Reply Brief for the United States at
21-23, United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (No. 23).(on file at Harper Memorial Library, University of Chicago). Freund's argument is relied on in Wiecek, supra note
139, at 531-32; Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Supension Clause: Is There a Constitutional
Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 874 n.49, 887
n.129 (1994); Mello & Duffy, supra note 335, at 461 n.54, 462-63.
Freund found this "misplaced parenthesis" in the difference between the following
two sentences: "it shall and may be lawful to and for the person or persons so committed or detained (other than persons convict or in execution by legal process) . . . to
appeal or complain to the lord chancellor or lord keeper" (the standard version of the
1679 Act) versus "it shall and may be lawfull to and for the the person or persons so
committed or detained (other than persons Convict or in Execution) by Legal Process .. . to complaine to the Lord Chauncellor" (Freund's version). For Freund, the
second version (with "legal process" outside the parenthesis) was more inclusive, meaning
"convicted persons were wholly excepted from the section, leaving their rights to be
worked out through the common-law writ." Brief at 31-32 (again without citation). This
theory confounds the entire historical understanding that the 1679 Act was an improvement over the common law because it codified or "enforced" it, as Chief Justice Marshall
concluded in Watkins.
391 Freund's only cited authority refutes him:
As the Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, applied only to cases where persons were detained in custody for some criminal or supposed criminal matter, the benefit of
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suggested that "this Court will doubtless be anxious to know who
misplaced the parenthesis in the Act of 1679. ''s92 No mention was
made in the Court's Hayman decision of the "misplaced parenthesis," although the Court cited Watkins to restate that "at common
law a judgment of conviction rendered by a court of general
criminal jurisdiction was conclusive proof that confinement was
legal" and that "[s]uch a judgment prevented issuance of the writ
without more.""9 3 Eleven years later, however, Justice Brennan
relied on Freund's "misplaced parenthesis" and Bushell's Case in
Fay v. Noiad to conclude that habeas at common law extended
to convicted prisoners."5 This "history" was thoroughly disparaged by scholars, but of such arguments has judicial expansion of
federal habeas been made.
The legal case for broad habeas review is a house of cards. It
must disregard the text and history of the 1867 Act. And its use of
Supreme Court decisions begs the essential question-what is precedent? The cases on which advocates rely-Nielsen, Lange, Siebold,

its provisions in facilitating the issue of the writ did not extend to cases of illegal deprivation of liberty otherwise than on a criminal charge, as, for example,
where children were unlawfully detained from their parents or guardians by
persons who where not entitled to their custody, where a person was wrongfully
kept under restraint as a lunatic, or where a person was illegally kept in confinement by another. In all such cases the issue of the writ during vacation
depended solely upon the common law, and remained unregulated by statute
until the year 1816 ....
10 LAwS OF ENGLAND 44 (Halsbury ed. 1909). Duker agrees. See DUKER, supra note 28, at
273 n.3.
392 Reply Brief for the United States .at 23, United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205
(1952) (No. 23).
393 Hayman, 342 U.S. at 211. Without analysis, however, the Court preemptorily stated
that "Congress changed the common-law rule" in the 1867 Act (citing dictum in Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), and other
post-Moore cases). Id. at 211-12 nn.10 & 12.
394 372 U.S. 391, 403-04 n.13 (1963).
395 Id. Two years after he argued Hayman, Freund suggested at an academic conference that the Supreme Court had power to expand habeas corpus because there was an
"organic element" in the institution. See Hurst, supra note 388, at 61. Freund's argument,
however, ignored the Court's conclusions in Watkins that the English Habeas Corpus Act
of 1679 "enforces the common law" and that Congress effectively adopted the Act of
1679 in the Judiciary Act of 1789 by leaving "habeas corpus" undefined. Professor
Freund's view, however, was untethered from history. Freund's notion that habeas corpus
had a "dynamic element" and that the "courts of England were capable of developing
the writ" ignores the authority of both Parliament and the Congress over the courts' construction of the common law. Parliament codified, but did not expand, the common law
with the English Act of 1679, and the Supreme Court made clear in Bollman and Watkins
that federal court power vis-a-vis habeas corpus was derived from Congress and not from
a general appeal to common law notions.
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Whitten or Tyler-were never taken to mean what the advocates
contend. When the Court expanded habeas in Frank or Moore, or
afterwards, these cases were virtually never relied upon. Basically,
the Court expanded habeas for federal prisoners and incorporated
these decisions into its application of the 1867 Act-simple ipse
dixit.
An appeal to history in statutory interpretation must delineate
what is authoritative. If judges are untethered from text and history, they are free to consider unauthoritative factors and, by sleight
of hand, to contract or enlarge Congress's purposes. This is demonstrated by Justice Brennan's opinion in Fay, where he relied on
extraneous incidents like Parliamentary bills that were never
passed by Parliament, and English cases, like Bushell's Case, which
had nothing to do with freeing criminal defendants after conviction. Greater respect is due to Congress's purposes.
Precedent and stare decisis in the Court's construction of the
1867 Act have gone unmentioned in most Supreme Court habeas
corpus decisions. This started at least as early as Frank and Moore,
where no recognition was made that the Court was significantly
altering federal habeas jurisdiction. Supreme Court precedents
which more narrowly interpreted the history of habeas and the
1867 Act were implicitly or explicitly overruled in favor of broader
interpretations in Moore v. Dempsey, Brown v. Allen, and Fay v. Noia.
Conversely, much of Fay was overturned in Wainwright v. Sykes?96
and Coleman v. Thompson," 7 and a significant part of Townsend
was overturned in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes.398 The rule of Brown v.
Allen-that any constitutional claims can be raised on federal habeas without regard to the jurisdiction of the state courts or the corrective process provided-still stands, but federal court consideration of those claims now requires that a prisoner satisfy a number
of procedural rules. These rules include "cause and prejudice" for
procedural defaults and successive petitions and retroactivity for
new rules. Most of these decisions have not explicitly mentioned
the relevance of stare decisis.
Stare decisis et quieta non movere (or stare decisis for short) means
to "stand by what has been decided and not disturb what is at
rest." Stare decisis in judicial decision making is intended to promote stability, continuity, consistency, and orderly development in

396
397
398

433 U.S. 72 (1977).
501 U.S. 722 (1991).
504 U.S. 1 (1992).
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the law. But stare decisis is "not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision . . .", In Desist v. United States,4°'
for example, Justice Harlan considered Fay v. Noia far from settled
law. Why are stability, continuity, and consistency important? Not
for their own sakes, ultimately, but because they promote respect
for the law and the authority which promulgates the law-the
people or their representatives. In statutory construction, the
Court's interpretation must reflect proper respect for the preeminent lawmaking function of Congress in our constitutional system.
In the context of the Court's interpretation of the habeas
corpus statutes, however, there has been much change and little
stability over the 125 years since the 1867 Act was passed. Watkins
was the governing Supreme Court decision throughout the nineteenth century.412 The jurisdiction doctrine survived at least until
Frank and Moore. It was further diminished by procedural rulings
until Brown allowed the presentation of all constitutional claims,
subject to the adequate and independent state ground rule. That
lasted only ten years, until Fay v. Noia eliminated the rule. Fay was
subjected to immediate and sustained criticism both within and
outside the Court, and Fay's elimination of the adequate and independent rule lasted only fourteen years, until Wainwright v.
Sykes. Further procedural limitations on the dictum of Fay have
coritinued in the sixteen years since Wainwright.
The notion that limits on federal habeas jurisdiction began
with the Rehnquist Court downplays the actual criticism of expansive federal habeas jurisdiction, and of Brown and Fay, which has
been growing since Justice Jackson's original opinion in Brown.
Justice Harlan picked up the theme in his dissent in Fay v. Noia,
which he continued in his dissents in Henry v. Mississippi, Desist v.
United States, and Mackey v. United States. Justice Black also criticized the use of habeas in Kaufman v. United States0 3 in 1969.
Justice Powell adopted Justice Harlan's criticisms and thoroughly
articulated them in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 4°' in 1973. His dis-

399 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Vasquez v.
'Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO.
LJ. 1361 (1988).
400 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
401 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
402 See supra notes 208-15, 267, 314 and accompanying text.
403 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
404 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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sent in Schneckloth became the majority opinion four years later in
Stone v. PowelL4 5 Criticism of expansive habeas jurisdiction was
40 7
6
also expressed in Castaneda v. Partidal and Brewer v. Williams
in 1977, and by Justice Blackmun in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court4 8 and in Rose v. Mitchell' in 1979. Judge Henry Friendly,
a revered federal court judge, also levied criticism against expansive habeas jurisdiction in a famous 1970 law review article, which
has since been cited regularly by the Court.4 1 Following on Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Fay and Justice Powell's criticism of expansive habeas in Schneckloth and Stone, a majority of the
Court soon came to emphasize principles of finality, comity, federalism, and fairness.
Ultimately, judicial opinion and scholarly commentary up to
Fay recognized that the Court's habeas jurisprudence had become
as much (or more) a matter of policy judgments or equitable
considerations as a matter of statutory construction. Indeed, such
judgments go back to the Court's first decision construing the
1867 statute in Royall after its appellate jurisdiction was restored.4 ' In a 1961 law review article, Justice Brennan wrote that
"administration in the exercise of the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction when invoked by state prisoners" was a problem of "choosing well" where "[Ithe reality often is that logical consistency will
no more demand one outcome than another."" 2 The generality

405 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
406 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
407 430 U.S. 387, 428-29 (1977) (Burger, J., dissenting).
408 410 U.S. 484, 501 (1973) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
409 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
410 Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on CriminalJudgments, 38
U. CHm. L. REv. 142 (1970). Judge Friendly's "model" of federal habeas for state prisoners would go beyond the historic function of habeas because habeas was not intended to
oversee a trial court's determination of guilt; that was the function not of habeas but of
the appeal process.
411 This was also implied by Justice Frankfurter in Brown where he noted that it was
"important... to lay down as specifically as the nature of the problem permits the standards or directions that should govern the District Judges in the disposition of applications for habeas corpus . . . ." 344 U.S. 443, 501-502 (1953). It was more explicitly noted
by Justice Jackson in Brown, where he lamented the lack of practical guidance from the
federal habeas statutes. This reality has since been acknowledged by Justice Brennan and
Justice Stevens in Wainwright in 1977. 433 U.S. 72, 100-101 n.2 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 96 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring). Similarly, Professor Bator in his 1963
article emphasized the necessity of "functional, institutional, and political considerations."
Bator, supra note 27, at 449.
412 William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in
Federalism, 7 UTAI-I L. REV. 423, 423-24 (1961). After reviewing the impact of the incorporation doctrine in imposing on the states certain federal procedural guarantees for
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of the language of the 1867 Act and subsequent amendments
simply does not provide for many contingencies that the courts
have faced since the expansion of habeas corpus in 1953 in Brown
v. Allen. As faithfully as a judge might read the federal statutory
language, policy judgments of one kind or another were inevitable
once the traditional function and guidelines governing habeas at
common law were completely thrown off in Brown and Fay.
The contention has been made that, whatever dispute may be
made over the history of habeas corpus, Congress settled the issue
by adopting Brown in its 1966 amendments to the federal habeas
statutes.4 1 s But Congress's 1966 amendments were quite limited.
Congress amended section 2244 by eliminating the words "or of
any state" from the 1948 version, and by adding two additional
subsections. 4 The 1948 version provided that no federal judge
was "required to entertain" a habeas petition by a federal or state
prisoner "if it appears that the legality of such detention" was
determined on a prior application and "the petition presents no
new ground not theretofore presented and determined" and the
judge is satisfied "the ends of justice will not be served" by reviewing the petition.4" 5 The 1966 amendment struck petitions by
"state" prisoners from this section and added new provisions. Subsection (b) provides that a second petition "need not be entertained" if (1) the application alleges a factual or other ground not
adjudicated on the prior petition, and (2) unless the judge is
satisfied that the applicant did not (a) "deliberately" withhold the
"newly asserted ground" or (b) "otherwise abuse the writ." The
"abuse of the writ" phrase has been a fertile source for judicial
discretion. Section (c) provides that a Supreme Court judgment

state prisoners, Justice Brennan wrote that "throughout the entire reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal habeas corpus statute empowers a single federal judge,
sitting at nisi prius, to set aside state convictions affirmed by the highest state court. You
will easily see that to confer such a jurisdiction was a step of major proportions .
Id. at 424. This implicitly imputes the foreknowledge of the Supreme Court's incorporation doctrine of the 1950s and 1960s back upon the 1867 Congress and implies that
Congress intended to give federal courts power that the Supreme Court would not create
until 90 years later. Through such "anticipatory legislative history," the Court's expansion
of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction after 1953 was implicitly imputed to the legislative
intent of the 1867 Congress.
413 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 507-08, 528-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Congress
has legislatively accepted [the Court's] interpretation of congressional intent as to the
necessary scope and function of habeas relief.").
414 Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L No. 89-711, 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. (80 Stat.) 1104, 129093.
415 Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 965 (1948).
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on appeal or certiorari "shall be conclusive as to all issues of fact
or law with respect to an asserted denial of a Federal right...
actually adjudicated by the Supreme Court" unless (a) the petitioner pleads and the court finds a new material and controlling
fact not in the Supreme Court record and (b) the court finds that
the petitioner "could not have caused such fact to appear in the
record "by the exercise of reasonable diligence." Congress also
amended section 2254 and added subsections (d), (e), and (f) to
establish deferential standards for the federal review of factual
determinations in state proceedings. Under subsection (d), state
court determinations of factual questions supported by written
documentation "shall be presumed to be correct" unless any of
eight conditions appears. 4 6 The Senate Report accompanying the
legislation makes no reference whatsoever to the Court's decisions
in Fay or Townsend. The Report makes clear that Congress sought
"to alleviate the unnecessary burden by introducing a greater de417
gree of finality of judgments in habeas corpus proceedings.
Subsections (b) and (c) were intended "to add . .. provisions for
a qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata." Section (d)
creates a presumption of correction and imposes the burden on
the petitioner "to establish by convincing evidence that the factual
determination by the State court was erroneous."418
Consequently, the stare decisis claim based on the 1966 amendments seems to be more an argument from silence: If Congress
does not affirmatively overturn a Supreme Court interpretation of
a federal statute, that interpretation is deemed adopted by Congress and not subject to judicial change. It seems just as clear that
Congress amended section 2254 to limit specific effects of Fay and
Townsend on federalism and the state courts, but nothing more.
Given the history of the 1867 Act, the 1885 jurisdiction act,
and the Court's interpretation of the 1867 Act through Brown, the
certainty of the correctness of Brown or Fay in their interpretation
of the purpose of the 1867 law is quite strained. Likewise, given
the evolution in doctrine from Frank to Brown to Fay to Wainwright
to Teague v. Lane, adherence to whatever is left of Fay and Brown

416 Act of Oct. 23, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-504, 80 Stat. 1104, 1105 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (1982)).
417 S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3663, 3664; see also H.R. Rep. No. 1892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); 112 CONG. REc.
21,754 (1966) (House vote); 112 CONG. REc. 27,974 (1966) (Senate Report).
418 S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3665.
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cannot be said to promote real stability, continuity, or consistency
in the law. What is left is essentially a policy judgment as to the
value and necessity of a second tier of federal appeal over and
above the criminal justice system of the states and direct federal
review. This is the Court's policy, not Congress's.

